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THE EFFECT OF NATIONAL CULTURE ON PARTNER BUYOUTS IN CROSS-BORDER
BIOTECHNOLOGY ALLIANCES
ABSTRACT

This study examines how national culture influences the likelihood and rate of buyouts
among R&D equity alliances and joint ventures in the biotechnology industry. We hypothesize
that the interaction of specific national culture attributes and cultural differences between alliance
partners bear upon: a) the amount of endogenous uncertainty surrounding the potential
integration of the target firm and b) the marginal rate of learning in hierarchical versus
collaborative governance. Applying a competing hazard model to a sample of 173 joint ventures
and minority equity collaborations in the biotechnology industry, we found that investing firms
from high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance countries are more likely to buyout
their alliance partners. Furthermore, greater cultural distance between alliance partners increases
the likelihood of partner buyout when investing firms are from high power distance countries.

2

As knowledge-intensive industries become increasingly global, high tech firms are
confronted with the strategic challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with cross-border
alliances. Indeed, considerable managerial and scholarly attention has been paid to not only the
benefits of such alliances, but also on the transactional difficulties wrought by alliance partners
from different national cultures. However, most of these efforts have focused on the choice of
initial governance mode (e.g., Erramilli, 1996; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Shane, 1993). The present
study is motivated in three respects. First, it is becoming clear that governance decisions may
involve a strategy to sequentially invest equity in an alliance partner over time (Chang, 1995;
Penner-Hahn, 1998). Second, partnerships often terminate with acquisition (Folta, 1998; Hurry,
Kogut, 1991; Miller & Bowman, 1992) as opposed to other forms of termination, such as
dissolution or third party buyouts. Third, little research to date has explicitly examined whether
national culture characteristics influence patterns of sequential investment and the particular
mode of alliance termination.
This paper is an attempt to fill the gaps noted above by examining the role of national
culture on the likelihood and rate of buyouts among R&D equity alliances and joint ventures in
the biotechnology industry. Partner buyouts are a relatively common occurrence in other
knowledge-intensive industries. For example, Park and Russo (1996) found that 16.2 percent of
joint ventures in the electronics industry were acquired within three years of founding, while
Choi (1991) has found that 13.6 percent of minority investments ended in acquisition within one
year of initiation. I Yet, despite their frequency, very few studies have explicitly treated partner
buyouts as a distinct form of partnership termination. This is unfortunate because Park and
Russo (1996) and Park and Ungson (1997) argue that termination by acquisition and termination
by dissolution may be driven by entirely different factors.
3

Like our study, Kogut (1991) examined the partner buyout decision through an option theory
lens. Whereas his study examines the role of exogenous factors on buyouts, our focus is on
endogenous uncertainty and the impact of national culture. To date, only Park and Ungson
(1997) have examined the role of national culture on the partner buyout decision. They reveal
some evidence that cultural distance increases the likelihood of buyout of the joint venture, even
after controlling for other important factors such as organizational and operational differences
between partners, the type of transaction, and the incidence of prior transactions between
partners. Unfortunately, since their focus was termination by dissolution, they do not develop
any a priori theoretical arguments about the determinants of buyouts. Neither do they offer any
empirical evidence regarding the effects of dimensions of culture other than cultural distance.
There are other reasons to believe that national culture may play an important role in the
partner buyout decision. Chang (1995) and Hurry et al. (1992) found that sequential investment
patterns were found to differ across U.S. and Japanese venture capital firms. Relative to U.S.
firms, Japanese firms exhibit incremental approaches to expansion. Subsequent to news
indicating venture success, Japanese venture capital firms tended to upgrade a venture investment
to a joint venture or acquisition, while U.S. firms tended to sell their ownership stake. Chang
(1995) questions whether the sequential investment pattern holds for western firms, reasoning
that cultural and institutional background of non-western firm favor an incremental and
evolutionary approach to investment. Although he does not test this proposition, he encourages
study of the matter.
Hofstede (1980) defined national culture as the collective programming of the human mind.
His dimensions of culture are well known and include uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
masculinity-femininity, and individualism and vary considerably across countries.
4

Understanding which cultural dimensions bear upon the decision to buyout a partner may shed
. light on several important issues. For instance, investing firms in knowledge-intensive industries
would benefit from knowing how target firms from different cultures tend to respond to
sequential investment behavior by partners. This ex ante knowledge may prove helpful in
negotiating the terms of R&D equity collaborations. Similarly, collaborating firms would be
advised to understand whether foreign partners are likely to consider them an acquisition
candidate. At a broader level, national culture may have significant implications for
understanding the level and type of commitment firms make in emerging, high tech industries.
We explicitly examine the effects of national culture on the rate of partner buyout across
twelve different countries. Our hypotheses are developed using aggregate measures of cQltural
distance by Hofstede (1980) and Ronen and Shenkar (1985), as well as more specific dimensions
of culture relating to the investing firm. Using a time varying model, we test these hypotheses on
a sample of minority investments and joint ventures in the biotechnology industry. In the past
two decades, the biotechnology industry has grown explosively, largely due to the recognition
that biotechnology could disrupt old markets, create new products, and cheapen current
manufacturing process. Virtually every developed country has targeted leadership in
biotechnology as a national goal (Office of Technology Assessment, 1991).

BACKGROUND

Following Kogut (1991), we characterize R&D equity collaborations as a two-stage
compound option; whereby investing firms holding a limited equity stake in a target firm can
track knowledge development and (market and technological) opportunities in industries. Such
equity collaborations allow firms to maintain strategic flexibility to respond to industry trends
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that are difficult to predict. Following the initial equity investment, exercise of the first stage of
the option is represented by the full acquisition of a target partner. In the case of R&D
partnerships where an investing firm has taken a minority equity stake, partner buyout refers to
the acquisition of the R&D supplier/partner. Partner buyout for joint ventures refers to the
acquisition of the joint venture by one of the parents. 2 Exercise of the second stage growth
option is represented by making further discretionary investments in research or commercial
opportunities resulting from the first stage commitment. In this view, equIty collaborations may
be initiated as a way to manage endogenous and exogenous uncertainty. Exogenous and
endogenous uncertainty have different effects on the decision to commit additional capital (Dixit
& Pindyck, 1994; Rivoli & Salorio, 1996).
Exogenous uncertainty cannot be reduced by the actions of the firm. In the case of emerging
technology industries, exogenous uncertainty exists when, for example, the technological
trajectory of the industry is indeterminate, industry infrastructure is lacking, and/or when key
legislation affecting the industry is pending. Given these conditions, the premature acquisition of
firms developing emerging technologies may impose considerable risks because the investing
firm gives up the option of waiting for new information that might affect the desirability or
timing of the investment. The ability to delay irreversible investment expenditures until
exogenous uncertainty is resolved can be an important source of flexibility in a project and
profoundly affect subsequent decisions to invest (McDonald & Siegel, 1986).
By contrast, endogenous uncertainty can be decreased by actions of the firm. Potential
sources of endogenous uncertainty for the investing firm include: expansion into unfamiliar
international markets, integration of firms from diverse cultures, initiation of R&D projects that
take time to develop, or inability to assess the target firm's knowledge. This form of uncertainty
6

is primarily resolved by learning; that is, actually performing the activities associated with a
given project. Previous research suggests that greater endogenous uncertainty increases the value
of information, and thus, increases incentives to invest in knowledge generation or acquisition
(McCardle, 1985). In the presence of endogenous uncertainty, the key characteristic that makes
the investment in knowledge so attractive is the ability to temporarily or permanently suspend
further equity investment if the expected value of the completed projects declines due to
exogenous shocks. Roberts and Weitzman (1981) have shown that if learning is enhanced by
moving to the next stage of the project, there is an incentive to speed up the rate of conunitment.
We argue that it is the combination of endogenous uncertainty and enhanced learning by
moving to the next stage that motivates the decision to conunit incrementally. This staged
investment approach takes on value when internalizing the partner increases the rate of learning
about the project. In this sense, exercising the buyout of a partner is comparable to the exercise
of a call option on equities that pay dividends. In the presence of dividends (that come in th<;
form of learning advantages) there may be an incentive to exercise the partner buyout option
early. If the target turns out to have skills that are relevant for the partner but cannot be easily
transferred across firm boundaries after a brief interchange, a buyout may be the only viable
alternatives. Relative to arm's-length contracts, internalization facilitates transfer of
technological capabilities because the acquirer can tap into its repository of social knowledge that
structures cooperative action. According to Kogut and Zander (1992), this difference in the
marginal efficiency of technology transfer constitutes the ownership advantage of the firm. 3
Internalizing the partner firm may increase the efficiency of knowledge transfer, thus enabling
the firm to reduce future R&D costs so that growth opportunities can be exercised at a lower
cost.
7

In sum, there are at least three important factors which need consideration when examining
determinants of partner buyouts: (1) the level of exogenous uncertainty, (2) the level of
endogenous uncertainty, and (3) the relative rate of learning inside versus outside firm
boundaries. Unless endogenous uncertainty (2) is present, the relative rate of learning inside
versus outside the firm (3) will have no consequence. This implies an interaction effect. In this
paper, we focus explicitly on the expected interaction between endogenous uncertainty and
learning. In the presence of endogenous uncertainty firms will invest sequentially when such
commitment yields information about future opportunities. Firms that learn more efficiently in

hierarchies are candidates to buyout their partners.

In the next section we describe our main thesis: that national culture traits and cultural
differences between partners should contribute to endogenous uncertainty and rates of learning in
hierarchy, and therefore, should bear upon the buyout decision.

HYPOTHESES

When valuable, but unexplored technology is resident in a target firm, investing firms differ
in terms of how learning activities are to be organized. Consistent with previous research (e.g.,
Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1991; Olie, 1994; Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; Powell, Koput & SmithDoerr, 1996), we argue that the cultural attributes of among investing firms are principal
determinants of how firms choose to organize learning activities. We motivate our hypotheses
using two of Hofstede's (1980) dimensions of national culture: power distance and uncertainty

avoidance. We believe that these two dimensions are the most relevant in the study of partner
buyouts for several reasons. First, as noted by Hofstede, "Of the four dimensions of national
culture, power distance and uncertainty avoidance in particular affect our thinking about
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organizations. Organizing always demand the answering of two questions: (1) Who has the
power to deCide what? And (2) What rules or procedures will be followed to attain the desired
ends?" (1991: 140).4 In contrast, Hofstede believes that while his other two dimensions,
masculinity and individualism, broadly reflect the values of the national culture, they imply little
about administrative practices within organizations. Consistent with the importance placed on
power distance and uncertainty avoidance inside organizations, these two dimensions have been
the most pervasive in research examining the behaviors of multinational corporation as
evidenced by the work of Erramilli (1996), Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Kogut and Singh
(1988), and Shane (1993). Finally, Hofstede (1991) argues that various combinations of power
distance and uncertainty avoidance correspond directly to each of Mintzberg' s (1983) preferred
authority configurations and coordinating mechanisms, thereby capturing both national and
organizational traits. It seems that power distance and uncertainty avoidance are the most
distinctive cultural dimensions which influence organizational structure and functioning
(Hoecklin, 1995).
We argue that power distance of a national culture will influence the degree to which the
investing firm can learn in hierarchy. Also, uncertainty avoidance and cultural distance are
argued to contribute to endogenous uncertainty in the equity partner relationship. 5

Power Distance and Learning Inside versus Outside the Firm
As noted, Kogut and Zander (1992) point to the important differences in learning efficiency
across governance modes. They argue that it is more efficient to transfer complex knowledge
within the boundaries of a firm because learning processes are a function of shared values and
assumptions. If national culture embodies social knowledge and organizing principles, it
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therefore bears upon the expected efficiency of learning subsequent to partner buyout. Firms
from certain cultures may learn more efficiently when internalized, while the marginal rate of
learning in hierarchy may be lower for firms from other cultures. Hall (1976) argued that
cultures vary greatly in the processing of information and patterns of communication.
One cultural attribute that should influence the rate of learning in hierarchies relative to
collaborations is power distance (PD). Power Distance is defined as "the extent to which
members of a society accept that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally"
(Hofstede, 1985: 348-349). As applied to organizations, control, decision making, and authority
are likely to be highly centralized (Hofstede, 1980). Acquiring finns from cultures characterized
as high PD operate most comfortably in hierarchy. In such countries, we expect the marginal rate
of learning or technology transfer to be highest in hierarchy. Indeed, Hofstede (1991) discusses
the implications of culture in an important learning context - in schools. In high PD cultures,
such as Japan, learning is structured and hierarchical. By contrast, learning is loose and more
unstructured in low PD cultures.
One might expect that firms from high PD cultures will move directly to outright
acquisition, and avoid the first stage equity collaboration. Consistent with this expectation,
Shane (1993) found that the higher the PD, the greater the likelihood of hierarchical control in
transactions. More recently, Erramilli (1996) found that firms from countries with higher PD are
more likely to seek majority ownership in foreign subsidiaries.
In the absence of endogenous uncertainty, firms from high PD cultures will acquire outright.
However, in the presence of endogenous uncertainty, they will invest incrementally, beginning
with the first stage equity collaboration. Several cultural attributes influence endogenous
uncertainty.
10

Uncertainty Avoidance, Cultural Distance, and Endogenous Uncertainty
The study of national culture on governance modes has predominantly focused on
transaction cost explanations, where the cultural attributes or partner differences in national
culture are expected to moderate the ability of managers to perceive the potential for
opportunistic behavior by partners (Harrigan, 1985). As noted earlier, these transaction costs
were found to be a key determinant for dissolution of equity partnerships and joint ventures and
have been carefully articulated in the literature. Building on previous research, we argue that
uncertainty avoidance (UA) and cultural distance (CD) are two important contributors to

endogenous uncertainty.
Uncertainty avoidance (UA) is defined as the "degree to which the members of a society feel
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, which leads them to support beliefs promising
certainty and to maintain institutions protecting conformity" (Hofstede, 1985: 348-349). In an
organizational context, having high levels of UA leads managers to make less risky decisions and
develop coping mechanisms to control uncertainty, such as developing complex systems of rules
and regulations and following structured, ritual behavior (Hofstede, 1980).
Uncertainty avoidance was shown to be an important predictor of foreign market entry
modes. For instance, Kogut and Singh (1988) found that multinational corporations from
cultures high in UA are more likely to choose joint ventures or greenfield entry modes over full
acquisitions. These authors attribute this result to the fact that the uncertainty associated with
integrating the management teams of both subsidiary and parent firms is untenable. Therefore,
these firms are more comfortable with either a greenfield investment or establishing an equity
partnership with the host county target. Shane (1993) found that firms from high UA societies
favor licensing over acquisition-type entry modes.
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Given their proclivity toward risk avoidance, it is not surprising that finns from high UA
cultures prefer staged investment to outright commitment. At the same time, we expect finns
from high UA cultures to benefit from a transition toward hierarchy because of the added
structure in place to control opportunistic behavior. When finns are from cultures that are also
high in power distance, we expect there is added incentive to internalize the target finn in order
to learn about growth opportunities more efficiently. Our proposition that high PD, high UA
cultures are quicker to internalize appears consistent with arguments made by Hurry et al. (1992)
and Chang (1995), who asserted that Japanese finns, relative to U.S. finns, were more likely to
eventually acquire target firms. By contrast, U.S. finns are more likely to sell their equity
positions in target finns following the target firm's initial public offering. Indeed, according to
Hofstede (1980), the Japanese are ranked significantly higher on both PD and UA compared to
the United States.

Hypothesis 1: When established finns are from cultures ranked high in uncertainty
avoidance and high in power distance, partner buyouts are more likely.
In the passage above, we argued that established finns from cultures with higher power
distance learn more efficiently from their partners, and that the marginal incentive to acquire
their partners is highest when the relationship is confronted with endogenous uncertainty. While
uncertainty avoidance is one dimension that accentuates endogenous uncertainty, cultural
distance (CD) between the partners may also influence the amount of endogenous uncertainty.
Cultural distance is defined as the degree to which the home country culture of an investing firm
is dissimilar from that of the host country market and finns operating therein. When there is
more cultural distance between partners, the ability to effectively observe and predict
opportunism among partners is hindered (Kogut, 1988), leading to higher potential transaction
12

costs. Here, transaction costs represent communication and control costs embodied in cultural
differences.
A large body of work has focused on initial governance choice and found cultural
differences lead finns to shy away from hierarchy (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Gatignon and
Anderson, 1988; Shane 1993). Other researchers have attended to the role of cultural distance on
the stability of existing partnerships, finding that it contributes to a higher rate of partnership
dissolution (Harrigan, 1985; Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Barkema,-Shenkar, Venneulen,
& Bell, 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997). More relevant to our study, Olie (1994) and Elsass and

Veiga (1994) argued that the blending of diverse cultures tends to be a challenging obstacle to
successful mergers. Indeed, cultural differences between finns was found to predict stress,
negative attitudes toward merger, and the lack of cooperation between finns subsequent to
merger (Weber, Shenkar, & Raveh, 1996).
These findings suggest that for existing partnerships, cultural differences raise the degree of
endogenous uncertainty facing partnerships, and the endogenous uncertainty facing prospects for
successful mergers of the finns. The successful transfer of knowledge among culturally distant
partners is an indeterminate process. This view is captured clearly by Luostarinen, who defined
cultural distance as "the sum of factors creating, on the one hand, a need for knowledge, and on
the other hand, barriers to the knowledge flow and hence also for flows between the home and
the target countries" (1980: 131-132).
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we argue that when endogenous uncertainty is combined with
more efficient leaming in hierarchy (i.e, high PD), partner buyouts should ensue. As a result,
when partners are culturally distant and the investing firm is from a culture that is high in power
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distance, we expect there to be added incentive to internalize the target firm in order to learn
about growth opportunities more efficiently.

Hypothesis 2: When partners are more culturally distant and the established firm is ranked
high in power distance, partner buyouts are more likely.

REsEARCH DESIGN

Sample
We drew a sample of minority equity collaborations and joint ventures involving dedicated
biotechnology firms (DBFs) from the North Carolina Biotechnology Center (NCB C) Actions

Database. This database includes detailed information regarding over 4,000 relationships and
transactions among firms in the biotechnology industry since 1978. In particular, the NCBC
database includes the following transaction characteristics: a) whether the transaction involved an
exchange of equity via a minority investment or a joint venture, b) the transaction date, c) the
identity and number of partners involved, d) the type of partners involved (i.e., DBF, established
firm, government, or university), e) each party's home country, f) the technological subfield, and
g) a general description of each transaction. All transactions were cross-validated with a similar
database, Bioscan. In the event that the transaction dates differed across sources, we used the
earlier of the two dates.

In studying the NCBC Actions database and comparing with Bioscan we collected
information on 618 equity collaborations. This original sample was reduced for three theoretical
reasons. First, our compiled data were restricted to transactions involving only two parties, a
target DBF domiciled in the United States and established firms having core businesses outside
of biotechnology. We believe it is easier to identify the integrated manufacturer as the holder of
14

the call option to acquire, a belief consistent with Hurry et al. (1992). This is particularly
reasonable in cases where established fIrms take a minority equity stake in a DBF. These cases
constitute 83.8 percent of our fInal sample. Determining who holds the call option is more
challenging in joint ventures, where both parties contribute capital and knowledge to a jointly
owned and controlled entity.6 We control for likelihood that joint ventures may be bought out by
the DBF by including a joint venture dummy variable and by modeling joint venture buyouts by
the DBF fIrm as a competing event.
Second, we restricted our sample to include only four broad subfIelds: a) therapeutics, b)
diagnostics, c) agriculture (aglbio), and d) supplier/specialty chemical. These subfields account
for a large majority of all firms dedicated to biotechnology (Dibner, 1992). This focus on the
largest subfields was necessary because of our need to have a critical mass of public fIrms to
generate stock market indices for each subfield for our measure of exogenous uncertainty.
Finally, we focus on equity collaborations with DBFs domiciled in the United States. This
enabled us to better control for exogenous events specific to country boundaries. Given these
constraints on our database we identified 248 equity collaborations initiated between 1978 and
1995. Of these, we were unable to obtain the precise starting dates of 30 transactions, despite
supplementing our search using LexislNexus and SEC Schedule 13D mings.
We made considerable effort to verify the outcome of each partnership. If the December
1995 issue of Bioscan listed the equity partnership as ongoing, the transaction was coded as
right-censored. Otherwise, a systematic search was undertaken to understand the nature of the
transaction termination. NCBC and Bioscan data were supplemented with a search of Ernst &
Young Biotechnology Industry Reports, Predicast' s F&S Index of Corporate Change,
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LexislNexis, and SEC Schedule 13D filings. From this effort we were able to verify the timing
and outcome of 173 equity partnerships constituting our final sample.
Of the 173 transactions in our final sample, 23 were terminated by partner buyout by
established firms, 39 were dissolved, 21 were terminated by other means (6 joint ventures were
acquired by the DBF partner, 5 joint ventures were acquired by third parties, 10 DBFs were
acquired by a third party), and 90 were right censored; that is, they were still in effect at the end
of 1995. 7 Table 1 provides a breakdown ofthe number of established f~s from each country
that have initiated equity collaborations with U.S. biotechnology finns. Here, we also list the
outcome of these equity collaborations for each country. While equity investments are most
prominently undertaken by firms in a few countries, there seems to be a clear difference in the
outcomes of these collaborations. U.S finns have a high percentage of partnership dissolutions
and third-party buyouts. Japanese finns and those from the United Kingdom have a significant
proportion of partnerships maintained, as do finns from Switzerland, Gennany, and Sweden.
While these trends show clear differences in country propensities regarding equity collaboration
outcomes, it is unclear whether these patterns are statistically robust when controlling for cultural
factors, finn-specific factors, and those relating to the value and exogenous uncertainty regarding
the technology. Furthennore, Table 1 does not consider the timing of the outcome event. For
example, while it is clear that a greater percentage of Japanese firms maintained their equity
stake than do U.S. finns, it does not help us understand whether Japanese finns maintained their
equity relationships longer than U.S. finns.

Insert Table 1 about here
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Model and Method
We selected a competing-risk, discrete-time event history analysis to test our hypotheses.
Event history models are especially appropriate for analyzing longitudinal data when the
dependent variable is a discrete event and the timing of the event's occurrence is of particular
interest. Competing risk is a special form of event history analysis that is used when the
dependent variable has two or more outcomes and the occurrence of anyone outcome removes
the subject from the risk of the other outcome(s). Buyouts are one of several ways in which a
partnership may be terminated. Other forms of termination include (a) dissolution of the
partnership, (b) acquisition of a biotechnology firm or joint venture by a third party, and (c)
acquisition of a joint venture by the biotechnology partner (rather than acquisition by the
established firm). Although we do not develop explicit hypotheses regarding these other forms
of termination, they do represent relevant "competing hazards" in that they preclude subsequent
occurrences of partner buyouts. To model the competing hazards, the hazard rate function is
defined as
(1)

h/t} = limP/t,t + s)/s
S40

where h(t) is the hazard function associated with either partner buyout (j=1), partnership
dissolution (j=2); or other termination (j=3). Plt,t+s) is the probability that event type j occurs in
the interval between t and t+s, given that the partnership is at risk at time t.
Cox's (1975) partial likelihood method for parameter estimation allows us to incorporate
time dependence into the model, without specifying its form. The general form for the Cox
proportional hazards models estimated in this study is:
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where altJ may be any function of time, X(t) and Yare vectors of time dependent and time
invariant explanatory variables, and Pj and

A, are vectors of estimable parameters. We used TDA

version 5.7 to simultaneously estimate the competing hazards model (Rohwer, 1994) with Cox's
partial likelihood method. We do not provide estimates for the baseline hazard function,

alt),

since partial likelihood estimation discards this function. 8
The three events - buyout, dissolution, and other termination - were updated monthly. The
sample includes 9,843 monthly periods. The cultural variables were not time varying, but many
control variables were updated monthly.

Culture Variables
Hypothesis 1 is tested by multiplying Hofstede's (1980) well-known measures of

uncertainty avoidance and power distance to each country in our sample. Hypothesis 2 also
suggests a multiplicative function involving power distance and cultural distance. Our test
considers two alternative measures of cultural distance. First, following Kogut and Singh (1988),
we measured Hofstede's cultural distance (HCD) as a composite index based on the each of the
four cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980).
We also used a second measure of cultural distance is generated from a study by Ronen and
Shenkar (1985), who synthesized country clusters into nine groupings of countries with similar
work-related attitudes and values. The "Anglo" cluster involves Australia, Canada, Ireland, New
Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States. All other countries in the study were
grouped into the other eight clusters. Using this data, we constructed a measure of cultural
distance such that when the established firm fell in the Anglo cluster, Ronen '8 cultural distance
(RSCD) was coded "0", otherwise it was coded" 1".
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Control Variables
Clearly, cultural factors may not dominate partner buyout decisions. We argued earlier that
exogenous forces partially dictate how uncertain future payoffs are and whether a buyout option
is in-the-money. Other forces specific to the industry, the investing firm, and partner
relationship may also bear upon the buyout decision. In this section, we describe our attempts to
control for the factors found to be important by previous researchers.
Kogut (1991) argued that exogenous forces determine whether a buyout option is in-themoney. He argued that when industry sales deviated positively from industry forecasts, joint
venture partners would seek to acquire the joint venture. His annual measures, shipment growth
and deviation from expected growth, are meant to capture the certainty to which joint ventures
operating in an industry have appreciated in value. Our measures of exogenous variables are in
the same spirit, but are measured differently. Whereas Kogut's study spanned several industries
and uses annual measures, ours concentrates only on biotechnology, and we consequently focus
on measuring exogenous forces within technological subfields on a monthly basis. Sales
measures are unreasonable in this industry because most firms have no revenues from sales. Like
Folta (1998), we measure subfield value and subfield (exogenous) uncertainty using stock market
indices generated from publicly traded firm in concentrating in particular biotechnology
subfields. These measures were constructed from stock prices that were gathered from the
Center for Research in Security Prices data base, and are described briefly below, but in more
detail in Folta (1998).
Differences in the expected value of growth opportunities across the four subfields
(Therapeutic, Diagnostic, AglBio, and Supplier I Specialty Chemical) with four stock indices that
were created from weekly returns of nine U.S. biotechnology finns specializing in the respective
19

subfields. The subfield value of firm j was measured as the value of the monthly biotechnology
index for subfield m (whenj Em). These indices are weighted equally. Weekly values of the
indices were then averaged within each month to get monthly index values for each of the four
subfields. Subfield value was transformed by taking its natural logarithm to correct for positive
skewness.

Exogenous uncertainty was measured as the 26-week standard deviation of the log of
weekly returns for each of the four biotechnology subfield indices. The 26-week measure was
chosen because it provides enough history to produce a reliable measure of volatility, without
assuming constant variance over a longer period of time. Exogenous uncertainty was converted
to a monthly measure by averaging the weekly standard deviations within any given month.
Substantial literature has confirmed the importance of industry structure on the choice of
governance mode. 9 We use average subfield R&D expenditures divided by average total
expenses to control for such effects. Conventionally, the relationship of R&D expense is said to
encourage integrative modes, such as acquisition, in order to provide adequate administrative
control for coping with higher degrees of human and dedicated capital specific to a transaction.
Using this logic, we might expect a positive relationship between R&D expense and partner
buyout.
Park and Ungson (1997) did not control for exogenous forces, but did find that a series of
dummy variables related to the partnership influenced the buyout decision. They found that
partners with the same SIC code were less likely to acquire their partners, partners having a prior
relationship were more likely to end in acquisition, partnerships involving technology transfer
were less likely to end in acquisition, and partnerships involving multiple products were more
likely to end in acquisition. We test for some of these same effects, but not all. By definition,
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our sample includes partners from different SIC codes and partnerships involving technology
transfer.
Park and Ungson (1997) have highlighted the important moderating role that prior
relationships have on the effect of cultural differences on partnership dissolution. While they did
not test for whether this same effect holds for partner buyouts, it may be reasonable to expect
prior relationships to moderate either the degree of endogenous uncertainty or the relative rate of
learning in collaboration versus hierarchy. We did not include prior relationships in our formal
presentation because to the extent that cultural dimensions influence the choice of prior
relationships with the partner, including a measure of prior transactions in the model would
confound our ability to interpret the results. In runs not reported, we did, include a dummy
measure for prior relationships, consistent with the measure employed by Park and Ungson, but
found no significant relationship in any of our models. Surprisingly, only 7.0 percent of the
partnerships had a prior relationship, a number significantly below Park and Ungson's 26.0
percent in the electronics industry. Apparently, it is more common to initiate a relationship with
equity transactions in the biotechnology industry.
Target firms having more commercial partners may not be attractive buyout candidates
because commercial opportunities to exploit their technology may be siphoned off by others. To
approximate the declining marginal threat of preemptive bidding or acquisition by each
additional partner, we used the natural logarithm of the target finn's number of current
commercial alliances. The number ofpartners was taken during the year of the event. In the
event of right-censored cases, the measure was taken in the last year of the observation window.
Bioscan provided this infonnation.
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If the transaction was ajoint venture an indicator variable was classified as a "1", and "0" if

it was a minority equity investment. Joint ventures are thought to provide a real option that is
more proprietary than is the case for minority investments.

Insert Table 2 about here

RESULTS

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables. Because of concerns
of multicollinearity between Uncertainty Avoidance and the Cultural Distance variables, as well
as the small number of events, we opted to present three full models relating to our hypotheses.
Table 3 presents the full (columns 2, 4, 6) and reduced (columns 1,3,5) models with the
parameter estimates for the hazard of partner buyout. To ascertain the degree of model fit,
likelihood ratio tests were performed on the incremental and full models. Each test produced a
chi-square statistic well above the critical value (p < 0.001), indicating that the overall fit is good.
The hypotheses for the individual interaction coefficients are tested under one-tail t-tests. In each
of the full models, the hypothesized interaction is positive and significant. These findings are
consistent with our expectations.

Insert Table 3 about here

In model 2, the positive coefficient on the interaction (p < 0.05) between Uncertainty
Avoidance and Power Distance is consistent with the expectations offered in hypothesis 1. It
suggests that established firms from cultures higher in UA and PD should be more likely to buy
out their partners.
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In models 4 and 6, both the positive coefficient on the interaction (p < 0.10) between

Hofstede's Cultural Distance and Power Distance as well as the positive coefficient on the
interaction (p < 0.01) between Ronen's Cultural Distance and Power Distance are consistent with
the expectations offered in hypothesis 2. It suggests that when partners that are more culturally
distant and established investors are higher in Power Distance there is an increased likelihood of
partner buyout.
Since the remaining variables in the models have no hypotheses related to them, we use a
two-tailed test to assess the significance of relationships. The only variable that demonstrated a
significant effect was Target Firm's Number of Partners. As was expected, it was negatively
related to the likelihood of partner buyout. This variable should approximate how proprietary the
buyout option is. The more partners a target partner has, the less proprietary is the option. The
variables relating to exogenous uncertainty, subfield value, and subfield R&D expense were not
significant. Neither was the indicator variable distinguishing joint ventures from minority
investments.
Table 3 also includes the competing hazard results for partnership dissolution in columns 710. These results indicate that Uncertainty Avoidance and Ronen's Cultural Distance is
negatively related to the likelihood of dissolution. The latter result is consistent with those found
by Park and Ungson (1997) in studying the electronics industry. They did not examine the effect
of Uncertainty Avoidance. Furthermore, in comparison with the findings for the partner
acquisition models, these findings demonstrate that national culture attributes influence partner
dissolution differently. 10
Consistent with previous studies, we focused mainly on aggregate measures of cultural
distance. However, Hofstede (1980) suggests that partner differences for power distance,
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uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and individuality may represent important areas of conflict
among partners. In addition, recent research suggests that absolute measures of cultural
"distance" may obfuscate directional differences among individual cultural attributes (O'Grady &
Lane, 1996). As a result, we also tested measures of cultural distance that are specific to
individual attributes. These variables are calculated the same way as illustrated in equation 3,
however, they only apply to a single attribute.

Insert Table 4 about here

Table 4 reports the parameter estimates for cultural distance measures that are specific to
Hofstede's individual attributes of national culture. II We provide only the full models including
the interaction. In modell, the positive coefficient for the interaction between Power Distance
and Cultural DistancelPartner Differences in Power Distance is consistent with hypothesis 2.
Also consistent with Hypothesis 2 is the positive coefficient for the interaction between Power
Distance and Cultural DistancelPartner Differences in Uncertainty Avoidance. The interactions
in models 3 and 4 involving differences in Individuality and Masculinity, respectively, were not
significant. These findings support our a priori expectation focus on Uncertainty Avoidance and
Power Distance, and also support the arguments by Hofstede that these two dimensions of
national culture have the greatest bearing on organizational phenomena.
Given that partner differences in Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance seem to be the
two dimensions of national culture which best explain organizational phenomenon, we created a
cultural difference measure incorporating both of those dimensions. The model is illustrated in
column 5 of Table 4. The positive and significant interaction (p < 0.05) is consistent with
expectations for hypothesis 2.
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DISCUSSION

The role of national culture on governance choice has been frequently studied. However,
these studies have largely focused on the initial governance decision or partnership tenrunation,
giving little attention specifically to partner buyouts. This oversight is consequential, given the
high incidence of acquisition of joint venture and equity partners. By explicitly considering the
role of national culture on partner buyouts, we extend a growing body of literature that examines
the incremental nature of investments in joint ventures and partner firms in knowledge-intensive
industries. Although we are the not the first to characterize equity collaborations are compound
options, our study is the first to attempt to theoretically explain the role of national culture on
partner buyout. Partner buyout represents the exercise of the first stage option, while future
discretionary investments represent the exercise of the second stage option. Real option theory
suggests that firms should choose to invest incrementally in the face of endogenous uncertainty.
It also suggests that firms will be more likely to commit to the next stage when they can learn
more by committing, thereby reducing endogenous uncertainty.
We have built upon option theory to suggest that partner buyouts will be influenced by three
factors: exogenous variables, endogenous uncertainty, and the rate of learning inside versus
outside the firm. Our central argument is that attributes of national culture bears upon these
latter two factors. Specifically, we argue that both uncertainty avoidance and cultural distance
increases endogenous uncertainty. This is likely due to the inability to perceive the potential for
opportunistic behavior by partners, or information asymmetry between partners. As a result of
such uncertainty, established firms will shy away from aggressive commitment to growth
opportunities, they will invest incrementally. Firms from cultures that are high in power distance
are expected to transition to hierarchical governance because it is in hierarchies that they operate
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and learn most efficiently about growth opportunities. Thus, it is the combination of high
endogenous uncertainty and the ability (or prospects) to learn more efficiently after internalizing
the partner that leads to partner buyout.
Our empirical findings are consistent with the expectations noted above. Uncertainty
avoidance and cultural distance are argued to contribute to endogenous uncertainty, while power
distance is argued to impact the relative rate of learning in hierarchy relative to collaborations.
Established firms from high UA home country cultures are more likely to buyout partners when
they are also high in PD. Partners that are culturally distant are more likely to buyout partners
when they are also high in PD. These fmdings suggest that it is the combination of endogenous
uncertainty and efficient learning at the next stage that promote commitment via partner buyout.
They are robust to different measures of cultural distance emanating from work by Hofstede
(1980) and Ronen and Shenkar (1985). Distance measures using Hofstede's dimensions of
Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance seem to mostly explain endogenous uncertainty.
Upon examination of country values for UA, Japan is among the world's most uncertainty
avoidant cultures (about 1.5 standard deviations above the mean; see Hofstede, 1980: 315).
According to our research findings, Japanese firms might be expected to exhibit high levels of
anxiety with respect to both endogenous uncertainty and exogenous uncertainty. Therefore,
Japanese firms will place greater intrinsic and extrinsic value on maintaining the equity
collaboration. Indeed, our findings suggest that firms high in UA (including those from Japan)
are less likely to acquire their collaboration partners and less likely to dissolve the partnership.
These findings support those of Hurry et al. (1992) and Chang (1995) who found that Japanese
firms were more likely than U.S. firms to retain their holdings in international joint ventures.
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A Framework for Understanding Intentions of Foreign Partners
Using Hofstede's dimensions of Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance there is
potential to create a broad framework by which future studies can examine partner buyout
decisions in particular, and sequential investment more generally. In Table 5 we located
countries based on only two measures: Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance. Since these
measures are specific to the established firm, and not the relationship between partners, we can
develop a general framework of tendencies toward partner buyout. Since firms domiciled in
France and Japan are high in both Uncertainty Avoida.nce and Power Distance, we expect them to
be most likely to buyout their partners. The second most likely group to buyout partners
consists of firms high in Uncertainty Avoidance and medium in Power Distance: Germany, Italy,
and Switzerland. Finally, firms from countries that are medium in Qoth PD and UA (Australia,
Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States) may also demonstrate a notion for partner
buyouts, although to a lesser extent. Established firms from other countries are less likely to
exhibit a tendency to buyout their partners either because there is low power distance or low
uncertainty avoidance.

Insert Table 5 about here

Of course, cultural distance is not depicted in Table 5. According to our theoretical
expectations, even established firms from uncertainty avoidance cultures may display a tendency
to buyout partners if they are culturally distant. The expectations presented in Table 5 can be
altered to reflect cultural distance. For example, France and Japan are especially likely
candidates for buyouts of U.S. partners because they are high on all three cultural attributes:
Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Cultural Distance. The framework can be extended
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to partnerships not involving United States target firms. For example, the tendency for Japanese
firms to acquire Japanese partners may be muted somewhat because of a lack of cultural distance.
At the same time, because of high cultural distance, firms from Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States may demonstrate an increased tendency for acquiring Japanese
partners. We believe that these propositions are very deserving of more attention in samples
involving multiple industries and entry into multiple countries.
We should note several limitations of this study. Although our sampiing methodology was
comprehensive for nearly the entire life of the biotechnology industry, the number of partner
buyout events is small. Nevertheless, we managed to attain statistical significance for our key
variables and stability across a number of models containing firm-level and/or industry-level
control variables. A larger sample would allow disaggregation of joint ventures and minority
equity partnerships. Our study focused on a single industry, and sub-segments within that
industry. While these segments are distinct from one another, future research should attempt to
verify the expected relationships in other industries, including both R&D intensive and more
stable industries.
Parkhe (1991) suggests that formal training programs can enhance cultural understanding
and may moderate the relationship between cultural variables and the duration of global
alliances. These integrating mechanisms may have an important influence on the relative rate of
learning in joint ventures versus acquisition, and hence, may playa role in the buyout decision.
Unfortunately, since we lacked data on the extent of cross-cultural training programs, we could
not examine this issue. However, we believe that our theoretical framework offers an interesting
new opportunity to ascertain how integrating mechanisms may influence the relatively
unexplored phenomena of partner buyouts.
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Previous research has demonstrated that companies use collaborations when partnering with
culturally distant partners. Thus, our sample of equity collaborations may reflect some restricted
range of cultural distance. Indeed, means scores of cultural distance varied significantly when we
examined a broader sample of transactions involving both equity collaborations (0.64) and
outright acquisitions (.036). Thus, our study, and any study examining the effect of national
culture on partner buyout will suffer from such a bias. This will tend to weaken the results for
cultural distance. We have demonstrated, however, that even though we have sampled culturally
distant partners, power distance acts to moderate the partner buyout decision.
Overall, our study suggests that cultural attributes of the investing firm and cultural
differences between the investing and target firms playa significant role in predicting the rate at
which partner buyouts occur. It suggests that firms find value in flexibility in the presence of
endogenous uncertainty, and are quicker to exercise when buyout enhances the potential rate of
learning. The hypotheses developed here and the results we found offer some promising new
directions for future empirical research.
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ENDNOTES
Other evidence of partner buyouts include Kogut (1989), who found that 24.0 percent of
joint ventures were acquired by a partner within seven years, and Mikkelson and Ruback (1985),
who discovered that 13.6 percent of firms having initiated minority investments either acquired
or attempted to acquire their partner within three years of taking an initial equity stake.
1

2 We are not without precedent in defining the scope of this research to encompass both joint
ventures and minority investments (e.g., Hennart, 1991; Pisano, 1989).

For Williamson (1985), the ownership advantage of the firm results from its superior
mechanisms for coping with opportunism.
.
3

4 Although Hofstede is largely famous for his 1980 IBM national culture study, he and his
colleagues later found several links between national culture and organizational culture
(Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990). In particular, the organizational
culture dimensions of need/or authority and need/or security correlated strongly with power
distance and uncertainty avoidance, respectively. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to only
power distance and uncertainty avoidance - cultural dimensions that capture both national and
organizational traits.
5 We are grateful to a reviewer who emphasized that cultural distance and uncertainty
avoidance are not equated to endogenous uncertainty. Indeed, they are merely constructs that
contribute to endogenous uncertainty. As pointed out on pages 6-7, endogenous uncertainty may
be represented by many factors.

6 Either partner may hold the option to acquire the joint venture. Who is most likely to
exercise the option in the case of joint ventures turns not only on the strategic intentions of the
partners, but the relative competitive strengths of the partners--the partner possessing unique
complementary resources being the more likely to acquire the weaker partner's stake (Hurry,
1993). Integrated firms investing in biotechnology have downstream skills in marketing and
distribution, and regulatory savvy (Arora & Gambardella, 1990). Although dedicated
biotechnology firms (DBFs) have important R&D capabilities, they frequently lack the cash
needed to invest in acquisitions. Furthermore, most integrated manufacturers of pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, and agt'"iculture have a major goal of acquiring technical knowledge in biotechnology,
while only a handful ofDBF's aspire to become fully integrated (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1991). In our sample we found that six joint ventures were acquired by the
integrated partner and six joint ventures that were acquired by the DBF. Our focus on the
established firm as the holder also rests on our theoretical interest in understanding when firms
are more likely to commit to internalizing technical knowledge to capitalize on emerging
technologies, and not downstream skills.
7 Although the rate of acquisition (6.9 percent) by year three appears somewhat below rates
found in studies noted on page 3, to make our rate comparable we must also include acquisitions
by the DBF partner and allow for a three year window for the event to take place. In making that
adjustment we find that 10.0 percent of the total sample (14.8 percent of joint ventures and 8.9
percent of minority investments) was terminated by acquisition by one of the partners within 36
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months. This, then, is consistent with previous studies.
8 The Cox method uses only information about the relative order of duration times, instead of
the exact timing of events. Hence, the Cox method involves some loss of information,
potentially inhibiting model estimation. This same feature makes the Cox model an attractive
one when one has no prior expectations about time dependence. Another reason to question the
validity of the Cox partial likelihood model for our data is that our number of events is relatively
few. Although partial likelihood models are asymptotically efficient when the sample size is
large (Efron, 1977), when the sample size is small, the precision of the partial likelihood
estimates can be much less than that for maximum likelihood estimates (Coleman, 1981). We
estimated a second model using maximum likelihood. Maximum likelihood methods require
specification of a baseline hazard function. We chose the exponential specification because it is
the parametric equivalent to the Cox method. The results from that estimation produced a
pattern of relations identical to those found via the Cox estimation, with slightly less
significance. This supplemental analysis provided evidence for the robustness of the results
reported in this paper.

We also examined the effect of industry structure using number of rivals active in each of
the 123 product areas for each year throughout the publication of Bioscan (1987-1995). We did
not include this variable in the formal presentation because it had no substantive impact on the
model, and there was substantial coIinearity with other variables in the model (R&D Expense and
Subfield Value).
9

We also examined whether dissolution was influenced by an interaction between cultural
distance and power distance, and uncertainty avoidance and power distance. Log likelihood ratio
tests indicated no such interaction existed.
10

Weber, Shenkar, and Raveh (1996) also used distance measures for Hofstede's individual
culture attributes, but focused on the impact on mergers and acquisition, not partner buyouts.
II

31

REFERENCES

Adler, N. J. 1991. International dimensions of organizational behavior. Belmont, CA: Wadworth
Publishing.
Arora, A. & Gambardella, A. 1990. Complementarity and external linkages: The strategies of
the large firms in biotechnology. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 38: 361-379.
Barkema, H., Bell, J. & Pennings, J. 1996. Foreign entry, cultural barriers, and learning. Strategic
Management Journal, 17: 151-166.
Barkema, H., Shenkar, 0., Vermeulen, F. & Bell, J. 1997. Working abroad, working with others:
How firms learn to operate international joint ventures. Academy of Management
Journal, 40: 426-442.
Chang, S.J. 1995. International expansion strategy of Japanese firms: Capability building through
sequential entry. Academy of Management Journal, 38(2): 383-407.
Choi, D. 1991. Toehold acquisitions, shareholder wealth, and the market for corporate control.
Journal of Financial and Ouantitative Analysis, 26: 391-407.
Coleman, J.S. 1981. Longitudinal data analysis. New York: Basic Books.
Cox, D.R. 1975. Partial likelihood. Biometrika, 62: 269-76.
Dibner M.D. 1992. U.S. biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. BioPharm, 5(8): 24-28.
Dixit, A. K. & Pindyck, R. S. 1994. Investment under uncertainty. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
Efron, B. 1977. The efficiency of Cox's likelihood function for censored data. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 72: 557-65.
Elsass, P.M. & Viega, J.F. 1994. Acculturation in acquired organizations: A force-field
perspective. Human Relations, 47: 431-453.
Erramilli, K. 1996. Nationality and subsidiary ownership patterns in multinational corporations.
Journal of International Business Studies, 27: 225-248.
Folta, T.B. 1998. Governance and Uncertainty: The tradeoff between administrative control and
commitment. Strategic Management Journal, 19: 1007-1028.

Gatignon, H. & Anderson, E. 1988. The multinational corporation's degree of control over
foreign subsidiaries: An empirical test of transaction cost explanations. Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, 4(2): 305-336.
Hall, E.T. 1976. Beyond culture. Garden City, NY: Anchor BookslDoubleday
Harrigan, K. 1985. Strategies for joint ventures. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Hennart, J.P. 1991. The transaction cost theory of joint ventures: An empirical study of Japanese
subsidiaries in the United States. Management Science, 37(4): 483-497.
Hoecklin, L. 1995. Managing cultural differences: Strategies for competitive advantage.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Hofstede, G. 1980. Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values.
Beverly Hills: Sage.
Hofstede, G. 1985. The interaction between national and organizational value systems. Journal of
Management Studies, 22: 347-357.
Hofstede, G., Neuijen, B., Ohayv, D., & Sanders, G. 1990. Measuring organizational cultures: A
qualitative and quantitative study across twenty cases. Administrative Science Quarterly,
35: 286-316.
Hofstede, G. 1991. Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. Berkshire, UK: McGrawHill.
Hurry, D. 1993. Restructuring in the global economy: The consequences of strategic linkages
between Japanese and U.S. firms. Strategic Management Journal, 14: 69-82.
Hurry, D., Miller, A. T., & Bowman, E. H. 1992. Calls on high-technology: Japanese exploration
of venture capital investments in the United States. Strategic Management Journal, 13:
85-101.
Kogut, B. 1988. Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Strategic Management
Journal, 9(4): 319-332.
Kogut, B. 1989. The stability of joint ventures: Reciprocity and competitive rivalry. The Journal
of Industrial Economics, 38: 183-198.
Kogut, B. 1991. Joint ventures and the option to expand and acquire. Management Science, 37:
19-33.
Kogut, B. & Singh, H. 1988. The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. Journal
of International Business Studies, 49: 411-430.
33

Kogut, B. & Zander, U. 1992. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities and the
replication of technology. Organizational Science, 3: 383-397.
Kogut, B. & Zander, U. 1993. Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the
multinational corporation. Journal of International Business Studies, Fourth Quarter: 625645.
Luostarinen, R. 1980. Internationalization of the firm: An empirical study of the
internationalization of firms with small and open domestic markets with special emphasis
on lateral rigidity as_ a behavioral characteristic in strategic decision-making. Helsinki:
Helsinki School of Economics.
McCardle, K. 1985. Information acquisition and the adoption of new technology. Management
Science, 31(11): 1372-1389.
McDonald, R. & Siegel, D. 1986. The value of waiting to invest. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 101:707-28.
Mikkelson, W. H. & Ruback, R. S. 1985. An empirical analysis of the interfirm equity
investment process. Journal of Financial Economics, 14: 523-553.
Mintzberg, H. 1983. Structure in fives: Designing effective organizations. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
O'Grady, S. & Lane, H. 1996. The psychic distance paradox. Journal of International Business
Studies, 27: 309-334.
Office of Technology Assessment. 1991. Biotechnology in a global economy. Congress of the
United States, Washington, D.C.
Olie, R. 1994. Shades of culture and institutions in international mergers. Organizational Studies,
15: 381-405.
Osborn, R. & Hagedoorn, J. 1997. The institutionalization and evolutionary dynamics of
interorganizational alliances and networks. Academy of Management Journal, 40: 261-278.
Park, S. & Russo, M. 1996. When competition eclipses cooperation: An event history analysis of
joint venture failure. Management Science, 42: 875-890.
Park, S. & Ungson, G. 1997. The effect of national culture, organizational complementarity, and
economic motivation on joint venture dissolution. Academy of Management Journal, 40:
279-307.

34

•

I

Parkhe, A. 1991. Interfirm diversity, organizational learning, and longevity in global strategic
alliances. Journal of International Business Studies, Fourth Quarter: 579-601.
Penner-Hahn, J. 1998. Firm and environmental influences on the mode and sequence of foreign
research and development activities. Strategic Management Journal, 19: 149-168.
Pisano, G. 1989. Using equity participation to support exchange: Evidence from the
biotechnology industry. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 5( 1): 109-126.
Powell, W., Koput, K., & Smith-Doerr, L. 1996. Interorganizational collaboration and the locus
of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Administrative Science Quarterly,
41: 116-145.
Rivoli, P. & Salorio, E. 1996. Foreign direct investment and investment under uncertainty.
Journal of International Business Studies, 27: 335-358.
Roberts, K. & Weitzman, M. 1981. Funding criteria for research, development, and exploration
projects. Econometrica, 49: 1261-88.
Rohwer, G. 1994. Parametric transition rate models. TDA Working Paper 5-7, University of
Bremen.
Ronen, S. & Shenkar, O. 1985. Clustering countries on attitudinal dimensions: A review and
synthesis. Academy of Management Review, 10: 434-454.
Shane, S. 1993. The effect of cultural differences in the perception of transaction costs on
national differences in the preference for licensing. Academy of Management Best Paper
Proceedings, 122-126.
Weber, Y., Shenkar, O. & Raveh, A. 1996. National and corporate cultural fit in mergers /
acquisitions: An exploratory study. Management Science, 42(8): 1215-1227.
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.

35

Table 1: Cultural Measures and Outcomes of Equity Collaborations by Country of Corporate Headquarters
Cultural Measures
Country

Australia

UA

PD

Hofstede's
Cult.
Distance

51

36

0.026

Outcomes of Equity Collaborations
Actual (Percent)
3rd Party
Partnerships
Partnership
Dissolution
Buyout
Maintained

Ronen's
Cultural
Category

Partner
Buyout

Anglo

1 (100%)

0(0%)

0(0%)

1 (50%

Total

# of
Establish
-ed Firms

0(0%)

1

1

1 (50%)

0(0%)

2

1

1 (50%)

0(0%)

0(0%)

2

2

o (0%)

0(0%)

3 (60%)

5

2

I

Canada

48

39

0.138

Anglo

0(0%)

I Denmark

23

18

1.745

Nordic

1 (50%)
I

France

86

68

1.617

Latin Europe

2 (40%)

Germany

65

35

0.630

Germanic

0(0%)

0(0%)

2 (28.6%)

5 (71.4%)

7

2

Ireland

35

28

0.530

Anglo

1 (50%)

I (50%)

0(0%)

0(0%)

2

1

Italy

75

50

0.650

Latin Europe

1 (50.0%)

0(0%)

0(0%)

1 (50.0%)

2

2

Japan

92

54

3.104

Far East

3 (13.6%)

3 (13.6%)

1 (4.6%)

15 (68.2%)

22

17

Norway

50

31

1.667

Nordic

0(0%)

I (100%)

0(0%)

0(0%)

1

1

Sweden

29

31

1.859

Nordic

1 (12.5%)

2 (25.0%)

1 (12.5%)

4 (50.0%)

8

4

Switzerland

58

34

0.528

Germanic

3 (17.7%)

1 (5.8%)

3 (17.2%)

10 (58.8%)

17

3

United Kingdom

35

35

0.083

Anglo

0(0%)

1 (7.1 %)

0(0%)

13 (92.9%)

14

3

United States

46

40

0.000

Anglo

10(11.1%)

28 (31.1%)

13 (14.5%)

39 (43.3%)

90

34

23 (13%)

39 (23%)

21 (12%)

90 (52%)

173

73

Total

I

36

--

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix8
Mean
53.143

S.D
18.157

I

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

9

11

1.

Uncertainty Avoidance

2.

Hofstede's Cultural Distance

0.632

1.078 I 0.786 *

3.

Ronen's Cultural Distance

0.343

0.475

0.653 * 0.795 *

4.

Power Distance

40.804

8.141

0.823 * 0.572 * 0.268 *

5.

UA*PD

2290.158

1283.659

6.

Hofstede's CD * PD

30.817

57.567

7.

Ronen's CD * PD

15.023

22.129

8.

Exogenous Uncertainty

0.3191

0.103

-0.035 * -0.006

9.

Subfield Value

5.736

1.095

0.050 * 0.050 * 0.099 * 0.026 * 0.052 * 0.056 * 0.106 * 0.098 *

41.423

11.846

11. Target's # of Partners

3.118

1.625

-0.030 * -0.177

12. Joint Venture

0.170

0.375

0.067 * 0.035 * 0.072 * 0.053 * 0.058 * 0.039 * 0.073 * -0.035 * -0.109 * -0.084 * 0.164 *

10. Subfield R&D Expense

0.964 * 0.794 * 0.573 * 0.918 *

*
0.835 * 0.879 *
0.869 * 0.977

*
0.940 *
0.728

-0.004

*
0.568 *
0.711

0.893 *
0.807 * 0.876 *

-0.027 * -0.029 * -0.014

-0.013

0.135 * 0.188 * 0.201 * 0.052 * 0.133 * 0.186 * 0.205 * 0.107 * 0.328 *

*

-0.040 * -0.128 * -0.112 * -0.173 * -0.086 * -0.003

-0.021

*

* Pearson correlations are significant at p < 0.05.
a

Correlations are calculated using pooled cross-sectional and time-series data covering 173 equity partnerships and 9,843 one-month periods.
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-0.076 *

Table 3: Partial Likelihood Estimates for Hazard of Partner Buyout and Pa,rtnership Dissolution
Partnership Acquisition
Variable Name
Uncertainty Avoidance

(1)
-0.0278
(0.0197l

(2)
-0.0338
(0.0356)

Hofstede s Cultural Distance

(3)

0.1899
(0.2100)

I

(4)

(5)

-0.0660
(0.0420)

UA*PD

-0.0996*
(0.0392)

-0.0262
(0.0246)

(6)

(7)
-0.0179t
(0.0102)

-0.7904
(0.6699)

(8)

(9)

(0)

-0.2919
(0.1823)

Ronen's Cultural Distance
Power Distance

Partnership Dissolution

-0.0510*
(0.0254)

0.6992
(0.4355)

-2.7992*
(1.5773)

-0.0215
(0.0210)

-0.0902**
(0.0306)

-0.8394*
(0.4066)
-0.0315
(0.0195

0.0012*.
(0.0006)

Hofstede's CD * PD

0.0219t.
(0.0136)

Ronen's CD * PD

0.0903**.
(0.0388)

Exogenous Uncertainty

-2.0209
(2.2834)

-1.8379
(2.2631)

-2.3513
(2.2945)

-1.8959
(2.3054)

-2.3481
(2.2896)

-1.8051
(2.2970)

2.6796t
(1.5885)

3.1736
(1.6273)

3.2658*
(1.6409)

2.5622
(1.5882)

Subfield Value

-0.0581
(0.1951)

-0.0775
(0.2020)

-0.0612
(0.1962)

-0.0666)
(0.1976)

-0.0736
(0.1954)

-0.1045
(0.1988)

0.1934
(0.1637)

0.2007
(0.1631)

0.2183
(0.1638)

0.2045
(0.1634)

Subfield R&D Expense

-0.0131
(0.0165)

-0.0217
(0.0174)

-0.0143
(0.0170)

-0.0175
(0.0172)

-0.0154
(0.0168)

-0.0220
(0.0174)

0.0148
(0.0164)

0.0140
(0.0162)

0.0151
(0.0164)

0.0124
(0.0162)

Target Firm's # of Partners

-0.4819**
(0.1627)

-0.3797*
(0.1678)

-0.4524**
(0.1659)

-0.4213**
(0.1632)

-0.4567**
(0.1637)

-0.3884*
(0.1622)

-0.4584***
(0..1291)

-0.4982***
(0.1303)

-0.4851 ***
(0.1310)

-0.4775***
(0.1289)

Joint Venture

0.6862
(0.5065)

0.6543
(0.5057)

0.6032
(0.5020)

0.6359
(0.5008)

0.6449
(0.4986)

0.6671
(0.4954)

0.1343
(0.4955)

0.0792
(0.4911)

0.0966
(0.4917)

0.1550
(0.4976)

-326.98***

-325.86***

-325.14***

-322.93***

327.52***

328.21***

327.20***

328.52***

-326.70*** -324.72***
Log-likelihood Ratio
a Standard error in parentheses
t p<O.IO; * p<0.05; ** p<O.OI; *** p<O.OOI
• One-tailed t-test for hypothesized relations
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Table 4: Partial Likelihood Estimates for Hazard of Partner Buyout
Variable Name
Cultural Distance - Partner
Differences in PD
Cultural Distance - Partner
Differences in UA

(2)

(1)

(4)

(3)

(5)

-0.4271
(0.6234t
-1.3022
(0.7499)
-0.1099
(0.8065)

Cultural Distance - Partner
Differences in Individuality

-0.5841
(0.5007)

Cultural Distance - Partner
Differences in Masculinity

-0.4084
(0.3592)

Cultural Distance - Partner
Differences in (PD + VA)
-0.0531 *
(0.0252)

-0.0594
(0.0251)

Power Distance
Differences in PD

* PD

Differences in UA

* PD

-0.0404
(0.0263)

-0.0647 *
(0.0269)

0.0201 *.
(0.0116)
0.0295 *.
(0.0137)

Differences in Individuality
Differences in Masculinity
Differences in (PD + UA)

-0.0323
(0.0305)

* PD

0.0042.
(0.0157)

* PD

0.0183 •
(0.0145)

* PD

0.0127 *.
(0.0064)

Exogenous Uncertainty

-1.9168
(2.2621)

-1.6697
(2.2915)

-2.2012
(2.2884)

-2.0129
(2.3173)

-1.7917
(2.2811)

Subfield Value

-0.1443
(0.2066)

-0.0984
(0.2014)

-0.0560
(0.1964)

-0.0664)
(0.1960)

-0.1110
(0.2019)

Subfield R&D Expense

-0.0195
(0.0173)

-0.0204
(0.0174)

-0.0140
(0.0169)

-0.0143
(0.0170)

-0.0212
(0.0175)

Target Finn's # of Partners

-0.3839 *
(0.1659)

-0.3882 *
(0.1635)

-0.4597 **
(0.1659)

-0.4460 **
(0.1641)

-0.3734 *
(0.1652)

Joint Venture

0.5012
(0.5013)

0.5850
(0.5028)

0.6206
(0.5059)

0.6045
(0.5009)

0.5825
(0.4993)

Log-likelihood Ratio

-323.94

***

-324.71

Standard error in parentheses
t p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
• One-tailed t-test for hypothesized relations

a

40

***

-327.43

***

-326.88

***

-324.14

***

Table 5: Countries in Sample Located by Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance*
Low Power Distance

High Uncertainty Avoidance

AustraUa
Canada

Medium Uncertainty
Avoidance

Unite~ Kingdom

Ireland
Norway

United States

Denmark
Sweden

Low Uncertainty Avoidance

* The darker the background the more likely firms from these countries are to buyout their partners..
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ABSTRACT
.usn.~

This study examines how national culture influences the likelihood and rate of buyouts
We bl'1""""'"
hypothesize
among R.lD
R&D "l"'ty
equity oIlionccs
alliances IIld
and join!
joint -=tUla
ventures ia
in tho:
the ~tu>olop'
biotechnology ioduony.
industry. w.
""""'l
that the interaction of specific national culture attributes and cultural differences between alliance
partners bear upon: a) the amount of endogenous uncertainty surrounding the potential
integration
~

of tho:
the _firm
target firm IIld
and b) tho:
the roqinal
marginal rate
of learning in hi<nrclli<:01
hierarchical .......
versus
_oIlcunin.l;"

collaborative
governance.
caI~
.. ~

173 joiIlI.-...
joint ventures
Applying a '"""'!"'I••
competing hAzard
hazard Il>Ild<J
model 10.
to a umpI<
sample of 113
AppIyUlJ'

and mi.ooritJ
minority oqllilyroltabonlions
equity collaborations ill
in LI>o
the ~
biotechnology Indwlt}'•
industry, ....,
we found
that investing
firms
ar.l
fOUllol .....
ia"'tOllq fitlDI
from IUp
high pow«
power dl""""
distance at>d
and hlp
high ~"'Y
uncertainty ,.."daoot.-;u
avoidance countries ~
are more
likely 10
to buy
buyout
I.....
"""" likely
""
their alliance partners. Furthermore, greater cultural distance between alliance partners increases
the likelihood of partner buyout when investing firms are from high power distance countries.

,
2

industries become increasingly global, high tech firms are
As knowledge-intensive
knowkdg ~ 1
confronted
with the
fnmte.d wi
t e strategic challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with cross-border
alliances.
Indeed, considerable managerial and scholarly attention has been paid
to not omy
only the
am
.d 10
~he
benefits of such alliances, but also on the transactional difficulties wrought by alliance partners
. ,Wi 'Vcr, most
_
of these efforts
national cui
cultures. However,
rts, have focused
focos~d on
fill the choice of
ffrom
rQlD different
" • °nr InMi'clOal

initial
governance
Erramilli, 1996;
Singh, 1988;
Shane, 1993
1993). -Thee present
: Sba:ne~
pfe'.sent
il~itial gove
anCf, mode ((e.g.,
. "t Bnmn~l
~'. Kogut & Sm
J
study is motivated in three respects. First, it is becoming clear that governance decisions may
involve a strategy to sequentially invest equity in an alliance partner over time (Chang, 1995;
s·
Penner-Hahn, 1998). Second, partnerships often terminate with acquisition (Folta, 1998; Hurry,
'UITy.
of termination, such
as
Kogut, 1991; Miller & Bowman, 1992) as opposed
, has
IDppos¢d to other forms
f~
dissolution or third
party
diss-olulion
t' rid P'
, buyouts. Third, little research to date has explicitly examined whether
sequential investment andd the pal1i
particular
national culture characteristics influence patterns of sequtntiaHnV~il:mC:nl
ul
mode of alliance termination.
This paper is an attempt to fill the gaps notedI above
by examining
the rot
role Qf
of DalloDL1J
national
bo...e byex
-, i.ning [he
culture on the likelihood and rate of buyouts among R&D equity alliances and joint ventures in
the biotechnology industry. Partner buyouts are a relatively common occurrence in other
~·r
knowledge-intensive industries.
For ,ex,
example,
Russo (1996)
that 16.2 percent
du tfrlie-s. 'Fo
le~. Park and Rills,'
199" found
. 0 nd lh
ftl off
joint ventures in the eJaclrOnlcs,
electronics industry
within three ...years
off fOW:ll:.I!l{"I!O,
founding, while
dustry were
w' acquired W
'S 0
investments ended in acquisition
Choi (1991) has found that 13.6 percent of minority
mlIlori,ty ~n"'cstmcnt~
Slliolli within
""ithio one
year of initiation. I Yet, despite their frequency, very few studies have explicitly treated partner
buyouts
partnership termination.
OLl)'1OUlS as a distinct form of pannership
lem'U'.nnliQn This is unfortunate because Park and
Russo ((1996)
and Park and Un
Ungson
argue that
acquisition an:,
and terminationn
RJ
I
'. ,f(1997)
1997' argue:
th.3t termination
[~rminalion by
~ y acqur&.i:tion
entirely diffe.ten!
different factors..
factors.
'.byy dissolution
" ,lurlon may
m~}' be driven
<.\'e.n by entirel.!
3

Like our study,
partner
ud Kogut (1991) examined the p
artn~r buyout
I:m:}l. [ decision through an option theory
exogenous ,factors on buyouts, our focus is on
lens. Whereas his study e:urnRD.£S
examines the
role of'e.xogell.oo.s
Lbe roJ
endogenous uncertainty and I}the impact of national culture. To date, only Park and Un
Ungson
~n
(1997)
have examined the role of national culture on the partner buyout decision. They reveal
"91 h
some evidence that cultural distance increases the likelihood of buyout of the joint
·,oint venture,
"'(HI·
, even
operational diff
differences
after controlling
other import
important factors such as organizational
.. ational and '4:fpetilU"IJ'I'w
afte
oootroning for othe
e.s
between partners, the type of transaction, and the incidence of prior transactions between
partners. Unfortunately, since their focus was termination by dissolution, they do not develop
any
any apd
a priori theoretical arg,w'ncnts'
arguments abou
aboutt lhe
the detmnimmts
determinants of buyouts.
buyouts.. Neither
er do they. offer am'
an
~

dimensions
other than cultural distance.
empirical evidence regarding
ding the
t ' C effects of
0 dim
. ns of culture
cullwe otber
• the
There are other reasons to believe that national culture may play an important role in

partner buyout decision. Chang (1995) andd Hurry et ilL
al. (1992)
found that sequential investment
'992 'flund
patterns were found to differ across U.S. and Japanese venture capital firms. Relative to U.S.
firms, Japanese firms exhibit incremental
approaches,0
to e~pan
expansion.
Subsequent lto news
nla! <lp'proat:l
n. Subsequenl
new.
indicating venture success, Japanese venture capital firms tended to upgrade a venture investment
to :la jjoint
. venture or acquisition, while U.S. firms tended to sell! their
stake. Chang
tflc:' ownership
wner!ihip stakt:,
C

(1995)) questions whether the sequential investment pattern holds for western
firms, r.C:
reasoning
lem :firmr.
::as(l~nipg
that colt
cultural
background of non-western firm favor an incremental
mal
a1 and iinstitutional
1Stit
renlleotai and
evolutionary approach to
investment.
does fiot
not test
this proposition,
he encourages
[0 in
Ve!ibJIlmlLL Although he doe,s
tf:5[ thi
,'1'0 .
study
matter.
s:rnd)' of
0 the
t e malr,
Hofstede (19
(1980) defined
as the col
collective
€1:eJ1l1c~1 national culture
culturei)"
i ~ ti programming of the human mind.
HOistede-.
His dimensions of culture are well known and include uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
masculinity-femininity, and individualism and vary considerably across countries.
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u""" "'"

Understanding
which
cultural <Ii"""""",,,
dimensions bear
upon the 0«;';""
decision 10
to buy
buyout
partner moy
may ibtd
shed
u
_....
hi<~ <ul'on!
_
.....a ponnu

_f.

. lichI
light ""
on ..
several
important W"".
issues. For
instance, in_1inJ,
investing f"""
firms ill
in k""""l«Ige-int<..
knowledge-intensive
industries
""JOI lmpotlOOl
Foo~.
i"" induwios
would benefit f"""
from l<r>owi"1
knowing _
how """"
target firms
from diff«=l
different ow,..,..
cultures I<ll<l
tend Tn
to tUJlO"'I
respond '"
to
"'-'<I
n"", I"""
ante ........
knowledge
may prove h<!pM
helpful in
in
sequential ..
investment
behavior by _
partners.
This ex """
ocqO<llliol
",,"men' brna.....
n o nu."
l«IF may"""",

equity collaborations. S,.w.Iy.
Similarly, <allalto<Oling
collaborating _
firms would
be
negotiating the l<"'"
terms of R&D equifyrollabonlinDa.
..,oo.InJ"'"
_ II<.
advised Tn
to lIIl(Ionc.......
understand whether
foreign pan-.
partners ....,
are lil«ly
likely to
to ~
consider ""'m
them an ocquulliool
acquisition
adrio<><l
1l<1b:r f"",,1I'

""r """

candidate. ",.
At a broader
level, national <\OJ,....
culture may have ,;lJlif""""
significant ImplkcJnl"'"
implications t..
for
...."'_
_1<",1.""_
commitment fmoo
firms ....
make in ~"""1'''&emerging, hi!!,
high O<d>
tech 1
industries.
understanding
the 1<",1
level ond
and type
_
n l 'Il<
'YPO of O",,.'n,,,,,,,,",
-.
national <III"""
culture ""
on the
rate of J'I'1na"
partner 1N}'IlUC""""
buyout across
We ClIp1iciclr
explicitly '''"''''''''
examine ,be
the .rr_
effects of notional
the nu:
cQltural
twelve diff"",m
different """"tries.
countries. o..r
Our h)'p<'Cl>ele>
hypotheses ....,
are do""loped
developed oninl
using ~
aggregate """""'.
measures of ad......
'welYo

cIi5UDD<
Hob_ (198ll)
_
opecifi<
'distance II)'
by Hofstede
(1980) IIlll
and R......
Ronen ond
and Sh<tlW
Shenkar (['ISS).
(1985), II
as ...U..
well as more
specific ctW
dimensions
of «01.......
culture relating
to "'"
the ;investing
firm. Uol..,.
Using a 'imo
time •varying
model, ...
we ""
test """"
these ~
hypotheses ""
on
of
!ali"1 to
.,;..1 fttm.
.,y;., _I.
of minority investments
and ;O;"
joint -..mm
ventures in the ~
biotechnology ~_
industry. "'11K
In the poll
past
a sample ol,..;-;ryl
.-.pIc:
_
......
two decades,
the bi<><oehnnlOl)'
biotechnology industry
has JW"1I
grown ..
explosively,
largely d""
due to the """'P'tion
recognition
,....
. "'"
"",ulUy lw
plool.... lr, Io.-.Iy
that _
biotechnology
could
"""
_ OI)'""",leI

disrupt old .,.,......
markets, ,create
new P""Iuc:".
products, _
and che.>p<n
cheapen cumn'
current
d".....
..........

proc<".

manufacturing. process. vlnu&lly
Virtually ....
every
developed <OWU)"
country boo
has torzc«<llca<l<r>lup
targeted leadership in
manuflCl"';.
ety ck"'k>p«I

_'""""11"

of Technology "Assessment,
biotechnology as a"","""
a national &0&1
goal (orr~
(Office ofT"'hntll<oJY
...... mall. 1991).
1'l'J11.
BACKGROUND

Following Kop;
Kogut (l'l'JI)•
(1991), ...,
we c~ri..,
characterize RAD
R&D <qUiry
equity 0011_
collaborations ...
as a la'll-II..,
two-stage
FoJIowInI

""",.on,

compound opcino:
option; ..
whereby
firms holding aUmilod
a limited equiry
equity ltIlke
stake in.
in a l>opt
target firm
can
a>mpOIInd
Oueby investing f"""lIoldi..
f'lm <an
track
development ond
and (mOIto:,
(market ond
and '«""""'sicoI)
technological) opponun"ieI
opportunities ;"
in iDdtwries.
industries. S"'~
Such
_ . kknowledge
__ l«Ig< oS<",~
equity coli_ions
collaborations &I1ow
allow f"""
firms to oWnw.
maintain ......
strategic
flexibility ro
to ...fIO"'110
respond to industry
trends
equ;ry
p: llu.ibillty
indulltY """'"

,
5

of''''

that on:
are dl/f",.I,
difficult 10
to I""!i<l.
predict. F<>k>wUIllh<:
Following the iol,ial
initial eqnl!)'
equity i"""""",",.
investment, <urN<
exercise of the flRl
first .
stage
,Il0o
. . of

'"..-.f

the option "is ~
represented ..,.
by ,..
the full
acquisition of.
of a '1fJ<I
target _
partner.
R&D
Ih<:
fuJI ""i"~~ion
. In the case of I(&!>
partnerships
where on
an
~
p < ......

investing fum
firm IlOl
has ,oIwI
taken •a millOrily
minority equity .stake,
partner buyw'
buyout ld"",
refers ,.
to
iDvnl1n1
. . . porID<l"

of Ih<:
the R&D .oppIietlp.."
supplier/partner.
Partner buyooI
buyout lot
for join,
joint .-<.....
ventures ",I
refers ,.
to dl<
the
the ""'luioiolon
acquisition 01
Ih<:
...... I'artD<r
2
the join'
joint """""'..,.
venture by """
one oflh<:
of the ~
parents.
Exercise
growth
acquisition of ,be
""",,;o;tioo
...' fu...
is< of the _second stage J'O"'Lb

by moDOJ
making further
discretionary ,
investments
in research
or """"""",oJ
commercial
option "
is r<p<e><n'cd
represented by
"l"'''''
run..". <li"'''''"",0I:)'
, , _ '"
_ <.this view.
view, «(IIi!)'
equIty "",Uatoomiom
collaborations may
opportunities raultio.
resulting Ifrom Lb<
the f""
first .
stage
commitment. In 1m.
oppon"';!ia
. . commillll<lll,

....,!O

"'oseoo,,, """''''"''y.

initiated ...
as a way to manage <t>iIoJmou<
endogenous .....
and exogenous uncertainty. Exogenous
and
be initio!<d
fu"",,,,,,,,, ODd
additional c......
capital (0;,;,
(Dixit
endogenous -.inlJ'
uncertainty 11.1""
have MI.......
different effects
on Ih<:
the <l<cioion
decision 10""""""
to commit oddi,o><w
.odot<""".
ff<ds ""
& Piod)o:k.
Pindyck, 19\1<;
1994; Rivoli
& SilJurio.
Salorio, 19(6),
1996).
'"
Ilholi ol
reduced by til<
the _
actions
the firm. In ,be
the ""'"
case of '_Iin.
emerging
Exogenous "'lUfUl1IIJ'
uncertainty ".,"'"
cannot be ~
bc"'......
. of ,t><

,""."Ii.....xtJ.<IWO,

technology
uncertainty ...
exists
example, the toeIi<IOloIial
technological
""~""'"c industries, exogenous MUrIOW7
;,u when,
"hen. for
lot c.om;tJ<
the iDdumy
industry II
is ~
indeterminate, iDcIwuy
industry infrastructure
is lacking, .-.lIt><
and/or "beD
when key
trajectory of ....
lnIj<clO<y
inlOUlnl<"tlll< illockJ
legislation off""';OJ
affecting ....
the iDduoIry
industry io
is pending.
I<J'>laUon
pclllliOJ.

Given
these <OD<litiono,
conditions, II><
the 1',.."
premature OC«IIl<itioo
acquisition of
Gi•
..,!b<o<

firms <I<vdopi".<mcrP>J
developing emerging ~
technologies may
impose .....
considerable
risks bo<a>o<
because the InvahOJ
investing
formo
Il1O)' ImpoM:
ilkrabl< n.b
firm .."".
gives Up
up ,be
the ""'"'"
option rI/
of waiting
new ;"I_ion
information Iluo
that mi
might off
affect the <I<.;
desirability
or
firm
~'"'" for
lot..,.
,;'~ ..
timing of
of the "'''''''"'''''"
investment. TIl<
The oIIl~'y
ability 10
to <l<1o~
delay _
irreversible
investment expenditures
until
""''''l
_10 In
pa><!i,
nhl
project .....
and
exogenous oncctUIlIIJ'
uncertainty is
is ......
resolved
can be
be ..
an important
source of flexibility
"ose
vcd ...
irnportonl """""
f\ul!>ili<)' in •a pro;.ct
profoundly
prolouDdl~

affect """-fueot
subsequent <locnion.!
decisions to inval
invest (McDonald .,
& S....l.
Siegel, 1986).
off"",

""'*'."""'" __

By
contrast, endogenous uncertainty
can be
decreased
by ""'''''''
actions of
of ....
the nnn,
firm. """'nriol
Potential
1I~ """~.
rIO"">'''"
be d<c,
'O"" by
sources of «><logo.....
endogenous """""..
uncertainty
for the <ovailOJ
investing firm
expansion 1010
into unfOlniI.unfamiliar
...roeo
DIy I<.-!b<
fum include:
inclLO!o: eJIponUon

=d<".

of r""",
firms 110m
from dl......,
diverse cul"n....
cultures, initiation
of R&D
that
international markets, ;"T<p....
integration of
inormoclon.ol
in;.;o,i<>o of
RItD projects
~ IhaI
take hill<
time ,n
to dcvckJfl.
develop, ...
or j"",o;h'~
inability ,n
to ...............
assess the target form',
firm's k.-Icdgc,
knowledge. Tluo
This lorm
form of uoccrwnty
uncertainty
toke

•
6

is
primarily "'....
resolved
by .......
learning;
that Ia,
is, 0<WlI1~
actually p<>fomtinl
performing ,he
the O<ti_IaOCWod
activities associated willi
with •a
i. prin>aril)
V«l b)'
nl; ,he
given ~
project.
Ii","

.oJ""

Previous
research "'&1=
suggests "".,.....,.
that greater ~
endogenous utl«rWlO)
uncertainty increases
the value
Pr<"""".-.....<h
~ "'"

i."",

of inf_""'.
information, aow:l
and .......
thus, in<t<....
increases io<nlli...
incentives 10
to invest i.
in I<nowlr<lt<
knowledge ...
generation
or ><qUi.ilion
acquisition
or
. - '"
the presence
endogenous un",,,,ainly.
uncertainty, iii<
the k<)
key clwo«<NIlc
characteristic 1I\lIl_
that makes
(McCardle, 1985).
(M<CWIe.
''lUI. In "'"
"",sene< of <tIIlos<1lOUS
the 1
investment
in knowledge
so OItJaai..
attractive l>
is ....
the abiJi'Y
ability 10
to """\",,,"1,
temporarily Of
or p<m>on<nIly
permanently au>p<nd
suspend
"'"
0 _ 10
_ _.. 10

.a1""

the upect<d
expected value of ....
the """'I'l<Ie<l
completed projects
declines """
due to
further <qUi!)'
equity 1
investment
funh<r
0 _ " , if
if,lI<
prnj<cl' <loc';"'.
0
_ >IIoocb.
Rotw:ns and Weitzman
Wci\<mon (1!/811
. \hal
i"l is _
if .....
learning
enhanced b)'
by
exogenous
shocks. Roberts
(1981) hi..
have _
shown
that If

of tho
the projocl.
project, """"
there Ii
is an lacen,i",
incentive 10"""';
to speed "I'
up "'"
the ,...,
rate o
of conunitment.
moving so
to the next, ....
stage of
...."...
f-.
uncertainty ond
and _enhanced learning
We
that 1,1>
it is ,..
the CO<IIIhnaliOII
combination of •endogenous
W argue Ibat
.........,.. """"'.'Y
"1 by
b)'
'""""'_ .....
_ . _ Ibn
moving to the next,stage
that motivates
the <locioio<l
decision to <OInI'lil
conunit in<mn<I".II~.
incrementally. This ......
staged

learning
investment
approach
takes 011
on .a1""
value ..
when
the porIIlCf
partner u..nincreases Ibn
the rate of IoonIlnJ
1
0..- _
h ..u.
b<o internalizing
...w;z;., "'"
this """'••••
sense, exercising
of a partner ioron.
is comparable
to the exercise
about ....
the ~
project. In Illi.>
_
,ci.il!& the buyout
)O"tof.pottno<
. _ IO""'uotCiooo
of a call "Pl"'"
option ""
on "'l"'l;es
equities I....
that ~,
pay ...
dividends.
the poUcO«
presence 01
of (Ii",dondJ
dividends ((that <Om<
come In
in "'"
th<;
of.
.;do:n<l._ In ,he
form of ~WI
learning ool...'....
advantages)I'Oa<
there may Il<
be on
an 'n<rn<i""
incentive '0
to u</tis<
exercise iii<
the _
partner buyout
option
rOlm
yO<l, OpOion

"*"_

If the ......
target ,um.
turns "",
out 10
to ....
have >kjlls
skills ,...
that "'"
are "'ie
relevant, to<
for ,..
the p"'n."
partner "'"
but """"'"
cannot be
be ...
easily
early. lfl!><
00'.
ily

transferred 0<r0U
across Ii,,"
firm OouO<lari<••
boundaries after
brief ;",<r<
interchange, a 10.0,.,..
buyout "'"'
may be
the only
only .i.ble
viable
fIn-.a """I
b< II><

",mal"""""

alternatives. Il<I&live
Relative 10
to ",,'
arm's-length
contracts, internalization f""ili~
facilitates """I.,
transfer of
.....-I.....
..1<0111> ",""u"""...

'"l'"""'"

technological
capabilities ....,.....
because "'"
the oo::qu;,..acquirer """
can tap into its rq><>&i,0<)'
repository of
of oocial
social knowl«lll<
knowledge II\lIl
that
W
~ <apal>ililio•
structures <O<JIXl1oti...
cooperative
MrII<:tWU

action. A<><:ordi"IIO
According to Kogut
and ~
Zander ('992).
(1992), Ihi<
this <61J=nc<
difference I.
in II",
the
octioo.
KopI .....

_u'ea

3
of IO'"ooloc
technology ......
transfer
the _
ownership
of "'"
the firm.
marginal <1TI<i<nq
efficiency <II
!IIIIJp.at
1'« constitutes th<
i p advantage of
fll1ll.'

Internalizing the partnu
partner f!llll
firm ""'y
may _
increase ....
the oIr.cionc)
efficiency 01
of k.-lt.lJe
knowledge lI
transfer,
thus <oabIi.,
enabling
r<t. '"'"
IDlOnlalm"llbo
the f"",
firm 10
to oeduc<
reduce 1uIIln:
future R&D
costs ...
so thot
that powdI
growth opportuoiuea
opportunities """
can b<
be ......,i.......
exercised at a lower
,Il<
RItD 0I»Ii
.
cost.
<-

,
7

,hen:...,.......

In ......
~, f
_ ...
biclI _
_ ...
!l<n <u,,"n;na
sum, there are at least Ihr<o
three important
factors
which
need consideration
when
examining

<'_

of partner
buyouts: (1)1b<
(1) the lc:Yd
level of
of exogenous UDCataiDty.
uncertainty, (:Illbo:
(2) the lc:,,<:i
level of
determinants "
~
'_~
endogenous uDC<rtaiDly."
uncertainty, and (J)
(3) lbo:
the J<lali.......
relative rate of I<oniq
learning iaid<
inside _
versus
outside form
firm
<JMkw""""
_ <JIJlJide
of lcamiol
learning ...
inside
boundaries. UoI<..
Unless ~
endogenous ~
uncertainty (2)10
(2) is prueaI.
present, oh<
the J<lalift
relative _rate <Jf
l>oulld.......
0<1<
this
versus _lIw::f_(J)wiIl
outside the firm (3) will .....
have "
no consequence.
This implies ..
an _
interaction
effect.
.......
" ~ no;,.,.lo:o
<ff«
t , In
Iolh..
paper, ...
we focus
explicitly OIl
on Ibo
the upoc<ecl
expected inI<n<:tioo
interaction b<_
between ~
endogenous """,lUinty
uncertainty .....
and
papa,
r""", «plicitl,
learning. In
In "'"
the J'""<I'D<
presence <Jf
of ............
endogenous \IIl<:CttaiIIl)
uncertainty firmo
firms wiU
will In
invest ooqu<llliaUy
sequentially ...
when
such
I<oraillJ_JUdI

Firms that Udno
learn """"
more #jfk-.I,
efficiently in
commitment
information _about future
opportunities. FI
<O<'
l\Illl""'' ' yields
yi<lds lrJotmIlioo
fuIut< OJIlI<W'WIiUeo.

""*,,, ,,,.

..

1"''''''''''

buyout
their partners.
hierarchies are ~
candidates to /w1
iii..
"'" wI,

the ......t
next o«tiOII
section ....,
we describe
thesis: .....
that """"""'
national <Ill......
culture ltOl..
traits .....,.
and <0".....
cultural
In tho:
. , our main 1hoI#;
of Ieorn'l\&
learning in
in
differences bd..
between
partners should """'"_..
contribute to endogenous
uncertainty """
and ,....
rates gf
dilf"",,.,..
""n ~
,1:1 , .. ......,...;0<)'
hierarchy, .....
and ,!l<",f_,
therefore, """"'"
should boor
bear opOIl
upon "
the
buyout dui."",.
decision.
bicrorct>"
" tooJ'l'll
HYPOTHESES

When
valuable, bloI-.pIoI<ol
but unexplored """""*'IY
technology Is
is r<OioXn,
resident ;n.
in a 'orF
target firm,
firms differ
Wilen .alo.aI>lc:.
fml\, 1investing
... uil\I fi.....

0<11_ ...,

of how l<am;"I
learning activities are 'n
to be
be <ItJOW<o:<l,
organized. COII'_"'OII
Consistent with pt<Yious
previous "'""""'~
research «.1·,
(e.g.,
in _
terms ofl!2!:
I.
& H...,ooom.
Hagedoorn, 1m:
1997; Pow<ll,
Powell, Kopulol.
Koput & S",,''''
Smith1991; Hof>1OX.
Hofstede, 1991;
Olie, 1'19<:
1994; O>bom
Osborn 01.
Adler, 1'191,
1'I91:0IJ<.

gf....,.,.

Doerr,
attributes of among i'lV<Slin,s:
investing f,rms
firms lIr<
are principal
Doc", 1996), we argue that the cultural
1"...1 .<ri,,"...
piDC,pa1

O<IJ.,.....

how rfirms _
choose ..
to co-pn''''
organize leanU"I
learning activities. We
motivate
our h)pOl!>oOe>
hypotheses
determinants of """
<!<I<mIIn>nt.
W. _
_ "'"
of HoIIIOdo',
Hofstede's (1980) dim<m.ions
dimensions 01
of ...
national
culture: paw..
power ~<
distance ....
and IU.U"';"')'
uncertainty
using ,.....
two 01
'-'1io1
inn.. OIII,u""

avoidance. We
believe I!IIO
that .
these
dimensions ""'
are ........
the most reIe
relevant in Ille
the 0Iudy
study of!W'".,of partner
"""""""'.
We bebe...
- ,two
..... dimeJWOII>
buyouts for
several reasons. Finl,,,
First, as noted
by Hofstede,
"Of the four dj_.
dimensions
of national
t.Jyw<>
f....-KV<BI.-.
_\I)'
Hofual<, -of1lle1
. . . of.Olioo..
culture, p""'er
power dWoac<
distance ood
and UD«IIainly
uncertainty uoidan<e
avoidance ill
in porti<ular
particular affect our tIIinlioa...,."
thinking about
<III,....

•
8

•

.......eri.,

organizations. OrpnWnlll"')'ll
Organizing always <l<maod
demand tho
the answering of"""~:
of two questions: (1) WlIO
Who ....
has tho
the
otpI1Iu6oos.
_
In
n And (1)
ill II<
n"'"
deCide what?
(2) WhoI
What "'Io...
rules or ~
procedures will
be foli<>we<110
followed to .....
attain
the <I<>,rocl
desired
power
to dot.....,...

'wo

contrast, Hofstede
believes dUll
that while
his 0Ih<r
other two dunonoion>•
dimensions,
ends?" (1991: 100),'
140).4 In «>nItaIl.
dOIlr.r
1100'._ bolie...
10 hi.
of the notional
national culWt<.1h<y
culture, they lmpIyli"l<
imply little
masculinity ~
and _ri<l.ali....
individualism, "'_lIy
broadly 'dl«'
reflect "'"
the .al"",
values or"",
..-utin.,.
about odmioiolrlti>'o
administrative pn<ti<e>
practices "';lbi.
within "'l""iuI......
organizations. CnnslsInu
Consistent ..i'h"'"
with the irnp<:In-:o:
importance pIooDlon
placed on
.......
power distance _
and """".lInty
uncertainty .voi<Iua:
avoidance lnsi<lc:
inside oopniuli<lna,
organizations, ......
these '100
two di"",nt.ions
dimensions bo..
have bncn
been
power.m.-,.
multinational ~
corporation ..
as
the ~
most 1""''';''
pervasive ,n
in "sutclI
research ...
examining
the bcha.xn
behaviors of "",ltinobonl!
tho
mlnin. tho

K"".. S.

of Emunilll
Erramilli (J'l96).
(1996), GOIipon.uo:l
Gatignon and An<l<t>on
Anderson (1m).
(1988), Kogut .uo:I
and Singh
the work of
•evidenced
>'id<nud by
hJ' tho

of P"W'"
power
(1988), and Sboo<
Shane (I99J).
(1993). FirWIy.
Finally, Hofstede
(1991) .......
argues thai
that v,""",
various roml""'"combinations of.
(1988).
Hohlede (l99I)

"""".pomtl

of Mintzberg'
(1983) p«fnmI
preferred
distance .....
and """''''''<Ny
uncertainty .._
avoidance correspond dim<tJy
directly In
to ~
each of.
<Ii..."
Mint2bul·.s (1m)
authority _n_"""
configurations IDol
and ~"";nl
coordinating """hanl'n»,
mechanisms, tl>=by
thereby •.tpo"-;o.
capturing bodI
both ""'"'"'"
national """
and
..ol>ori<y

.. -...

organizational ,roi'~
traits. It seems ,hal
that PO"""
power di"""",
distance an<!
and "nt<r1';n<y.~
uncertainty avoidance ...
are ,he:
the most
orpniut......
'"""

...

distinctive cuI'....
cultural1~,rn<...,.,
dimensions which
organizational WUCIIIf<
structure and f.n<:tIOIIIn.
functioning
l!ialiactI..
tu<h influence
,nfltJ<OC< OI'IoniutIOIIlIl
(Hoecklin, 1995).
(IbctI;",
I'm).

"""'Of

of a """or>aI
national c.I,.1O
culture ..
will
influence tho
the <1<_
degree '0
to ..
which
the
We M'JItJ<
argue ....,
that power di""",,,
distance of.
W.
iII,.IIucOC<'
"'ell "'"
investing finn...,
firm can !<ani
learn In
in h",l"OIChy,
hierarchy. ...
Also,
uncertainty •....,."..,
avoidance .uo:I
and c.I,tn1
cultural ~i>Ioncc
distance oro
are
iIl....in.
1.." .nt<r1I1.,y
to ..............n=u.l.,y
endogenous uncertainty in
the <'I,,;'y
equity pottnc,
partner 1'<100000000p.'
relationship. 5
argued to eonIri""",
contribute ro
M'JI'IOIl1O
In tho

Power Distance
Learning Inside
versus o.oWo:lo
Outside 11>0
the Fl""
Firm
.........
011...... and
nn<lIAan<I"I
I............
As noted,
Zander
point to tho
the 1mpnrtanI
important di1f<.......
differences in 1ollllln,..rT'oci<:ncy
learning efficiency
....
_ . Kogut
Ko.", and
IDll 7
_ (1992) pninllO

._10

across ..
governance 1mdo1
modes. Th<y
They 1rJII"
argue .....
that il
it "'
is """"
more efficient to lr2II.r..
transfer """,pie'
complex b>wlcd..
knowledge
""""'"
of a firm
because Io>rnlnl
learning P'O<UM*
processes Ole.
are a flmclion
function of >Iwod
shared ..
values
within "'"
the booIn<bri«
boundaries of.
_
r....., bc<_
1<... and

00'."

assumptions. If ...
national
embodies oocial
social ...........
knowledge _and .....
organizing
principles, iIit
""""""'"'
j.... culture <IIIhodJo.
i.;o. pi"",pIes,

,
9

therefore _bears UfIOIIIII<
upon the <>ponod
expected on-l<;mq
efficiency ofle""""l
of learning "'b«qu<oI
subsequent '"
to ....partner bu'J'OUl
buyout. Firms
"""'I"",
FIZIIlI
of
from
certain <Ulnu«
cultures ""'y
may lum
learn more
efficiently "hen
when '."nIlll«d,
internalized, while ""
the ......pn.I
marginal rate of
r""" <UUoo
~ ,m(""",~

ct"'"

learning
hierarchy
may II<
be Iow<I
lower for Firm<
firms from other t\I~
cultures. tt.l1
Hall (1976) 0lJU<'d
argued ,...
that
Icom'.1 in
i....
~~ "'"l'
of information
and ...._
patterns 0(
of "',11I,,"',,""><>11.
communication.
cultures ...,
vary JfUlly
greatly ,.
in ,II<
the processing
culIU....
~ 0(
i.formatlOll ood
of Je.niaa
learning iii_IDe>
in hierarchies ..
relative
to
One cull"'"
cultural .uri_
attribute tho!
that .......
should
influence the ....
rate 0(
One
k1 i.n""""",11<
IoU.. '"

"'\<Il' '"

collaborations is power
distance (PO).
(PD). 1'0.....
Power Distance
defined ..
as ""!be
"the extent to whicll
which
roIIoboo";"",
~ di<ton«
0;"",,,," is ddIDod
of a _;"'1
society oo:«p<l.hOI
accept that pow"
power I.
in iinstitutions
organizations "llisItibutrd
is distributed """",aJl~"
unequally"
members 0(.
""'onbrn
_ _ and
IlIld ~
(Hofstede, 1985:
As oppIiod
applied '"
to orpoiu!ioo.,.
organizations, _
control,
decision 1IVIkj01.
making, IlIld
and ."U>:rl'~
authority
(HQI,l<Ile.
198.'i; 348-349). N
. <IocWoo.
are hlu:l~
likely '"
to II<
be t>JghI~
highly "<'luoJi«d
centralized (lIof.-,
(Hofstede, 1980).
Acquiring r""",
finns from
cultures <1IanocIai<ed
characterized
...
1980), Acq.;n,,1
_
<Ul,u:eo

_,M<

as hlgk
high PD operate most comfortably
hierarchy. 10
In ""'h
such ~
countries, "'"
we up«'
expect ,II<
the musl
marginal
rate
..
l~ in hi<fo«hy.
.........
of learning
or le<hno!ogy
technology .....
transfer
to b<
be '"J!>a'
highest in
hierarchy. Indeed,
(1991) di"""",
discusses
0(
1<""'<1& Of
r", '"
io hi<twdly.
1n<Oood, Hofstede
_
(19\11)

<011"'" _

culture io
in ""
an Impon"",
important Iumiol
learning context - i.
in _
schools.
In high
cultures,
the Impll<lIl1<Jm
implications of ...,,,,..
,II<
" 10
his" PD
PO <UI'.....
such ..
as l~,
Japan, !<omIOI
learning is otru<IW'<d
structured ond
and houor<hi<.al.
hierarchical. B~
By """""",
contrast, komi..
learning his loose
and motr
more
""'h
1ס0o< oo<l
unstructured In
in low
cultures.
""''"''',.~
lo'" PD
PO """""".
might up""
expect 11IOI
that Ii"",
firms from
high PD ",,10=.
cultures ...111
will mo..
move dlm:tly
directly ",,011";1'"
to outright
One ""III'
bUIll hiflll'D
acquisition, 0I>d
and .void
avoid Ibo
the r....'
first "'i"
stage "'lullY
equity ooIloh<xa1ioo..
collaboration. C""oi""lII
Consistent w\1h
with Ibis
this "'~.
expectation,
O«Ju,sitl<n
of hierarchical «KItto!
control in
Shane (l99l)
(1993) foon<!
found "UIl
that III<
the hllh<J
higher <be
the PD,
the ,.......
greater Ibo
the lik<lihood
likelihood of_h,n]
Shone
PO, lb<
transactions. Mor<
More ,"",,",I)',
recently, &nmolli
Erramilli (1996)
(1996) 10UIHl
found ,hal
that fi"'"
firms from .-via
countries "illt
with hi~r
higher PO
PD ....
are
,........,.""".
more likely '"
to iOrt
seek II\lIjoriIJ
majority "...Il<nlup!ll
ownership in ro..ll"
foreign "'~.
subsidiaries.
_1it<1y
In lb<
the ~
absence ol.ocloFlIOII'
of endogenous ao«NI"'l'.
uncertainty, fi"'"
firms from
high PO
PD <Ul,.....
cultures ",ill
will ""qu'"
acquire ouui.ch<.
outright.
10
r""" '"&It
However, in Ibo
the JIf<I':"""
presence of <ocloF""'"
endogenous -..iol)',
uncertainty, lb<y
they will
invest incrementally,
beginning
H""",va,
"ill 10_
il,,:,.m''''I~I~,ho';NlI..
with Ih<
the r....'
first •..,.
stage oquit)'
equity <Ollobcnli<>o.
collaboration. Sova>i
Several cu"",oJ
cultural otlrihul<l
attributes jon"""",
influence ~
endogenous
"'illl
uncertainty.
"""",,",IllY·
10

'"

Uncertainty Mold......
Avoidance, o.ll~""
Cultural DIow-,.DOI
Distance, and
U_rt.ol~'y

Endogenous
Uncertainty
"""""_ U
ln,y

The 1I\Jdy
study 01",,,,,"01
of national <IIU"",
culture 011
on &Q"C1NDC<
governance _modes "'"
has prNoml
predominantly
focused ""
on
l, fO<USOd

.Iri-.

transaction 000<
cost explOUliono.
explanations, "h<t<
where "'"
the <Ill,.,..
cultural attributes or partner
differences 1O
in ....
national
I,.IlsacOOo
pormot diff..-:ea
ma1
of managers
to JI"fUi
perceive
the ~
potential lot
for
culture ....
are expocll>d
expected '"
to IIl<Id<fao<
moderate I!wI
the "'liIy
ability '"
,uI"""
I'" '"
.. lb<
my

opportunistic behavior
partners (Honipoo.
(Harrigan, 1985).
As 00«<1
noted ,earlier,
these ..........
transaction
costs
owononlol;<
beha""" by pon
19\15). 11>
..U.... """"
ion 0001$
of "",,11y
equity ponlOC»hipo
partnerships on<!
and jol..
joint YCIIura
ventures .....
and
found to be
be •a '0'
key _determinant lor
for d,>IOIOlion
dissolution 01
"were
... "'-I
have """"
been cltOfully
carefully arliculll<d
articulated ill
in lbo
the Ii..,......,
literature. Building
on Jll'C"kN.
previous research,
we argue _that
ha..
lIuillinJ ""
rcoean:b. .........

rotIlti"""'"

uncertainty
avoidance (UA) _and <Mi,.n>J
cultural ~
distance (U»
(CD) ""'
are ,....,
two import....
important contributors to
.....
~~

endogenous ...-..ry
uncertainty.
..........

."<Ii<Ian<.

as Ib:.
the ·do~
"degree '0
to "tn<h
which "'"
the menU><"
members ",
of •a ..",;o,y
society f<d
feel
Uncertainty avoidance (UA)
(UA) i.
is dof_
defined ..
U-"';"',
uncomfortable
with """"';11/}'
uncertainty or.l
and ~I"j,y
ambiguity,. ....nkh
which loods
leads ",.,.
them to""PPM
to support bW<f.
beliefs pn>nIi1i.,
promising
_.,.....h.....,th
certainty IIlod
and to ..,;
maintain
institutions P'''''''''''lI_ftl<lniti'"
protecting conformity" (1I01.1r<I<.
(Hofstede,
«ruio',
.. 0.;,. .....,"""""

an
1985: 3-O1-.lO9~
348-349). In OIl
19\15:

of UA """,
leads ....
managers
to make
risky <kclslons_
decisions and
organizational ,,,,,,,.~
context, ha";nllu&h
having high ....10
levels 01
OJIonitoOioNl
ap:n 10
_ . less
leu ri.ky

1_"'"

rules
develop «>pI01
coping moe..."",,
mechanisms 10
to COIIIroI
control Ull<Cftli"',.
uncertainty, ""h
such ..
as d<v<los"lIl
developing """,,",'
complex ')'IlmII
systems of niles
dovdolJ

(Hol"_.

and ....
regulations and foIk1willl
following ttIUI:IIIr«I.
structured, ri'uoJ
ritual behaVIor
behavior (Hofstede, 1980).
IIlod
1980~
foreign marUI
market <lilly
entry
Uncertainty ~
avoidance ....
was """'.
shown 10
to be III
an importlll'
important pmIielor
predictor of fom..
Ull<C<llIiot,
For instance,
Kogut, ond
and Sin,gh
Singh (I~)
(1988) f""DOI
found ,that multinational
corporations from
_modes. "'"
io"""",," K
mulllllo<lan>l """Jl"'1"1QAO
cultures
<Uj,....

high '"
in UA are more likely
to ,
choose
joint ...
ventures
greenfield ""'Y
entry _.,....
modes over MI
full
h1lb
lillely '"
_ j<>ioot
11'
or &m<of'dol

acquisitions. The><
These authors
attribute Ibis
this ....
result
to I!wI
the fact
the ut>C<OUiflly
uncertainty ...-ill<d
associated with
ocquioiOOoiJ.
00n ottribll..
It 10
fld that "'"

mao.......,.

of _
both ..
subsidiary
and pomII
parent t\rmo
firms i>
is UOlUlobIe.
untenable. Th<tr:f<n.
Therefore,
integrating U
the
teams III
io"SI1lllo.
.. management teamr.
Iooldioty Mil
establishing an <qUit)'
equity
these firms
are ..more """f"""l>1<
comfortable ..
with
either 'pt;eOf,,1d
a greenfield ill_tmo",
investment or _15lO1I.Il1II
""""
f,,",, ....
ith oj"""
partnership
with
the loooI.
host ooo0ly
county ""J....
target. S!lao<
Shane (1993) flllUld
found tIIOI
that _firms f"""
from hip
high UA
UA _societies
patUl<rUtip ..
ith "'"
favor licensing over acquisition-type entry modes.
11

"

,ho'"

Given their ",,",11'11)'
proclivity """OJ<!
toward risl;
risk ~.
avoidance, iIit .....
is not surpisiq
surprising lbIc
that fifinns
high UA
GI"",
_ from
_ hl&h
cultures ....
prefer
staged In_ot
investment '"
to 0IIlriP<
outright <:<>rnrDiIm<Dl.
commitment. A'
At Ibo
the .....
same tim<
time, we expect
finns
CII!lure>
r., ">&<d
peeI f1ml>
added
from h'&h
high UA cul'orn
cultures '"
to benefit from ,a Ir><nition
transition <own
toward hienr<hJ
hierarchy """because of ,the oddocI
structure in
in plot<
place ro
to conttol
control oppcnLlni><i<
opportunistic belli......
behavior. Wheo
When finns
are from c"ltufU
cultures Ih.It
that ....,....,
are also
"""""'"
r..... ""
high io
in _
power di<WlCe.
distance, ...
we "peeI
expect the",
there ..
is odd<d
added incentive
to internalize
the w
target
in order
hi'"
ill«flll.. '"
~ Ibo
... finn
r..... i.o_
to learn &boot
about Jr<l"'h
growth "PP""unl,a
opportunities """"
more .rr",ie...
efficiently.
Our ~Iioa
proposition "'"'
that III'"
high PD,
high UA
ro
ly. OwPD. IIIIJ'
cultures ...
are q."cku
quicker ro
to In<cmaliz<
internalize 0f'PUI'
appears """I",,",
consistent wi!h
with ....................
arguments made bJ
by H...".
Hurry <l
et 01.
al. 1l'l92)
(1992)
cult"""
and 0>00&
Chang (I'19S).
(1995), "00.......0
who asserted thai
that J
Japanese
relative
to U.s.
U.S. filllll
finns, were
more like!)'
likely '"
to
II>d
_.. finns,
fJrlllS, ..
I>Ii", '0
n: """"
eventually ""'l"i..
acquire ,_,
target fll'tDl.
firms. 8J
By conIruI,
contrast, U.S. ffinns
are """"
more IIK1y
likely '"
to ><II
sell their
equity
.","'wolIy
..... ""
If "'l"I.,.

,"!'"'

positions in ...,.,
target fimu
finns foIlowl••
following Ihe
the target firm',
firm's initill
initial public
offering. 1od<ed.1oO«Ifdin.
Indeed, according '"
to
pool""""
pllblk offeriot.
Hofstede (19M).
(1980), tho
the J...."...
Japanese II<
are 1>IIk0ll
ranked ..pill<I<ItIJ
significantly hi......
higher OIl
on _both PD
compared '.
to
IIof_
I'D _and UA comporod

,...
s......
the United States.

iii..,

Hypothesis
1: When
established finns
are from """""'"
cultures _ranked high 1II_1i~
in uncertainty
H"""~<JIJ: I:
WbooI_
fumo ""

'*'""'

avoidance and hllJ'
high in power
distance, partner bII)'O\ItI
buyouts ...
are -!ikdJ.
more likely.
,~ODd
pow..- diotMo<.

_u

-1fIIl<'l-__ r...... r"""

In "'"
the puu,.
passage above,
cultures "Idl
with hipo.
higher power
Id
. we argued that established finns from cui

"".c ""I"'"

distance .......
learn """"
more CIlkK'Uly
efficiently from
from \helf
their 1*"
partners, II>d
and llIIo
that .....
the ~
marginal incentive 10
to acquire
dl>t""'"
their partners
is 1IIphighest "when
the n:b1.kIol.hip
relationship is confronted
with endogenous
uncertainty. While
'hei,
"""""" i<
..... "'"
""r""'.... wi,~
,. ~:
"""",,*,"'y.
While
uncertainty avoidance bis OIl<
one <Ii........,.
dimension Ih.It
that 1<X<JIl......
accentuates .
endogenous
uncertainty,
cultural
If/IC<n.oi"".voI<Iaoc<
--.~
y . cui'.....
of .....
endogenous
uncertainty.
distance (OJ)
(CD) 1><0
between
the partrsm.
partners DlIy
may 11<0
also i.onll<S>C<
influence l!I<
the """"'"
amount of
~
...... "'"
~" """"""",y.

,,<I<f_

Cultural di.,..,.,.
distance is defined IS
as \he
the dqR<:
degree '0
to "h",~
which 'I><
the bom<
home <OunUY
country eul"""
culture of '"
an in"""'t
investing firm
Cui""..
r"",

i,
tty m>tk<l
flnns op<t'IliIIJ.-....
I,
is d;..lmilar
dissimilar from IhII
that Dllbo
of the _host ......
country
market _and finns
operating therein. When ,I><",
there is
more culMoI
cultural di""""'
distance ..........
between pOrInUS.
partners, "'"
the obi)l.,.
ability '"
to cff""j",ly
effectively obsavo
observe _and prnl><l
predict
""""

iii"""

opportunism
among putnm
partners h
is ~r<d
hindered (Kocui.
(Kogut, 19l1~}.leadio.I'o
1988), leading to higher j>Jt«1t1a1
potential ".....,I\on
transaction
_
_I>m IDlOII.I
12

"

costs. IIu<.
Here, It.....moo
transaction roiI$
costs "'.........
represent ~
communication ....
and C<IIItroI
control <:ooU
costs ,mbodial
embodied m
in wlunJ
cultural
roou.
differences.
<61l,"'.....
of work
focused GO
on iamoI
initial fOY<rIIOD<&,boIa
governance choice and found ..
cultural
A large
lata< body o
f _ has
t... f<><:W<d
It un!

a..,"""

differences Iud
lead finns
to illy
shy a.,.y
away rrom
from bi<r..,hy
hierarchy (K"C...
(Kogut and Sinp,
Singh, 1m,
1988; Gatignon and
<611.",..,..
r...... 10
of cultural distance ""
on
Anderson, 1!/8I;S!""<
1988; Shane 1993).
Other researchers ""..
have ""-'Ol!><
attended to the ......
role ol<UI'"<al<li<u<l«
"'..........
199~~ Oll><o"~
existing
partnerships, nndilllllha<
finding that "OOOIribura
it contributes 10
to a his/l<1
higher ....,
rate of putocnl1ip
partnership
the >IahiIi'y
stability of ••
I!><
"U"Il portn<nhip<,
1996; Barkema,-Shenkar,
(Harrigan, 1985; 11"-'11<11,&
Barkema, Bell, & Pennings,
_dissolution (~Im,
I'«>ninp. 1996,
lIamma, SbrnlAr. Venneulen,
V.nn<UIm,
& Bell,
and Un_
Ungson, 1997). ","'"
More "'kv....
relevant to our ..
study,
Olie (199<)
(1994) and Elsass
..
Ildl. 1997;
1991, Park IOd
lilly, 01>.
El .... and

diverse cultUla
cultures 0«140
tends to be.
be a <hAlIm&i"ll
challenging ob5ucle
obstacle to
Veiga
(1994) ItJIOOd
argued _
that II><
the bI<no<lifIJ
blending of Wftn<
V,ip (199<)

n"""

successful ...........
mergers. 1nde«I.
Indeed, cultural difr.ra><:a
differences betwe<tl
between finns w..
was _found to p«Jicl
predict >!tal,
stress,
IUC<eSlfuI

""pti",
_ "''P',
th< lo<k
t><......... finns
rum. JUbot<fu<n'
of <oop<fOIion
cooperation between
subsequent to
negative .,i!Ud<>
attitudes ,
toward
merger, _
and the
lack of
& Raveh,
1996).
merger
(Weber, Sb<nhr.
Shenkar, '"
.......... (W<b<r.
R.o"'h. 1_1.

of
These rfndinp
findings WU"'l
suggest t....
that fot
for ••
existing
partnerships, «Jl<...
cultural
differences ,..;1<
raise ttl<
the """'"
degree 0(
llIcoo
;.U!t& p,'lt.".h,p!.
>1 dill.........

f.,laa

endogenous """",","'y
uncertainty l>cin'_..
facing partnerships,
the ,~.
endogenous """,_y
uncertainty facing l'<O'PO'I'
prospects f<>t
for
~
hip> and ,00
successful
~ul

f,,,,,,,.

of ttl<
the finns. The successful
transfer of _Ied,<
knowledge ....,.,.
among <Ulunlly
culturally di>lo:n<
distant
mergers 01
-.....
1.1 ,...,1...

captured ,loony
clearly by ~.
Luostarinen, wOo
who <len_
defined
partners
is ..,
an ;nd<t<rnU
indeterminate P"X",.
process. Thio
This .low;.
view is <apo.l'I<>d
pon-. ;•
cultural dioun«
distance ..
as "tho
"the sum
of factors CJ<'Olin••
creating, GO
on 11><
the ....
one Iw>ll.•
hand, a .-d
need for
knowledge, and GO
on
nllt......
1Il orfkt<ln
f« -1<dJ<,
the _other hand, b&rri<..
barriers to ,he
the knowledge
and b<oc<
hence ..'"
also f«
for f\ows
flows "
between
the home ....
and
ttl<
lrowlodlC flow ....
" _ "'"

I!><
Ill-1J2~
the target countries"" (1980;
(1980: 131-132).
that ..."",
when """""''''''''
endogenous "-"''''''Y;'
uncertainty is rombiDod
combined wilh
with
Consistent
with Ilypot/l<o;'
Hypothesis I1, we argue WI
~
_ wi'"
more
efficient ldminl
leaming in rnn..:by
hierarchy (I
(i.e, bi&fl
high PD~
PD), puIDOt
partner buyouts
should ........
ensue. A>
As a result,
_
<lfl<km
00ry<Kn <houIol
reoWt.
when ~
partners ...
are nlllutaUy
culturally d;.....
distant ..,..;
and ,he
the ;"><Olin.
investing r......
firm i.
is from.
from a <.ltlft
culture thalli
that is !lip
high in p,n••"
power
........

13

distance, we
expect there 10
to be od<I<d
added incentive
<ll~.
W< <>po<llh<tt
inc=~"" to

internalize ......,..
the target firm
in OId<r
order to ....
learn
iDl<maIiu
fIrm '0

about J"'''''''
growth opponurutieo
opportunities _efffci<.~"
more efficiently.
'""'"

Hypothesis l'
2: """'.
When po<ttl<t<
partners Oft'.-.
are more oul<..
culturally
distant and 'ho
the ..
established
firm is
ranked
If"........
o.Il, di"...
_i>lM1I fItm
i, ...kool
high in ~
power <1;"""",,.
distance, _partner ~
buyouts "'"
are ""'"'
more likely.
hlrb

REsEARCH DESIGN

Sample
~~.
We ",",w
drew .a.sample
equity coll_,,,,,,,
collaborations ond
and joint ......."""
ventures iII><>l'l"1
involving dod..",,,,,,
dedicated
w.
. mplo of minority
mi""";lj' OIluilj'

Carolina Biotechnology
Center (NCB C) ",,0'_
Actions
biotechnology firms
(DBFs) from
the North
1100100"""","
f'rm> (DHF.)
fro:n tho
N",,~ Carol...
Bi","lutoIo,y c..".INCBC!
Database.
v.1Ubu>.,

oYer'.ooo

This dllot.u<
database ,,,,I.d..
includes detailed iuf<>nna<loo
information r<pnll...
regarding over 4,000 ",Iorion,,"ps
relationships I<Id
and
Thi,

In 1'0/'1"",1.......
particular, the NCIJC
NCBC
transactions ~
among firms
in the bius«bDolozlr
biotechnology irKl•...,.
industry ""'"
since 1'1l1.
1978. Iu
""","",,,,,,,
~"'" iu
a) "'.......
whether the ''''''':<'00
transaction involved
an
database IDclodoo
includes 'h<
the 1..
following
characteristics: .)
d........
_ , transaction
tnMactiou <haractaislic,'
i.\'OJ
..
of <q.I".ilI
equity via •a miuorilj'
minority to"""""'"
investment <II"
or •a JOi..
joint """,....
venture, bl
b) the........,.ioo
the transaction t!aI<,
date, oj
c) ....
the
exchange of
..,'-#
of ponnen
partners iu..,j~.
involved, dl
d) ....
the Iyp<
type ofpartDOB
of partners iu....
involved
(i.e., VBF.
DBF, ollablioh«l
established
identity ond
and 1lIJmb<r
number or
Ideo';'y
Y<d (i....

uni"""l'l.

f) ,I><
the ""~
technological IUbf..
subfield,
and
firm, _
government,
or university), oj
e) uch
each party',
party's homo
home 000.0)'.
country, f)
r"""
" or
1d., and

...--.oadal«I

of •each
transaction. "II
All """'''.''''''''
transactions W<If!
were cross-validated ",I,••
with a !timU..
similar
g) a _rill
general <I<>cn",I""
description of
I)'
.oc:b~,

Bioscan. In
the O'UtI
event """
that ....
the It>nSO<:UOU
transaction ......
dates differed OUOSIIOUt<:<S,
across sources, .....oed
we used ....
the
database,
. . . . B....-,
Ill ....

"'o

the two doI<,.
dates.
earlier of ....
..,1."

In
studying ....
the NCBC "etioM
Actions _database
and 00IIlf"'rlu1
comparing with Biooc.ou
Bioscan we <dIoc1ool
collected
III ..w)'l"S
... ond
information OIl
on 611
618 «(II1,y
equity ..,Uab<nti_.
collaborations. Thi,
This <>risJ'"
original samplo:
sample "'..
was t<duc«I
reduced fo.for tlvtc
three tbo<lr<ucol
theoretical
informldKJU

"""0<$, •

reasons.
First,
our compiled <bu
data were
restricted to
to ........,""'"
transactions t=WI.iuJ
involving Oll!)l'
only ''''''
two parties, a
_
. 1"
. .... out
W<If! ",>tri<lM

target DBF
domiciled in
the United
States and _10/lo<I
established ro_
firms ""iuJ""""
having core bw.in<sId
businesses ouuJd<
outside
'"'11<'
DIlF <loml<'!<d
;" ....
U"i~ S

i,"

biotechnology.
We 1><100..
believe it is easier to identify '''''
the ,n",.,.I1'"
integrated manufacturer
as the hoId<r
holder of
of _
" " "...., W.
_ _ ......
14
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the .011
call "l'lion
option to ""'lUlf<••
acquire, a 0<1",1
belief ~i1.I<III
consistent with
Hurry <l
et II.
al. (Im~
(1992). Th.;,
This is JlMti<uWly
particularly
Ill<
Wlth HUfJ)'
reasonable in
cases where
established r"""
fIrms 'oU
take •a minority
equity 01>4
stake ill
in •a DBF. Tl>o><
These c....
cases
,..oonoIJI<
;" ........
11<" ....,.,_
mi/I<lril) <qullY
of <Jut
our liool
fInal ..........
sample.
constitute IlU
83.8 p<1C<'"
percent <L
00D0li,,,,,,

Determining
who I><>IdIIb<
holds the call <>ptiooI1•
option is ..,...
more
D<uomi.ll;"I"1>o

challenging ;"'joint
in joint ....
ventures,
where
both parties <:<oUrit>u\<"loI
contribute capital .....
and m.w..l<d,.,
knowledge '"
to .poUy
a jointly
<""I\<nl'''!
n.........
II<.. both~;os
We <:Oolnll
control for
likelihood ,tuo,;o;'"
that joint \<ertJ"""
ventures may b<
be booJlll
bought QU(
out or
by
owned ond
and ....
controlled
entity.6 w.
.,...1>«1
oroIl<d .n!il).'
fO< ijk,llllood
the DBf
DBF by u.cholJoloj<>lrM
including a joint venture
variable ond
and or
by m<IlI<lmlj<>!n,
modeling joint venture
buyouts by
!hi:
ncuo< dummy "";abI.
.... ncur< buJwl.
competing event.
the DBF fIrm
lb<
r"", as a <XlIDJ><Iin!
01.
a) ~Dca.
therapeutics, b)
Second, we r=ricIool
restricted oor
our umpI<
sample '"
to inchlll<
include <>nIy
only (oor
four brood
broad ",bf,<Ida:
subfIelds: 0)
SKoM.

.,ocw,,,,

diagnostics, C)
c) agriculture (""';,,~
(aglbio), ond
and d) oupp!;e,l.poc,oIl)
supplier/specialty ch<micoL
chemical. "l1"<oI<
These _Ido
subfields """""'"
account
di,,_'ie<.
of all firms
dedicated '"
to """"'""",",*y
biotechnology (Dib.....
(Dibner, 1991).
1992). Thi>
This r""".
focus ""
on ""
the
for
large mojolri'y
majority 01"011
r(lt a 1"1"
r""", d<4ic_
of our nc<ll
need 0(1
to have a <riboll
critical mass
of puI:II;"
public r........
fIrms to
largest
subfields
was _necessary bncauO<
because of"",
lMJd' ..
V.d,H .....
...... '"

'Ot ....

of exogenous ~
uncertainty.
generate s«>ck
stock mao'I:<,
market llId......
indices for each
subfield for
measure of"~
,"",""
b """..Id
r our ""
.. n'J_

<01""""""""

Finally, "'"
we focus
on <qolly
equity collaborations with
DBFs domicil<d
domiciled i"
in ,,.,
the Un.....
United S......
States. T1IU
This
F1o>lJy.
ror:.. OIl
"h OllF.

\><I"" ....

enabled "'
us 0(1
to better control
for c
exogenous
events 'I",dr",
specific ...
to """'''Y
country _
boundaries.
Given
""""*'d
trol r",
. _ ."""'.
_.. 0;•
. .these
,_

d.III_...

constraints OIl
on out
our database we ;donJil\<>l
identified ~I
248 "l"i'y
equity <OIl.oI>or>&"",.
collaborations I.i'''''''
initiated ""
between 1978
and
.....".;""
1971ond
these,
we were .-1>'"
unable to """".
obtain ""
the 1""'1$<
precise .......
starting d-..
dates <>f
of 30 _
transactions, <l<o.p;to
despite
1995. Of . ..........
supplementing _
our I<OICb
search w.in&
using L..WNu........
LexislNexus and SEC SCb<dolr
Schedule 13D
mings.
""""""'........,
I)D filin....
each
partnership.
the December
We .
made
considerable offon
effort '"
to ..,i(y
verify the <>UU:OOlO
outcome of ....
Wo
. - «><Wdet>bk
b ponno.....
1' If
Il"lb<
~
of Bi<u<:
Bioscan li>l«l
listed ,I><
the eqully
equity part
partnership
as OII~
ongoing, til<
the 1J0000000Oll
transaction ,.,..
was a>dt.l
coded ..
as
1995 iwIo
issue 01"
1m
p ..
right-censored. 01
Otherwise,
a systematic
search was """,,nokcn
undertaken 'to
understand lho
the .a"""
nature oI"tho
of the
n&ht_
,,..••
y>l...... '" .,,,.,,b
Q undcI>l.....
transaction termination. NCBC IIld
and Bi<u<:""
Bioscan <IatI
data were ~
supplemented ,."Ib
with 0
a search
Ernst '"
&
"""""'llOIIlOmIinJ.t101L
" _ of Etrm
Young
Industry Rcpons.
Reports, Predicast'
Corporate ChaD,..
Change,
Y"""" Biotechnology
8""",hllCllosY .........,.,
I'r«l"' s F&S Index
Inda; of Corpnrato
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[n.illNui.......
LexislNexis, and SOC
SEC 5<.-.-..
Schedule 13D fill....
filings. From Ihi>.
this effort we were oblo
able 10
to veriI)'
verify tho
the tilDiDl
timing
1737
equity
constituting our final ~
sample.
and 0UI00IIl<
outcome of 1
.....
) " partnerships
ponnershi", o:onstitOliq

_i.. . . t'"

"'.....-1Iy

the 171
173 ..........uetransactions io
in our final
sample, 1.1
23 ....
were terminated by poolD<t
partner b<Iyool
buyout by
Of tho
fiaaI oampI<,

""O"ll
_ (~joitlt
21 "'Orttenni_lIy
were terminated by _
other means
(6 joint _h.",.
ventures ""'"
were
established Ii",..
firms, }\I_di
39 were dissolved,
acquired b)'
by the D8F
DBF poolD<t.
partner, 'joiIl<
5 joint >alMa
ventures ""=
were ocqutml
acquired b)'
by <bird
third portio$,
parties, 10
10 D8'"
DBFs wm>
were
~
acquired by •a nli...
third pI01)'~
party), .....
and 90
90 ...",
were "lbO
right «1lS<lfed,
censored; Ih>llo.
that is, they
were «iU
still io
in <ff«>
effect II
at ,...
the <ooj
end
KqIlit«l
tho~ ....,
7
Table 1I I"""!da'
provides a b<uk-.n
breakdown of,...
ofthe IIUIIIb<r
number or
of <Slabli>hal
established r"""
f~s from _h
each «>WI!r)'
country
of 1995.
1995.' Tabl<

bioI«"""""

that h.",.
have ,oi'i_
initiated equ;sy
equity <
collaborations
with
finns. Ikr<,
Here, ....
we olIO
also lis!
list tho
the
lhIII.
0 1 1 _ ...
itll U.S. biotechnology fimlS.
of ,.....
these <qUily
equity <GI~
collaborations ro<
for oath
each <OWI1t)'.
country. While
equity
investments are ""'"
most
_outcome 01
WIlil< ....
ilJ' iII_nto
prominently
undertaken by llrmlio.
firms in a r....
few 00WIu>u,
countries, tho",
there _
seems
to I><
be •a clear tli"
difference
the
ptomi...
n'l~ _01..,
10
""" in tho

r""" ""......

or

o

these ooIlaIJooBlt-.
collaborations. U.Jl
U.S finns have a h'lb
high ~
percentage of partnership di...,l"""",,
dissolutions
outcomes of tho..
"""""""

hi"".

and tlIitd.porty
third-party bw)'OU'"
buyouts. J
Japanese
finns and thoS<
those from ,...
the UoiI<d
United Kingdom
significant
and
_ r......
~ have a "I"ir""""
of f'"'llI=Ilioa
partnerships 1IIOlnW-..
maintained, as do ffinns
from SwituflaDd,
Switzerland, Gmnooy,
Gennany, and Sw<d<1L
Sweden.
proportion or
...... fmrn
While
these tmIdI.trends show <....
clear diff"""""",
differences "'
in «IUIIlty
country JItOO""'''ieI
propensities rqardiq
regarding <qUil~
equity <011_
collaboration
Whilt th<o<
outcomes, it "is """_
unclear whether
these 0-.........
patterns are "";1IllcoI1~'statistically robust _
when """""lIi~
controlling f"f
for ouh",*,
cultural
"••'com...
_
......
factors,
finn-specific rfactors, ot>tl
and """""
those ",1"i"l:OO
relating to tho
the v.....
value and
and ..._
exogenous """"'..
uncertainty
regarding
n'1 felO"bnl
racton. fi""'!pO<if'"

""",i<Ie<

of tho
the """"""'"
outcome .......
event. For
the
technology. ~
Furthennore,
Table 1I doe....
does not consider tho
the lilnIq
timing of
tho """""""'.
. T.....
Fat

,hoi,

of J."..,...
Japanese r......
firms moinlainod
maintained their <q""~
equity
example,
while
it i.
is <..........
clear that a p<aW
greater ...."....,.
percentage of
<•
...-.pl< ....
hI.. i,

r""",

lIok<
_ _ fimta
stake tIwI
than do U,S.
U.S. finns, it _
does_
not bolo
help III
us undo"U<Id
understand ..._
whether JJapanese
finns mainLoin<d
maintained tho,,their

equity ",Iobonshi",
relationships Ion....
longer !boo
than U.s.
U.S. r.nns..
finns.
«Iully

Insert Table 1 about here
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Model and Method
selected •a e<>Illl""inl-rW:.
competing-risk, disc","'·li"",
discrete-time .
event
history ..wyoi.
analysis '0
to test out
our bYJ>Olllaa.
hypotheses.
We oeleetN
_ bi.""Y
Event
history model.<
models ore
are _""",;oIly
especially apptopi
appropriate rot
for ..wJ'%iq
analyzing ""'1"oo1inaI
longitudinal ddata when
the
E...., biaI<l<y
hen !be
discrete ....'"
event and the ,imi"&
timing of the event's 0=0"""""
occurrence ;0
is of parti<.w
particular
dependent
variable
dLp"..<le", .
. . - ;is. .a <1;"""",
history analysis
that is
used ",,"0
when the
interest.
Competing riot
risk ;0
is ••
a special
form of event' !Ii""'}'
i
= - C.,..,.,.,i"~
poo;al f<ImJ
p.io .....
io Uf<d

'wo

anyone
outcome mIlO"eI
removes
dependent .arIaOk
variable lI&l
has two ot
or more _come.
outcomes ond
and ,be
the ~
occurrence of &oy
<lepeadeDt
ODe """""'"
outcome(s). 1l0y0ut>
Buyouts ....
are ODe
one of ............
several ways
which •a
the subjocI
subject from the ri.t
risk of the _other OUICOIDO(.).
"'"
yo in wlilch
of termination Il>clu<le
include (a)
(a) dWoJutlon
dissolution of
of ....
the
partnership OIly
may II<
be """"""""
terminated. Oth<r
Other forms
portKnhip
rom.. oftenninmon
of a biooe<lInoIosY
biotechnology f1Jlll
firm or
or jolnI
joint I'<nI\l«
venture by aa Ihinl
third party,
(c)
partnership, (b)
(b) o<q."itloo
acquisition of.
.,.......wp.
pony and «)
a joint ..DlIIt.
venture by Ibe
the ~
biotechnology "."....
partner (
(rather
than ocquUitioo
acquisition by ....
the
acquisition of aplll
"'l"iI;'jcwo
_ thaD

..1&bliabr-<l
p1icit h)JlOlIle...
established r.1DI).
firm). Allboogh
Although ""
we do DOl
not <leveJop
develop ..
explicit
hypotheses ",pr<linf:
regarding these _other fonno
forms

"I'="'"

of oetmina<ion.
termination, they do
do represent "Ie.....
relevant "ro<npeIins
"competing lw.ard<"
hazards" ill
in t,,",1Il<y
that they ptecl
preclude ..-q......
subsequent
of

Iol:roo""

competing """am.,
hazards, Ibe
the haunl
hazard rate fI.a<doo
function II
is
occurrences of partner
t>=o>Yo<e<
patIO><' buyouts. To model
_ I the ,ompetlnl
defined as
<lef'-""<:lu
(1)
(I)

h/t} = limP/t,t + s)/s
~,h).~Pi<Jo,)IJ
S40

where It(,)
h(t) II
is Ibe
the hala-d
hazard filn<1iorI
function ..
associated
with ...
either
partner buyoullJ-l}.
buyout (j=1), partnos<bip
partnership
wber<
ooci&I<d wi,.,
lb<r panne,
(j=2); or o<br-r
other lClmI,,""OII
termination 1J-3~
(j=3). PjUH)
Plt,t+s) i.d..
is the poOOo..
probability
that event type!"""""
type j occurs ill
in
dissolution
d
I _ (.;4);
llty ........111

Irt....,.,

the in..
interval
and 10'.
t+s, given
that the partncnIIip
partnership "is ..
at ri,...
risk at ""'"
time 1t.
Il><
",01 between t ond
~""" thaI..1I<
Cox's (197')
(1975) panlal
partial I;keh_
likelihood method
for _
parameter
estimation allows III
us 10
to incorporate
Colt·,
_ fot
" ' " <OIl_ion
"""' ........

ro.

time d<peod<nce
dependence ,nto
into !he
the model,
without .pec;rying
specifying ilS
its fome
form. The ..
general
for the
Cox
';me
_ I , ....11bool
octol form
I
tbr- Co.
proportional h.&<oRIo
hazards _
models
this study i>.
is:
l""I"""ional
I••estimated
,timaI<d in .m."udy

(2)

losh,('}-" ,(,j+ II,X(I)' ",Y
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where
altJ only
may II<
be "'y
any function
time, X(t)
and Yo«
Yare vectors
time Ik
dependent and lin><
time
...t>= ./'1
fwl<l;"" of ,m...
XU!.o,od
"",ton of lin><
invariant ..
explanatory
variables, and Pj and .....
A, are 'I<dO<!
vectors "'
of ....
estimable
used 'fDA
TDA
in.>ria4I
pl..,.,ory..n.hlol,lIoOolAand
i _ parameters., We os«!
5.7 '0'"0III1............
to simultaneously
estimate the competing hazards model (Rohwer, 1994)
with eo.'.
Cox's
_version ~.7
1_"'"'~bo>attIomod<l~,
IWot) .....
partial ];k<llhood
likelihood <n<lbod.
method. We
do "'"
not pmvid<
provide ...;......
estimates for
the baseline
hazard fun<tioo,
function, oj')'
alt),
portial
W. &0
fot ....
_lin< bazMII
8

since port;'"
partial 1;~li_
likelihood ..._
estimation discards
this ,
function.
.""'"
. . . til;,
_,'

The Iln<
three urn"
events - -....-.
buyout, _ution.
dissolution, and 0Ib<,
other lomu.......
termination ~
- were Opd.o!<d
updated mon1hl1,
monthly. Th<
The
Th<
sample Iodude.
includes ~.8olJ
9,843 1IIOIIIhI1
monthly periods. Tho
The cuJlunJ
cultural .onoNos
variables ......,
were not limo:
time varylnlo
varying, "",
but mal>}'
many
IUDlIl<
control variables ......
were updated
monthly.
""'..........tole<
pdoood lEIOOlbIy

Culture Variables
Hypothesis 1I is \alai
tested by rwllilllYb\l
multiplying Hofstede's
well-known rn<aWl<.
measures or
of
H)'pOll><>l.
Hof>I<d<·. (1980) "",lI·kno-o.'n

p"""'"__

uncertainty •avoidance
to ...h
each coonlly
country in our..."pIe.
our sample. Hypothesis
also
."".......-....,.
........". and power distance lO
HJ'P'lII><>io 22 oloo
suggests •a "",I"pl"";""
multiplicative Iun<tion
function io..,.......
involving power
distance and cultlnl
cultural d
distance.
test
"'UC"
_
diiUOC<
I - . Our ....
cultural cfutonc<.
distance. First,
following
and SlnJh
Singh (19l1l1~
(1988),
considers 1"'0
two .I«rnoriyc
alternative meawreo
measures of coltunl
«>noidon
Ft
foIIc".... Kogut
Kopl ood

Hofstede's <><It•
cultural
distance (HCD) ...
as a compo.",
composite iod<>.
index bO>od
based on .......
the each
the
we .........,
measured l/ol,f<I<'.
.,.
...J.m....u
h of ....

fourc"I,,,,,",
lied by Hof_
four
cultural dime_
dimensions _
identified
Hofstede (19110).
(1980).
We .liO">«l
also used •a ...-1
second ..........
measure of ""Itunll
cultural dI"""",
distance is
is .._
generated (fOOD.
from a Mod)'
study oy
by Ronco
Ronen ....
and
countries ..
with
similar
Shenkar (1911~~
(1985), "1Io.}'IIIbeoized
who synthesized """"'"
country Ch""R
clusters ;,"0
into ni
nine
groupings of 0I>III>Cri<s
SbcIIUr
... ~
itll ..
mi....
work-related
attitudes
and values. Th<
The -Ao&i<l"
"Anglo" en-.
cluster ,"vol_
involves .............
Australia, Conodo,ll'd......
Canada, Ireland, N
New
_
·..1_ ..."
..... and_
...
Zealand, SouIh
South Africo,
Africa, IhliIed
United Kinp:>m.
Kingdom, .....
and United
States. All other
other <:<JUnlrico
countries ill
in "'"
the ,,1Id1
study "'...
were
Zuww!.
Unit«! SLol",.
grouped ;n<o
into "'"'
the ""'"'
other ciPl
eight d"......
of cui,ua1
cultural
clusters. Using
this do<l,
data, "'"
we ~
constructed
a ""'""""
measure of
~
Usi"1 this
.
distance such that ",bon
when t
theh
established
firm fell in Ul<AII;1od......,R.......
the Anglo cluster, Ronen '8
cultural
distance
di1ooccsuehlllOl
c _ finnfdlln
~ ...
1btnd4il.......
(RSCD) "'..
was O<)dnd
coded "0",
otherwise
it ....
was O<)dnd
coded""I".
1".
(1lSCll)
V. _
_~
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Control Variables
V.ri.bloot
Clearly,
cultural
factors may
not cIo<ni_
dominate """"'"
partner ooJ'O"lIlo<i.......
buyout decisions. w.
We "to«!
argued .>01;'"
earlier tb>I
that
CI<..
I~, ....
wnd I"""",
y "'"

f.,.",

exogenous Ie«<>
forces !"",olly
partially d
dictate how
uncertain future I"yo!f.
payoffs OJ<
are ..,.j
and who:th<r
whether ol>uy<>ul_
a buyout option
,.xo"""",
bow """""'n
is
Other I"",..
forces ..,..if",
specific 10
to ,I><
the ind""'I'.
industry, ,I><
the u>ve><ioa!lml,
investing firm, ..,.j
and ""'"'"
partner
i> in-the-money.
iD·tfl<.mon<y. O!h<r

u..

In "'"
this K<:lioo..
section, "'"
we <IeornlIe
describe ow
our >ttoml'"
attempts '"
to
relationship may
also ......
bear "II""
upon the buyout
decision. 111
rdotioMIup
""'y 01",
buyoo, <loci.ion
control r,.
for til<
the factors
found to bo
be lmpott>m
important I»'
by I'",.lou>
previous ~.
researchers.
<.ool>Ol
rO<lon r-r.l

1.-'.....

is in-theKogut (1991) ~
argued ,....
that <101<000'
exogenous forces
whether •a 00"""
buyout "",ion
option t'
KOI"'
r".".. determine
nni.. wb<,hB

'<II¢OOIS,

money. Ik
He _II'<'!
argued ,boo
that ..."""
when inOo.»ny
industry ooko
sales 110:";
deviated ""i'ivcly
positively f"""
from i,"",,1f}'
industry forecasts, pn'
joint
mon<J'.

""'"'ut<:.
and dt>'ioIiooI
deviation from
from "1"""'"
expected ~
growth, are meant to '''1''.'''
capture til<
the ",,"',nt)'
certainty '"
to "bi<h
which jooiIII..-um.
joint ventures
....
u..

venture plf\lltf>
partners """,lei
would O<d:
seek to
to ocqui",
acquire the }oI.'
joint venture. Hi........
His annual "
measures,
shipment p<lWtb
growth
.........
" ' _ ....""""'"
Of<: ......, ' "

of ••_""",
exogenous _variables oro
are ill
in
operating "'
in on
an industry
have oprreciot<d
appreciated ,n
in value.
Our "",".ra
measures 01
""'
i""""", """'"
vol.... Ou,
the same .,..n,.
spirit, bul
but ""
are ...._
measured dkff""",I~.
differently. Whereas
study >f*UIOd
spanned .......
several _
industries
Ibt
"'''''.... Kogut's
KOJlII·. >ludy

<:on<:rn1,aI,,,

and _,
uses lIIIIUaJ
annual measures,
ours concentrates ""Iy
only ""
on biote<lu>olocY.
biotechnology, >Ad
and ...
we """""'l""nUy
consequently f""",
focus
0<Id
_us. OIl..
on measuring exogenous fforces witJ>;.
within 'odlrIoloVCal
technological ",bf..
subfields
on •a IllOIIlhly_"
monthly basis. Sola
Sales
OIl
l<1< OIl
measures oro
are .
unreasonable
in Ihl.
this iadustry
industry """because moot
most firm<
firms 110
have no "vmueo
revenues from ......
sales. Lik.
Like
""'"""'"
" " ' _ io
Folta (1993).
(1998), "'"
we ..........
measure "'Ilr
subfield
value ..,.j
and ",hI",..
subfield ((exogenous)) WK""",,'~
uncertainty ""'"
using >tOGi
stock _market
FolIo
..........
indices F""",kd
generated from publicly ndo<l
traded f,nn
firm '"
in COIlCO.""lOJ
concentrating ,.
in "",","tar
particular _""""'Jy
biotechnology
iD<Iioo<
subfields. Tho«
These ""'.......
measures ""'..
were «IIIotruetcd
constructed from <lock
stock pti<a
prices lhaI
that w...
were p
gathered
the
oubfiol<h.
l _ from "'"
Center f..for Re""""h
Research '"
in S<><W1'y
Security I'rio:ro
Prices d...
data b>o<.
base, or>d
and Of<:
are d<!<ribtd
described br«lIy
briefly .....,....
below, 00'
but iinlmore
e."",
l_
detail in foIt.o
Folta 1I99l1).
(1998).
....11.

of""""'"

"""'"

opportunities across u..
the fow
four .ubf",Jds
subfields
Differences in ,I><
the .'p«O<d
expected ......
value of growth ~,;".
Diffa=o
(Therapeutic, Piap><tk.
Diagnostic, """""
AglBio, ond
and S.VIN..,-I
Supplier I S"",iollY
Specialty a..mi<a1)
Chemical) with
four «<><:I:
stock iIodM:n
indices l!Ial
that
(11lrnop<u'jo.
with fow
of nit><
nine U.S
U.S. -1uIoIoJY
biotechnology fttm>
finns '!"""wi:r.in.
specializing in the ,""""",V<:
respective
were created r""",
from w..,Uy
weekly ttl"""
returns 0(
.........,td
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"

subfields. Tho
The '~~filitl
subfield ooI~.
value of firm
was "
measured
as II><
the v....
value 0(
of ,Il<
the _hly
monthly biotechnology
....t>r..lc..
fum j wll>
" ' _ IS
_lInololY

Ind<.
roo- __
",Id '"
.., of "'"
index for
subfield
m (""""I
(whenj __).
Em). 1lo:o<
These ;..1""•
indices .,.,
are ..."prd
weighted oqoally.
equally. Weddy
Weekly _al
values
the
indices wet<
were Ih<n
then ,~
averaged "ithin
within ea<h
each month 10
to J<'
get """"lily
monthly index
values
for 0ICIl
each of tho
the fow
four
Iodiull
i..... _al
... for
subfields.
Subfield _al
value
was ......
transformed
by LOtin.
taking it<
its _natural
to correct for pos;~
positive
.ubr..
ld<. Subr..h1
.. ""
form<oJ l>y
.. al logarithm
loprIIhm 1O<O<l'<CI
...
skewness.
~

*-.-

Exogenous
uncertainty "00
was "
measured
as lb<
the 26-week
standard deviation of
of ,lit.
the q.f
log of
~'""" "",_w,
" ' _ 00
26-..... k.lUJJd>rd
weekly ,.",m.
returns for _h
each of ohc:
the four bK>Io;;l""""c
biotechnology ,ubllekl
subfield ill<l'.<a.
indices. Tho
The 26-_
26-week ""''''''''
measure ....
was
_kly

'0

volatility, w:lobw!
without
chosen because I'it provHl<>
provides onoulb
enough .....
history
produce _
a ooli
reliable measure of voIui~'y,
c-..l>euus<
Of)' to pn><Iucc
time. Ex
Exogenous
uncertainty ....
was conVO«<d
converted
assuming ",""ani
constant .
variance
over ,a 100,..
longer period of tlm<.
...Udliof;
_ 0...
"""" -Willy
to _a lI>:II1lhIy
monthly m<lI>lUO
measure l>y
by _"""fin.....
averaging the -aly
weekly >W>datd
standard ...._
deviations witllio
within "'y
any ,;wn
given moIlIh.
month.
lO
industry """'"'"
structure QIIlh<
on the .b<H«
choice of
Substantial literature
has ronnnnod
confirmed tho
the """"""'"
importance of ioduotry
S._olal
lilHalUr< lw
9
governance mode.
use _....,..
average wbr
subfield
R&D expenditures 1li0'id«ll>y
divided by OY«q<
average lOIai
total
JO"""'""""
tood<,' We u'"
..1d R&ll"l"'"'6""'"

R&D expense l•
is ..ut
said In
to
expenses
to roolrul
control 100
for web
such .rr""•.
effects. C.......luolllly.
Conventionally, lh<
the ,dotior>ol»p
relationship of R&ll",_
.._
. In
~
encourage

"""I""w
, ....
integrative _
modes,
suchb ..
as a<qui';'iu<>.
acquisition, in ard<,
order 10
to ptoYid<
provide od<quol<
adequate odInio.;.ttali""
administrative

of human .....
and _"'"...
dedicated ,apiIaI
capital opocifi<:
specific "'
to _a transaction.
control for
coping witb
with hip..
higher d<_
degrees ofhwl:wl
ro.llrol
fut rop;o.
tn.n<a<don,

_.
_n

be,....,..,

.'p«' _

Using thi,luzie,
this logic, ...,
we ,.,;at><
might expect a positive
relationship between R&ll
R&D .._
expense .....
and portDer
partner
Usitl&
pOoiti'" ro.oioon>llip
buyout.

""",m!

of
Park .....
and Un__
Ungson (1997) did
did "'"
not control rut
for ••.,..""""
exogenous f......
forces, boO.
but did Hn<l
find <IIal
that _a serieo
series u(
Pari<

dummy .1lri>bJe>
variables <el-.lln""
related to the fl2'Ul<'t<hip
partnership onI1..
influenced
the buyout
decision. They f
found
that
du",,"y
00td "'"
boY"'" d<cl$iaa.
_ ,t>aI

""-inJ_

partners w:l'b
with !h<
the ...""
same SIC <od<code ...,...
were Jeoo
less ljkely
likely ",
to """"ire
acquire !h<1,
their partners,
partners having a print
prior
P"fUO<rJ. port......

"""-1"

""',Ief

relationship ...."
were more
likely In
to <till
end iflacquls.illoo.
in acquisition, partnerships involving
technology transfer
",I.,innsbip
,00ft- UUly
inYUl_iaa I«:l><>o>lon
were ....
less Illdy
likely I"
to <ad
end In
in a<q";';,ion.
acquisition, ond
and pmocrsllil"
partnerships involving
products ....'"
were """"
more
WCl'<
in_ohln, multiple
ltiplc pftldu<ts
We test for some of
of ""'..
these .....,
same elf
effects,, boO.
but no!
not all. By d<f,nl"....
definition,
likely
to a-.lln
end in acqu,,;lIOIL
acquisition. w.....
likely'"
20

our '""'PI<
sample inc_
includes p&M<f>
partners from
from ~
different SIC
SIC «><leo
codes and
and putn<nbipo
partnerships i.",h""_"11
involving technology
"""

"transfer.
....r....
Park &IKI
and Ungson
(1997) h>'"
have biJbliJhoed
highlighted ,he
the important
moderating rol<
role ....,
that prior
!'uk
Unpon (j'Jln)
~..., <mder>li.ol
cultural cliff.,"""",
differences 011
on parmenIllpdlosoh>lio<l..
partnership dissolution. While 1he1
they did
relationships
have 011
on Ih<
the .ff=
effect of cul'....
.". omhll'" hi'"

"'''I'"'''

not test for ..
whether
this _same .lrOd
effect hI>Ids
holds for partner
buyouts, it "'"l'
may he
be ruoona!IJ<
reasonable to expect
"'"
!lethe! tb"
parlllerbuyouls.
of endogenous
uncertainty
the ",Jali
relative rate of
prior t<l.oo""'Wpo
relationships 10
to modu:io••
moderate either
the <l<edegree or"",
i...... 1h<
'I ' . ~
1 or ....
learning ia
in cull.lbonbOll
collaboration versus
hierarchy. w.
We did"",
did not b.,hJ<l<
include prior "'laliclooll'l"
relationships ill
in our r........
formal
1eamiII.
' ...... 1u<ntd11.

II;"""""""

p<
__
presentation
because ",lI><
to the .."'.,
extent IhaI
that «lion!
cultural dimensions Inn"""",,
influence the ~
choice of prior

..... _, "'''''''II

transactions in the model would
relationships "'i'h
with ""
the pan-.
partner, including
measure
......,.....",
jachw;l;., •a _
_ of prior ~,l
In """
runs ""
not <q>o<t<4,
reported, "'"
we d>d,
did, include
dummy
confound our obi'''1
ability '"
to interpret
results. In
"""r_....
~ the ~".
jacl<J<l< •a """""1
Ib<

measure for
for prior
prior f<W_;po.
relationships, CQnOi".."
consistent ""tb
with the
the ."".,_
measure 'nlploytd
employed bI'
by r-t
Park """
and U..-,
Ungson, 1M
but
..........
of "'"
our models.
Surprisingly, ""'11.0
only 7.0 p<:rcenl
percent <If
of ,he
the
no oiJ1lir",.n,
significant "'l>o>OftOhq,
relationship i.
in ony
any cf
_found ""
_ i•. Sorpo'i.,nYI.
partnerships h><l.
had a prior ..
relationship,
a ",,,,>be<
number .;..,;r",...
significantly
below Park
and U.J'O""
Ungson's 16.0
26.0
""""",,,,,po
l>o~p,.
I, bel<'"
""'" ond

",j,"

percent ,.
in the ,10<"""""
electronics 10<1""",
industry. ""pp.,","ly,,'"
Apparently, it is ~
more """"'"""
common '0
to inilUte
initiate •a ",1"lOIIIlup
relationship with
"'....,.

_UoOtiooI, ;. ""
Target
firms hi••".
having more
commercial "",non
partners ""'l'
may ""
not he
be 01""""'
attractive
buyout <ondldal..
candidates
T
..... firm,
~ wmme",>1
" bu_

equity transactions in the ~""""""
biotechnology industry.
....''J
i...." .. '7.

off bI'
by """"'"
others. To
To
because «>mrn<tci&I
commercial "PI""'"niti<s
opportunities '"
to """"
exploit Ih<u
their It>CIlnol<IJ:/
technology ""'l'
may he
be "phDD<d
siphoned <>If
l>o<auo<
approximate the "odmio.1n>fJ"W
declining marginal tbIuo
threat <If
of 11""'_1,..
preemptive bidding
acquisition bI""'"
by each
~"""Ib<
bld0:6". or ><q";';';OO
the .......
target finn's
number 01
of =""''''
current
additional pan"",
partner, "'"
we """
used ,he
the natural
logarithm of ,he
odd'tionaI
n....... k>pri'bm
r"",',1WJIIb<I"

."_I>u .j""

was 'taken
during the )'001"
year of'h<
of the .""',.
event. In
In Ib<
the
commercial all;""",,,.
alliances. n.:
The number ofpartners w..
C<>III'Ilm:'>I
• • n dorinllhe
right-censored ......
cases, 1b<
the measure w..
was I>l<eIIIo
taken in ,he
the l.aII
last )'001"
year oflb<
of the -..,..."'"
observation "';ndow,
window.
event of ri&lrt~
.......
Bioscan provided ,""
this ;of"",,",\ooI,
infonnation.
1l_"'l""";6e<!
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If
the """"""'""'
transaction ....
was ajMlU
ajoint ,,"'''',..
venture ..
an lnltica!'"
indicator 'ori.Iblt
variable .....
was <!-.irlOCl
classified •
as•a "I",
"1", 11><1
and "0"
"0" if
1f,1I<

....",=- ....

it .....
was a minority oquit)'
equity 111.-.
investment. Joint ventures are ~
thought IOpnMilo
to provide •a rul
real opIioa
option "'"'
that io
is
U
more pt<>priewr!hln
proprietary than io
is 1110
the ....
case fa"
for "';"";'y
minority ill..........,...
investments.
""""

Insert Table 2 about here

RESULTS

Ttbl<
;<lkt, _and <:otf<l.........
k ithe
t !variables.
b e . - . _Because
..... or
Table l2 pro,<deJ
provides <loocripO...
descriptive ....
statistics
correlations for
of «>IIO<n'l'
concerns
multicollinearity _
between l1M<nain'y
Uncertainty ........
Avoidance
and !be
the CIlIIIftI
Cultural 0Ul-.
Distance ,,,,iohl..........
variables, as well,
of .."'IOtolh....,;'y
0Il<e 11><1

r"n

as III<
the .maIlll!l1111><r
small number of.-......
of events, we opt<d
opted I<>
to p«st1l'
present ""'"
three full modolo
models mm,;
relating ..
to out
our b)fl<llbeo<•.
hypotheses.
..
models with
the
Table
presents tho
the ruu
full (<<>I""""
(columns 2,.,
2, 4, 6) _and tel!l>«<l
reduced (
(columns
T
_ l3 pte>«IU
_ 1,3,5)
I. 1, ~) 1DOdeJ....
ilb Ib<
partner bu)'OUl,
buyout. To ooc..w.
ascertain Ib<
the de_
degree of IDOdeJ
model fit,
parameter
estimates 10<
for Ib<
the hounl
hazard of par!n<'
panm<I<t .,,;.......
likelihood rabo
ratio IeStO
tests ~
were petfotTt:l<d
performed OIl
on !be
the ;n<mno....
incremental """and I\ill
full .....sd••
models. Each
test p«><hI<ed
produced •a
Iikeliloxl<l
Eatb "'"
0.001), indi<aIlnl_
indicating that Ib<
the "\'Hall
overall fid,
fit is JOO<I.
good.
chi-square "statistic
well .."..
above tho
the t:riD<:oI
critical value
cbi-oqo_
..... 0< "ell
val"" (p < O,OOI~

_ff","'''' ....,

_laiI,·...".

The byp<Jtbeao
hypotheses r<><
for ,II<
the iDdi_
individual interaction
tested under one-tail t-tests. 10
In .""b
each
The
~ coefficients are 'tsUIollllld<r
the f"1I
full ~
models, tho
the bn>otbe>iz.<d
hypothesized i<>I<no:ti<>o
interaction it
is p<>oiti...
positive ...et
and .....
significant.
These filld;nl'
findings ....
are
of tho
r...... Tho..
consistent ""Ib
with our
our "'p«UI!or>o.
expectations.
"""",nco,
Insert Table 3 about here

In model 2, !be
the poom..
positive ""fficit-oI
coefficient ""
on Ib<
the ill..
interaction
0.05) ..........
between Un«"aihO)
Uncertainty
n<tioo (p < O.M)
Avoidance
and I'<ro=
Power Distance
is consistent
with
expectations <>ff<r<d
offered In
in b)'JlOlh<>i.
hypothesis I,
1. It
A
, _ ...,
Dioune< lo
.i
i,b 'the
l-o< "f'<'I'Ia'ioo.
suggests thot
that established
firms from ..Il
cultures b;Jbel
higher "'
in VA
UA _and PO
PD .......
should
likely '"
to o.y
buy
",g:eou
_i>hod tInno
I<I be _more ';koly
out ltiei'
their .,.........,..
partners.
"'-"
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be,,,,,,,,,,

In """",,
models .....
4 and 6, hoIh
both I!>c
the pOliti....
positive cocIfI<Icm
coefficient ool!>c
on the I
interaction
< 0,
0.10)
_ i " " (p <:
10) between

as "",II
well ..
as Ih<
the pMilJve
positive """rr",,,,..
coefficient on ,he
the
Hofstede's CuI,
Cultural
Distance ond
and PoW<T
Power lmunc<
Distance ..
Hof"«k',
.. a1 0."""",,

0;,,-..

interaction
(p <:0.01)
< 0.01) \0<1""""
between Ronen's
Cultural Distance 0I>d
and _
Power
Distance If<
are """'is......
consistent with
in«,""';'" (p
R""""', Cilhoral
, 0..,*",<
ilh
2. It
suggests 'tloo
that ...
when
partners 'h.,
that ...
are moo<
more ",hunrJJ,
culturally
the <>P«"'''''''
expectations offer«!
offered ,n
in ~
hypothesis 1.
,he
k >UUC'"
hen porI<I<<>

.....-

distant and ..
established
are hipa
higher in """""
Power 0;"""",
Distance ,hen:
there <>
is In
an mon:_
increased hkohhood
likelihood of
<lIollllll_
,obliohal investors
in.... on If<
partner buyout.
Since I!>c
the r<JMUun,
remaining ..
variables
in I!>c
the mo<I<.I,
models _have no h)'p<ll!><o<o
hypotheses ",1_
related '"
to thom.
them, ........
we use a
Sin«
riab... "'

of relationships. Tho
The ooly
only .....
variable
that <le""""""'<d
demonstrated •a
two-tailed "'"
test ,to assess Ih<
the lipif"""",,
significance ufr<loOOMhipo.
'-"';l«l
bIo thai.
of Partners. AA
As .....
was <>JI<CI'<I.
expected, I'
it was negatively
significant <If<<l
effect was Tarll'"
Target Fum',
Firm's "'
Number
lipif"""'"
..._
nfPann<n.
nopUvel1
of partner boJ__
buyout. nu,
This ,.nobk
variable II>oold
should ~U_
approximate 110
how proprietary
the
related 10
to "'"
the 1ik<liI><Jnd
likelihood of,..".....
"'......
~ ,he

""'*'

buyout option i.
is. Tho
The more
partners a '"'I<'
target _
partner has, the 1<.<0
less ptopi<tary
proprietary is tho
the uptioo.
option. Tho
The
bu)ou<d
moo< pan......
variables
relating ,...""'"""'
to exogenous """en.",'y.
uncertainty, ,ot>roold
subfield .al
value, and subfield
expense were "'"
not
.... ..,.1.,
hfoold R&D "-"po""'''''''

_.

'joi.'

significant. No""''''"
Neither was I!>c
the iftdi<.",
indicator .'-;obl<
variable di.Un,uI
distinguishing joint V<IIlllr<.
ventures from
minority
."rliflOOll'.
rtorn ",i~

.

investments.

iii...,....,.

Table 33 .....
also Ind""'"
includes lh<00Dlp.<U>f.
the competing _hazard "'ul"
results lrofor pootnoroIllp
partnership dissolution in «>l_
columns 7.
7Tobie
These ",,,,In.
results inodOcOl<
indicate thai.
that Unoottain'1
Uncertainty AvuMlan«
Avoidance ....
and Ronen's
Cultural 0.<W>t<
Distance i,
is
10. '1b<s<
Roo<n', Clllwtal
dissolution. Tho
The IAIIer
latter ...
result
is «>osiII<m
consistent ...
with
those
found
negatively ",,->,0<1
related '"
to tho
the lil«ll_
likelihood of dl...,....."".
oo••hely
ult io
ilh "
"_
Park 000
and Ungson
in Otud)'ln.
studying tho
the 01«,,,,,,,,,,
electronics i""""I)'.
industry. Tho,
They did "'"
not UOIIIUI<
examine ....
the off"'"
effect
by p",
Unll'!" (1997) i.
Uncertainty ....
Avoidance.
Furthermore, in """pari"",
comparison ...
with
the findings
for ,he
the 1'Ifl"'"
partner
of U""'...."
OidAn«- Fun~.
i,h ,II<
r'ndlnJlI"
acquisition _10.
models, ,he..
these flJlltiop
findings ..
demonstrate
that nauorW
national ""lmn:
culture ounbol<O
attributes influence
partner
><q<J;""OO
mono..........
inn...."", I*"n<r
10
dissolution ditf.."..
differently.
d'''ol""",,,
i,...

Consistent ...,lh
with po.."""
previous ..
studies,
we f~
focused mainly
on ,",,~OI<
aggregate ","",,,,,
measures of ""Hural
cultural
C""""'Ol
udioo, ....
moi0l100
distance. However, Hofstede
(1980) 'Uilld\llhat
suggests that _
partner 4iUuc'K<I
differences fur
for power
distance,
iii".,...
Kof"o<le (1980)
powe' dillan<r.
H~,
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uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and individuality may represent important areas of conflict
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among partners. In addition, recent research suggests that absolute measures of cultural
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"distance" may obfuscate directional differences among individual cultural attributes (O'Grady &

•
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however, they only apply to a single attribute.

individual attributes. These variables are calculated the same way as illustrated in equation 3,

Lane, 1996). As a result, we also tested measures of cultural distance that are specific to
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Table 4 reports the parameter estimates for cultural distance measures that are specific to

!l'.i"~
~go§Ol

Hofstede's individual attributes of national culture. II We provide only the full models including

~

the interaction. In modell, the positive coefficient for the interaction between Power Distance

.2

!

and Cultural DistancelPartner Differences in Power Distance is consistent with hypothesis 2.

<

.-

Also consistent with Hypothesis 2 is the positive coefficient for the interaction between Power

j.

Distance and Cultural DistancelPartner Differences in Uncertainty Avoidance. The interactions

]

_

0

in models 3 and 4 involving differences in Individuality and Masculinity, respectively, were not

~Il

ili.
ie"'·'

Power Distance, and also support the arguments by Hofstede that these two dimensions of

significant. These findings support our a priori expectation focus on Uncertainty Avoidance and

~

"'Ii
llijg~
... 'j;

Ii"

.".

'"

Given that partner differences in Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance seem to be the

national culture have the greatest bearing on organizational phenomena.

~~.5

I;i I

two dimensions of national culture which best explain organizational phenomenon, we created a

H~
.! I ~

cultural difference measure incorporating both of those dimensions. The model is illustrated in

!

~ 8 :

expectations for hypothesis 2.
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column 5 of Table 4. The positive and significant interaction (p < 0.05) is consistent with

<II

DISCUSSION
IllS<US'ot<

The _role of ...
national
culture ""
on rovernon«
governance <boico
choice .........
has been
frequently
studied. fl~.
However,
Tho
ioor>aI ""k....
nr
_ t t y I1udi«!.
these
studies have I-.:Iy
largely 10C\>00d
focused ""
on tb<
the icillo!
initial ,.,....mOIl«
governance _decision "'1'0,"",1>11,1'
or partnership ",,,,,i..._.
tenrunation,
"
- >Iud.,.
giving UlII<"""""
little attention Jpo<if><1111'"
specifically to parttI<t
partner b<>yooI>.
buyouts. Thio
This oversight
is ~.I:i
consequential, given
ri"';llJ
-," Ii
..n the
tb<
acquisition of joint
venture aDo:!
and <qtIity
equity portr><n.
partners. By ..plicidy
explicitly <>IlIW<Ierinf:
considering tb<
the
high iocid<nco
incidence of ""l"ilition
ki&"
join' ""n"'"
of national ""I"""
culture ""
on I'A""'"
partner I>.l~.
buyouts, W<
we .extend
growing body Or
of 11'_
literature ""'
that ..........
examines
_role 0(",""'-'1
.!<IId •a _inl
of investments in joint .."""".
ventures and _partner r,nn<
firms i.
in """"'~_i
knowledge-intensive
the ~
incremental
nature o(in""""""'10
"'"
......."",
••
~
.
industries.

!o.hIID<l&"_
fir>< ",<~
.. ri"'-<qtII"«lIl
__
Although we .......
are the no<
not Ib<
the first
to characterize
equity collaborations
are «lIIIpOWIIl
compound

<1>_""

"pi'"

of naboaaI
national culture on
options, _
our IIudy
study i.
is "'"
the f""
first '"
to """'P'
attempt "'lhonmkaUy
to theoretically explain tb<
the _role or
opboooI..
the first
stage optinn...
option, while
future
buyout. Partner
represents tbo
the ..
exercise
_partner ....,.,...
p"""" buyout
b<lyou' rqR-'<JlI'
«cit< of Ib<
r..........
mit. twin<
of the ~
second 0Iq<
stage np<i<IIL
option.
discretionary ;"
investments ~l"<"""
represent ,0<
the '''''<;00
exercise of"..
dio<m""'-Y

Real opt
option 1b«<y
theory
ReAl

"""'* "'

of <od<>F.......
endogenous "uncertainty.
suggests "'"
that firms
should
invest In<tc,,,,nLllly
incrementally I.....
in the face
"IFIU
n
Id choose to in_
rO«. 01
"'Y.
also suggests that r"""
firms ...
will
be """"
more I,uly
likely 'o«ln\ll1il
to commit '0
to Ib<
the .."
next stage
when
they un
can learn
learn
"It lion
ill ""
OIq< ...
bon 1b<1
more by ~
committing, lb<<<by
thereby t<dUo<i"3'~
reducing endogenous on«rtaioI"
uncertainty.
......

r_o_

We u...
have I>.liit
built "pon
upon option
option .-,."'><lU">I
theory to suggest Ih><
that _
partner I>.lfO'll'Jl
buyouts ...
will
be iinfluenced
by three
w.
ill bo
o l l _ by_

"""""'""'Y,

_
of learning i_
inside versus
factors: exogenous ..abI<................
variables, endogenous uncertainty, """-tII<.and the rate ofl<""';nl

""t"",,

national culture b<an
bears tIpOIl
upon ......
these
the fum,
firm. Our <CIlIRI
central uJllmrnt
argument i.
is IIlat
that Iltri_
attributes of oatlOlUll
_outside
..... Ibo
latter two r.......
factors.
...........

Specifically, we IfJUI'
argue that
uncertainty ,vni<Ianc<
avoidance IIId
and ""~,,raI
cultural d
distance
Sl"'I'irlColJy....
_ both
_ un=taiD:y
I_

increases -.101<_
endogenous """""""",.
uncertainty. 71li.
This is
due 10
to tb<
the ,nobili'y
inability 10
to 1"'1«;"
perceive '10<
the poICtItili
potential II>for
in<....i. likely
lik<ly d<><
of
opportunistic behavior
by """"""'
partners, ..
or i
information
asymmetry betw=
between partners.
result of
opp;><'WIlioti<
_in< by
n f _ "l""JlII<l/)'
pan"",,- As a m<lI'
uncertainty, al>bl"bod
established firms
shy away from ..,....;..
aggressive COfNIlotnl<nl
commitment '0
to growth
_such -..i"y.
rlnDO will ol>y......,.
......
_
_• tho,"';11
_
from""I',"""
opportunities,
they will in"",~.
invest incrementally. Firms
from
cultures ,......
that are lu&"
high in p""""'cIiJtm<c
power distance
are .expected
Of<
. pee""

to "transition
hierarchical governance because
it i.
is In
in ~
hierarchies .....
that ""'y
they np<t>I<
operate
10
.... ioi<l<l to hio""'IIi<aIIO"~
bocome it

•
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and IunI
learn .,.,.,
most .ffo<"'"~,
efficiently """'"
about ~
growth ~""L
opportunities. Tho..
Thus, it
is the 'omb1naIlon
combination of"'l"
of high
n l.lI><
endogenous """",,liotyoOOllI<
uncertainty and the ob;lrly
ability (ao
(or prospod')
prospects) I<>IutD
to learn ......
more orr.a.mty
efficiently cIlcr
after internaliziq
internalizing
0Il00F""'"

1<"'" .,

the p=t><r
partner Ilw
that leads to ponno'
partner bol""".
buyout.
,,,"
Our <ttJ~n<al
empirical (;.ndillp
findings are consistent
with 'II<
the upocu<ion•
expectations ..,..,.
noted _
above.
Uncertainty
Cldr
lleOl ..-iIlI
. UDCO",-">'y

""'''''',"'''y, ..

avoidance .".,
and culluttl
cultural di.....,.
distance are "'1'><410
argued to """",
contribute '0
to <
endogenous
power
.~
~ uncertainty, while
!lil<_,
of learning
in _
hierarchy
to Cilllabont.,....
collaborations.
distance "
is lqU<d
argued '.
to Impo<t
impact ,II<
the "'1.,,""
relative ....
rate oIlo
d,,'
i"1 in
y relative
"'~..., to
buyout
partners "'.....
when
Established (;.mJ.
firms from
high UA
UA hoon<
home <OI""l)'
country cui,,,,,,
cultures are "..,..,
more 1i~.I~
likely I.
to bo~
EollObli
r""" IIiIh
"'" ""'.....
buyout
partners
they are ....,
also big,
high I.
in 1'0.
PD. hn.....
Partners IIJol
that on:
are «>Im,ally
culturally d,
distant, on:
are ......
more likely
,''''
Illtdy to boy
ow pRI1f1<n
endogenous
when Ih<y
they ....
are 0150
also nil"
high in PO.
PD. Tbex
These ftnd'np
fmdings $UU<>l
suggest ,that it
is to.
the _
combination
w,,"n
II ;,
....;0" of ondozrnou>
uncertainty and <ffo<ienl
efficient klearning
at tn.
the nut
next "'I!<
stage lIIOI
that ~
promote C<lm",lltnCI'
commitment via (JII1n<f
partner buyout.
UIl<ntlm'y
inl .,

""m

of cultwol
cultural di"lIl«
distance <nUnlllnl
emanating from work by
by Hofstede
They on:
are """'"
robust 10
to dlfl<r«l'
different measures of
Th<t'
flof._

""'''ora

(1980) l<Id
and Ronen
and S~
Shenkar (11ISj),
(1985). Di...Distance measures lI.inl
using flor..<do',
Hofstede's d'm<noK.ts
dimensions of
(19W)
~ __ ond
Uncertainty Avoidance
and Power Di>Ionc<
Distance .......
seem 10
to mOldy
mostly .,,,bln
explain ~
endogenous un«noillly,
uncertainty.
U""cn,,"'y
A ~ l<Id

,...,ion

country val....
values fur
for UA, 1"1'11'
Japan Ia
is _Ill<
among the W<I<!d',
world's most
uncertainty
Upon examination of _'1"
moo' ","".to''''Y
standard do:v\obonoobov<lh<
deviations above the _
mean;
1980: llS),
315).
avoidant cultures (
(about
..,,,<!>n,"ult
_ 1.5
l~ >WId..,.
: . .see
. , Hofstede,
flof....... 1980'
of
According
to ow
our lO>UI'<b
research f.odlnp.l_..
findings, Japanese flmll
firms IIliJb'
might ..
be uJIO<'O'l
expected "'","bd
to exhibit biJIII<"'I.
high levels of
_ i n l '"
anxiety wilh
with _respect '"
to bolh
both .........,.,.
endogenous u",,<1t&inty
uncertainty Ill<l
and "01<""'"
exogenous UDl>:I'I&IDIY
uncertainty. The",fOf<.
Therefore,
....I<ly

.,y

Japanese
will pi....
place 1"'_
greater intrin,",
intrinsic and .,trin,i<
extrinsic vol""""
value on malrllainina
maintaining 'ho
the equity
1
_ firms
n"", ..-111
collaboration. Indeed,
our nodi...
findings "'u<>'
suggest 'b"
that n"",
firms hlJII
high ",
in UA (.""h><li"ll
(including 'bos<
those from loplllj
Japan)
<oll'll><:o!lon,
In<l=;l. "'"

""'i,

are l«>
less likoly
likely to ocqui",
acquire their <»II_ion
collaboration partners
and kless
likely '"
to ~
dissolve
the partnership.
....
(JII1neB""
.. litol,
............
_tOIIip.
These findings
support ""'"'
those of
of tlut1)'
Hurry ..
et al,
al. (1992) ond
and C!>o<lI
Chang OM)
(1995) ..-ho
who rouoo
found lIIOI
that Japanese
Th<s<
nod,.p """"""
I..,......
firms ...",
were ......
more likely
than U.S.
firms '"
to main
retain 1!l<I'
their holilinp
holdings ill
in """:tu<ional
international joitll
joint "'""""..
ventures.
fimu
Iilld~ lhoo
u.s. f""",
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'0<
Using Koh,_',
Hofstede's d""""'.....
dimensions of Uncertainty
Power Distance
there ..
is
U"'"
Un=uo• .,. Avoidance _and """""
om.,." ,her<
potential to """I<
create ,a _
broad lratn<W<Jrir.
framework b)'
by wllkh
which fotur>
future ,tu<li<I
studies can examine parIO<'
partner bIl)'OUl
buyout

A Framework
Understanding Intentions of Foreign
Partners
r............. for U...........ndlnllnl<nUromp ""01.....
A~

pol,.....

,Ift . . onw><

Table 35 "'"
we 101:,,,<1
located
decisions In
in p2t1;o"I.,
particular, IlId
and _sequential
investment ...,..
more J<"""'Il~.
generally. In TabI<
<1«;'"""
...... in"""""",
countries bu<d
based ""
on only .....
two .measures:
and Power
Distance.
Since these
,ou"""'"
- . - . , Uncertainty
UIl«"o.io,~ Avoidance
Avoid>Ioo< aOO
Pow<, 0;.."
" " SI..........
measures .....
are specific
to 'ho:
the "",.n_
established r"",.
firm, IlId
and "'"
not ,I>;
the ~,,""""p
relationship ••,,"""'.
between ponn<n.
partners, "'"
we "'"
can
"",..um;
pod!l< to
of tendencies ,_om
toward pan..,
partner buyout.
firms """""iled
domiciled ..
in
develop 0""'"
a general framework
_lop
_ _ ofl<D<Imciu
b<>}'IlUC Since
SIn« fumo
France
and hp,....
Japan are high
in lloIh
both Uncertainty
Avoida.nce ond
and Power
Distance, "'"
we "I"""
expect ,1I<m
them to
to
_
Iftd
hilh in
UO«<1""'1 AY<>Kl""",
""""" [);'''''''.
buyout
their ponoe....
partners. Tho:...-.l
The second """"
most likely
group to
to o.y
buyout
partners
be ""'"
most IiW>'
likely '0
to Ooy
lie
WI oh<ir
iil«ly pt>o>p
"'" I'O'1JlC<>
of firms high
Uncertainty Avoidance ODd
and n>«lium
medium ;"
in Power
Germany, Italy,
consists offumo
""""""
mill in U"""mliOly
Pow<, Distance:
Di"OIl«: G«moo~,
PD 0IId
and UA (Au"'aIi..
(Australia,
and SwilUr!al>d.
Switzerland. Finally,
firms from rowuri..
countries tblIIor<
that are m«Iium
medium in Qoth
1<1II
Fonally. f"""
_ PO
Canada, Ill<
the U";!«l
United Kingdom,
or ""
the U11lu.l
United 5States)) ""'y
may ....
also dcll>Dll>"""
demonstrate 0a _notion fot
for partner
c-.
Kin,oom. ...
POOl''''''

""".lrin ....

'0'

buyouts, olthoulll
although to a leooe,
lesser "'l<nl.
extent. Established
firms founoth<t
from other countries are Iless Ijuly
likely to
to
bIlJ'O'l'"
Eol>bll
f"""

'0

their partners
either bee..,..
because 'he~
there i.....
is low PO''''
power <Ii
distance or """
low
exhibit a l<lIiOency
tendency to buyout
",hlhi"
buyOUllb<"
_ n .ilher
uncertainty avoidance.
U<><M&iIl<~,
~

Insert Table 5 about here

Of course, <>Il,ur>.I
cultural <Ii~
distance i,
is "'"
not <kpo<!«l
depicted ;0
in Tobie
Table ,.
5.
or""""".

According '0
to "'"
our ,..,....,,,..
theoretical
~"I

expectations,
even _i<I>N
established 'umo
firms 1"""
from .......
uncertainty
avoidance NJ,",...
cultures ""'y
may w'p1oy
display 0a t.<owI<ncy
tendency
..
~ .....
n.a;.'y.voidaIlo:<

_'ed

buyout
partners If
if Ihey
they ore
are CIlbonlly
culturally dl"""'distant. The <>po<tadoM
expectations presented 'n
in Tobie
Table ,5 OOn
can lie
be
to bIly
10
OIl' porl/I<fI
altered 'n
to n:lIecl
reflect <>I1,ur>.I
cultural dll1oncc.
distance. For
example, France
and J
Japan
are especially
oI'aed
Foo nampk.
~ ancl
_ .....
p.doll~ likely
Ilul~
candidates
for bill"'""
buyouts of u.s.
U.S. fW1lI<tO
partners bee
because lb<y
they ...
are hlp""
high on oIllhm:
all three <>IhuraJ
cultural ..
attributes:
......1
...... ,...
tribut<>:
be .._
extended
Power Distance,
Uncertainty Avoidance,
Cultural Distance.
The frameW<Jrir.
framework """
can he
I'<rwa
0;,,""', Un=umt~
A_OIl«, and ColturaJ
[);1lODC<. Tho
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to pann<BIIil'"
partnerships "'"
not involving
United St.........
States target ffirms.
example,
the _
tendency
'"
,.""'_... UIIil<d
....... For
For ..
ample.1b<
y for
f<or Japanese
J..,."...

""i"""

a lack of ,"I'ua1
cultural d,<UI><e.
distance.
firms 10
to acquire J..--I""'n<"
Japanese partners IN}'
may be
be muIOd
muted """"_
somewhat 00<__
because of .lock
firms
high cahLmll
cultural dimn<:c.
distance, t\rmo
firms fr<Jm
from Australia,
Canada, 'l><
the U.il«l
United
At the urn<
same 'im<,
time, b<auo<
because of hi&b
A'
A_I&. c.n.do.

<10"""",,,

Kingdom,
and the U..
United
States may
increased TeD<Ioo<:y
tendency ro<
for ""iwrinl
acquiring lJapanese
I(j~ oM
l«I S
y demonstrate an ia<:tu>ed
.........
_partners.
... We
W. bel"
believe that these propoojUOIIi
propositions are Y<r'f
very 1leIerv"'a
deserving of """"
more _attention in sample<
samples

,"0

involving "",'uple
multiple i~
industries _
and b'ltry
entry into m"l~p~
multiple """.........
countries.
'''''''''i.~
We 'hould
should ""'"
note ..
several
limitations ohlli<
of this ....
study.
Although '""
our ampIiq
sampiing tIltlbodoI"I)'
methodology was
W.
...-.lllmllo<iofto
dy. AIl"""&b
..
biotechnology ,........,..
industry, the oumt><t
number of pan
partner
comprehensive
for .....
nearly
the entire 1Ir<
life of the \IioIb<~
_l><."
.. f.,.
Y..........
..
buyout ...."
events i/o
is onIAU.
small. N
Nevertheless,
we ~
managed lO
to ....
attain
statistical ';11'1111<-'0
significance roofor 0Df
our koy
key
bu)'<MJI
_.....
i• .uti_
models coow,i..
containing nnn·l<..1_
firm-level and/or iodu$lry-l<..i
industry-level
variables """
and _il"y
stability """'"
across •a _
number
.........
, of _I>
joint -=r'
ventures >lid
and ";"""'1
minority
control .........
variables.
A larger umpIe
sample .........
would allow di_.-inn
disaggregation of l<""
«>nlt01
e<, A"""

.,tIdy _

"" •

equity """",BII,p<.
partnerships. 0...
Our study focused on a ""~
single ioduotl}'•
industry, ..-.:l
and oub-oe.sub-segments ""<!un
within 'Il>t
that
«/Oi'y

.Ie..,..

in<hlW)'.
_. f"'"",.-..dI
to
industry. Whilo
While ........,."......
these segments _are d;Wtl<lfrom
distinct from _
one another,
future research ,-Id
should attempt lO
verify
expected
relationships in ..
other
industries, 'nelooli.I"on<b
including both Roll)
R&D """",i..
intensive >nd
and ..,...,
more
....
ty the ••
J'<fi'd «1.Jonshipo
hot ,00:1.......

_
stable in<\wlri<>
industries.

oi"",

Parkhe (1'191)
(1991) "'UUU
suggests lb.
that formal ..
training 1'«'_
programs coo
can .n
enhance cultural
understanding
P&rl<l><
...".. "n<l=undinl

bet_.

oM
_ _ the relationship
_Ihlp between oulunl
global
and ....,
may moderate
cultural ..._
variables• .-l
and the d<>nok><l
duration of lk>ba!

of
alliances. n.,..
These "".If>llq
integrating "",,1wlJ.,.,
mechanisms ....
may
have ""
an iOlflO'U'l'
important I.n....,..
influence ""
on the 0:1""""
relative ,Me
rate of
.11-.
y .....

"'n«.

"*

learning i"
in join,
joint >'<nIJ>n:S
ventures .....'
versus
acquisition, oM
and hence, ""y
may p1.y
playa• role in
in the
the "")<1<11
buyout ol<cisioo.
decision.
l<Mniq
" ""iuWbocI.

tmJI'" _

.....,

of <ro>.-<UI,tnI
cross-cultural training programs, we oould
could
Unfortunately, ."""
since we
we locWl
lacked duo
data ""
on the
the ..
extent
Unroo"."dy,
1<0' of

_Ii<ai r..-._

not examine lb.........
this issue. _.~
However,.....
we l>ebo..
believe """
that ow
our theoretical framework off......
offers an '.I<n:.linl
interesting
.............

intta-ma """'.....

new
opportunity to...,......•
to ascertain ..,...
how integrating mechanisms
influence
relatively
"",. OW""un'OY
I>tns may ,
. n _ the ~
.. i.. iy

of.....-""-"

unexplored phenomena
""",,pl_
phe.......... of partner buyouts.
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Previous .,...",h
research ....
has <lemoo"'demonstrated 'hi<
that «>mponi<....
companies use r
collaborations
with
!'r<,i<Iu>
o I l _ when partnering
~"E wi<h
equity cull_lOll....y
collaborations may Iclkcl
reflect """"
some 1aIn<l<d
restricted
culturally d,,,...,
distant portll<'>partners. n-.
Thus, OIl'
our oonrrl<
sample of OIiO;ty
cuI'WlI!ly
cultural &"an«.
distance. Indeed,
means ",om
scores of
of <01'....
cultural di........,
distance _lipificu'lywh<a
varied significantly when ,,<
we
range of 'ol'unJ
'Onze
Ind«<l. """".

lnn>a<""".

of transactions iD..oh>iDE
involving both <qUlly
equity collabor>liolu
collaborations (0.601)
(0.64) 0Ild
and
examined a broader
sample of
........-I.
. oampIc

"ud,

of Ulioo.aI
national
outright ......
acquisitions
(.036). Thus.
Thus, ow
our ..
study,
and ..y
any study uamioiDE
examining the effect
O<IIrij><
iIitiono (.036).
'-'<!y. IDII
rr.c. 01
culture OIl
on parto<r
partner ""f'JUl
buyout will ",trer
suffer f"""
from ""'"
such •a bias. Thia
This will
tend "'
to weaken Lbo
the ........
results fur
for
cull...
iIIl<Dd

thou"'

have umpIod
sampled cull1nIly
culturally
cultural
distance. We
however, "'that even though we bo..
cul,..
aI ~
W have demonstrated,
_ . 110..._.
distant partners, power &
distance
acts '"
to IIlIld<fW.
moderate the patmU
partner buyou<
buyout ".dsiocl.
decision.
<Ilotau:
.. ao<:< acta
of lho
the iD.....,;",
investing f"'"
firm _and <olnlral
cultural
Overall, our
our ""'"
study suqcots
suggests """
that cultural
cultural alttibwol
attributes of
0vuaJI.

f""',

playa ,il";("''''
significant n>l<
role iol""di<tina
in predicting tb<
the ......
rate at
differences 11<1_0
between Lbo
the investing
target firms pl'y.
&ffcteac<,
ID.....,;~ and tatJ<l.
of
which _partner buyouts 0«Uf
occur. It
suggests
that f"""
firms fiho:l
find va!<>e
value io
in Ilc<ibili'y'"
flexibility in the _
presence
'O!licIl
U su
'" IIW
",

t..,..,...

_

.............
endogenous >IDC<I\aI'"Y.
uncertainty, IDII
and are quidel
quicker ,to exercise
dec when buyout ~
enhances the potential rate of
learning. The
The b)ll<llhe...
hypotheses <Io
developed
here and the ..,.
results we found off«
offer """"
some """"'
promising new
~
lop<ol 11<",
...
directions for fuourc
future <1J'4Iiri<aI
empirical .-ardl.
research.
dit<ctloas
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ENDNOTES
1, OIho::r
Other ••
evidence
of ........
partner bIl)'O'Q
buyouts ..,Iuo:\o
include Kopo
Kogut (19391
(1989), who
24.0 p«aDI
percent or
of
idenceof
110 found
fo<m<I that
tbal ~4.0
joint
ventures
were
acquired
by
a
partner
within
seven
years,
and
Mikkelson
and
Ruback
(1985),
P"'
ocquit<d b)" _
",1"'ln ••",," l"
Milli_ .....
(1985\,
who discovered ,hal
that lU
13.6 p<t='O
percent ofllrrno
of firms having
initiated mincooil)'
minority investments
either a<qul,..,.
acquired
wllo
tIa",,& m;uotoO
"'. <Me<
or .".,"p<c<IlO
attempted to aoquiI<
acquire lb<..
their _partner ...
within three years oftokilll
of taking ..
an b>ilIt!
initial equity
stake.
or
~~ ......

"<fl'""" """"
<I,""',.,..,.
,Ihi" ...... ,.....
We on:""
are not ...
without
precedent In.
in ddlrlio.lb<
defining the 0<0lI"
scope of
of IhiI
this _""b
research II>
to _encompass bo<h
both joim
joint
, W.
i""". pr«>«Ieno

_p"". . . .

2

ventures and ..
minority
investments ("I-,
(e.g., ""n"..,
Hennart, 1991,
1991; Pi......
Pisano, 1989)•
1989).
..n'u...
oonl)' In............

Williamson (19lS).
(1985), Ill<
the ownership advantage of Ill<
the f"'"
firm 0UIlI..
results I"""
from I....
its superior
•3 For
IU Wilham"'"
pmo,
mechanisms
for
coping
with
opportunism.
.
mochao:Wmo lor ""Pi"& wi'" _ ; ; 0 ,.
Although H.,Is,,,dd......
Hofstede is largely
famous for bi.
his 1980 19~
IBM ...;oruJ
national ""1,..,,
culture """Y,
study, he
and ~his
•4 """"",h
11 r..,...,
he .....
..
colleagues 1_
later I............,..
found several IifIQ
links ...........
between oWonal
national ",,11=
culture _
and ~
organizational ""1m",,
culture
001"""'"
(Hofstede, 1991; II~
Hofstede, ~.()hayv,.t
Neuijen, Ohayv, & S
Sanders,
1990). In ponicIIIM,
particular, ....
the "'l""i...
organizational
(1101-'
- " 19'1O).
i<InaI
culture dimen.""'.
dimensions of _fOT
needfor --...
authority .....
and 'Offdjo,
needfor ",",~riry
security ~
correlated 0It0flI;ly
strongly ""II".,...,
with power
<01,,"<
and
uncertainty
avoidance,
respectively.
Therefore,
we
restrict
our
analysis
only
distance
Ji"",.u .......c."",w,...-..-, r<>p<al.-.l~, "Tbcr<lor<, "" _ "'" -'yo;. ,,,to 0111,

_
, di>I-o<
- . _- ,oJ'..-.I
_national
_ .....
power
distance and ~
uncertainty •.
avoidance
cultural d",-",-lhII
dimensions that """"""
capture both
and
organizational
traits.
"'Caniuliofto! ..-a;...
are "",,,loJ
grateful to •a ,..;"wcr.....,
reviewer who "nplwi«<!
emphasized lhII
that ""1,,.,01
cultural ditr-..
distance "'"
and uncertainty
,5 We
W• ...,
avoidance are not oqu
equated 10
to "
endogenous
uncertainty.
Indeed,
they
are
merely
constructs <Iw
that
" : d""""""nl1. u-.Ib<y'" O><Jdjr""'h''''''
contribute to <tldoF
endogenous _
uncertainty.
As poi.1«!
pointed "'"
out ""
on pages
6-7, endogenous
uncertainty
may
y.....
_ . 6--7,,,
"s "'"~ unu.....
'1 ""y
be
represented
by
many
factors.
t>o.."....nr<d
y (I<I<JR,

.""""'0<)

''''''''IIn«''' ..,.
,,,,,tri_"'

ma, _

partner may hold the opti<>o
option '"
to oo:qor""
acquire "'"
the 1<"nI
joint ..
venture.
Who io
is ""'"'
most likely
to
•6 Either
Ehho, pan
,ZIt..". Wbo
IIUly "'
exercise \bo
the opti<>o
option "'
in the case ofj<>iol
of joint ventures ""'"
turns ....
not on1,
only <Ill
on tht.
the _p:
strategic _
intentions
the
.....',.
..... of "'"
partners,
but
the
relative
competitive
strengths
of
the
partners--the
partner
possessing
unique
ponnt<S. bur lbo .. Iat!v< oompooiti.. _
ofu.. pwta<tS-..... _
roe"". uoOq'"
complementary .._
resources !>ol<l&
being tho
the IDln
more IikeI)"
likely 10
to ""'lU""
acquire the _
weaker
partner's stat.
stake (H...-ry,
(Hurry,
«lftlpIem<nIM}'
_ ,.....,.,'.
1993). Integrated
firms I........
investing
in _bro"w
biotechnology 1>0..
have <!o"<nI>IRam
downstream olill>
skills In
in .....uti••
marketing _and
InlOpe<l1'im>o
S I.
distribution, .......
and regulatory
savvy (Ann'"
(Arora & aur--d<lI.,
Gambardella, 1990~
1990). Although
dedicated
c1i",,"buoo..,
~ .....,.
Ahh<lu:t> dodi<aIo<I
biotechnology
firms
(DBFs)
have
important
R&D
capabilities,
they
frequently
the "....
cash
_MoloeY r""" (OIlFo) tIa..
oopaljll'.... Ihcy~, lack
lid ....
needed
to In
invest in o<'qI1iolti<w..
acquisitions. """""",-,.Furthermore, most InlOp-aled
integrated manufacturers
pharmaceuticals,
_
10
-...J'""""", of ~
......
chemicals,
and
agt'"iculture
have
a
major
goal
of
acquiring
technical
knowledge
in
biotechnology,
dl""""01
cri<W.... III... mojo< """ of ""1"kMl "",h""," u-Ie<!i" 10
while only a llahdflrl
handful of
ofDBF's
aspire '0
to beoQ<n<
become foil,
fully l'lOp-ll«l
integrated (0f1l<,t
(Office orT..._"",
of Technology
...hl'"
IJIlP• ..ptr.
In
our
sample
we
found
that
six
joint
ventures
were
acquired b)'
by Ibo
the
Assessment,
1991).
...."'.......",. 1991). In .... ~ ,.. (""nd "'"' 01, po, .."'............ ~
integrated
partner
and
six
joint
ventures
that
were
acquired
by
the
DBF.
Our
focus
on
the
in"p«l panoo' aDd "'Po< - . . <Iw
""lwrcd
Ibo OIiF. 0... focuo "" the
established I"",
firm ..
as Ibo
the lo<llo5a
holder alJo
also .....
rests ""
on our lb«n,;.,..
theoretical _
interest
understanding ",to:-n
when firm<
firms
....,.lo./l<Id
I I in
I~
are """"
more IIUly
likely '0
to _commit ""
to iOlOfl<01i";"1
internalizing _ioal
technical '""'''kdF-1O
knowledge to oapiuoll..
capitalize ""
on rnltI'Jio~
emerging
ar<
technologies,
and
not
downstream
skills.
1DCIlooloc~ aDd "'" - . . - ailb.
Although tho
the ....
rate or
of ""'1"1_
acquisition (6,9
(6.9 percent)
appears _
somewhat
below t1l<S
rates
,7 .....<!Ioogb
p<:f<:eII') by lyear
" "three
' ' - "W"'"
' " " be"""
found ,n
in studies noted <>a
on I'"&"
page )3,....
to oWe.make our ....
rate «rmpanbl<
comparable we must 01>0
also ...
include
acquisitions
(""nd
Iud< ....
uioitlom
by 'ho
the our
DBF pan....partner ......."""
and allow lor.'for a three )'0""
year window for
the
event
to
take
place.
In
making
that
roo- 'ho " , <aU pl-. III
tbal
adjustment ..."
we find I/UI
that 1
10.0
of tbo
the \(,...
total sam~1c:
sample (1•.8
(14.8 """","'
percent or
of joior
joint ..
ventures
and 8.9
odiu"'""'"
0percent
. 0 _ or
",.res 1D<l1,9
percent
of
minority
investments)
was
terminated
by
acquisition
by
one
of
the
partners
within
36
PO"""'" or
D r _ ) ..... lO","""led by ..... ;.i';.,., by.",. of .... po<tII<n w,1!wI 'lI>

i_, "''''''

'""""'h»oIosl-,

""'y.

"lid'".-

maki.,

"'''''''''y

30

-"0.
, _.
months. Thio,
This, .......
then, I.
is «IflS~
consistent w;ll:ll""y.....
with previous ,
studies.
•8 Tho
_
UIi.... onl<r
The CoIl
Cox _method "~mly
uses only ;n_
information
about the relative
order of
of do_
duration lilD<l.
times, _ail
instead of
the ex.,.
exact liminJ
timing of events. 11<""".....
Hence, the Cox """"""
method in
involves
some .....
loss aI
of ilIf"...,...;"n.
information,
Ill<
_..,.,...
potentially
inhibiting
model
estimation.
This
same
feature
makes
the
Cox
model an attractive
~laIIy ilIhiblhn. mo<l<I atill>llioo.. n,;"..",. f<a<ur< """'''' Ill< C<n mod<!
.-;'"
one ...when _one hal
has ""
no "'''''""''~
prior expectations _about "
time
dependence.
Another reason to -"'"
question U.
the
_
- 01..
••• .-.-....-....validity
of
the
Cox
partial
likelihood
model
for
our
data
is
that
our
number
of
events
is
relatively
YoI01ily or.... C<n poniaIlikelihoo<l
b "'" <\au.;' """ ••1< oon'lb<o'
i' «I"".... ly

<V«ll'.

_J

.rr.:.......

few. AhtIou&fI
Although poniol
partial lil:<lihoocI
likelihood mo<l<I.
models Of<
are "'1".........
asymptotically
the wop&<:
sample ,;..,
size is
lew.
oIIy efficient when
110o "'"
i.
large
(Efron,
1977),
when
the
sample
size
is
small,
the
precision
of
the
partial
likelihood
loIF (EIfoo, 1971),
.......,.. 01.. I• .-n. 11.. ~ of"" ponlollil:<lihoo<l
estimates can be """'b
much less ,than that 1«
for muimn:a
maximum likelihood
estimates
(Coleman, 1'181).
1981). We
""'"'Ijk<li_
_ (Cokmoo
....mM
I tN,,,..
m likdibootL
_ _ teqUft
estimated a _second tJIOtld
model _
using
maximum
likelihood. Iobxtmlllll.
Maximum til:<1ibooil
likelihood methods
require
.ptrif
im aI.
pmeIllioi op<ciIIcaoi...
specification
of a NKlint
baseline bozar<l
hazard tl",,';oll.
function. We _chose the exponential
specification bo<aoo<
because it is
the potam<Irit:
parametric ",.,;..Jon,
equivalent to the Cox _
method.
The results from _
that ..
estimation
produced a
....
. Tho
1lmauoIl produced.
identical to _those found oi.....
via the Cox ""lowim
estimation, willllo1ifl"'~
with slightly ....
less
pattern of _relations iclalIialI,o
polI«D
<iplf>c--..
significance. Tbis
This auppl<mtntol
supplemental anaIyaiI
analysis provided e.HieD«
evidence bfor ....
the _
robustness of ""'-WI<
the results
reported ill
in lIIi.
this P"I'O'.
paper.
,.,.,.....

'0 ....

also .._
examined'....
the effect
of industry structure using number
active ill"",,,
in each or
of
•9 We ....,
fI.., ofindwlty""""..........
_ o lof
t rivals
l••• octi",
the
123
product
areas
for
each
year
throughout
the
publication
of
Bioscan
(1987-1995).
We
did
.... Il) ~
fOl""h,...~tIlep<Jbl_ ofB;.,oc.. (I'iIP-IWS), W.1b:I
"'"
ari>ble in ....
...."'" ....,....
_. . inIpo<l
not _include this variable
the rotmoI
formal _presentation
because is
it hIoIllO
had no .
substantive
impact ""
on ....
the
model,
and
there
was
substantial
coIinearity
with
other
variables
in
the
model
(R&D
Expense
and
_
Ibo« WllI ... b<tadclol «>IitIeotity
In .... rno<Iel (R.t.D E._ ond
Subfield Vol..,).
Value).
Sobrodd

W;'" ""'" . _

We 01.........
also examined
dissolution w..
was influenced
an """"""ioo
interaction bel_
between ...
cultural
..10 w.
<>ed whether
... hethet dioooluolon
infl....:<d by ..
11UnlI
distance
and
power
distance,
and
uncertainty
avoidance
and
power
distance.
Log
likelihood
ratio
tli..-.. _ _ di..-.:..... t.Ol<'<fI.Ol'"1 ~ ond I"""<" distlllCe. lo& ,,1:<11_ raIlo
tests indicated no >u<!I
such ......roo..
interaction ...
existed.
~

-.Iowl-=-

Weber, Shenkar, &Ill!
and Ito
Raveh (1?96)
(1996) ....
also o>«l
used 01'.......
distance _measures
for Hofstede's ilotli.idual
individual
"II W."...Sbeobt.
.... forHot.-·,
culture
attributes,
but
focused
on
the
impact
on
mergers
and
acquisition,
not
partner
buyouts.
......_ .. ~ ""' I"",*"
i _ "" """F"' ood ""'IU""ioo, "'" _
1>01""1&.
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Table 1: Cultural Measures and Outcomes of Equity Collaborations by Country of Corporate Headquarters

_., .
-'....
,
.
...
,
....
-0" .... ,-,...., ,-,,,- ,-,...., ........,,
....
,
....
,
-- ...., ....,

Outcomes of Equity
Collaborations
00_"
r.ot'1 ColIoko
1_

Cultural M_...
Measures
CloI'....

.--

Actual (Percent)
A"••,I..........'

Country

UA

Australia

I Denmark

'-

•"
"
"
•"
50

Norway

,,-

29

Sweden

58

Switzerland

United K.......
Kingdom
l!IIiIod
United """,
States
l!oiood

,Total

Anglo

0(0%)

1 (50%

1 (50%)

0(0%)

1.745
ue

Nordic

1 (50%)

1 (50%)

0(0%)

0(0%)

1.617
1,617

Latin Europe

2 (40%)
2(_)

o (0%)

0(0%)

3 (60%)
J(~)

35

0.630
OUJ

Germanic
~

0(0%)

0(0%)

2 (28.6%)
2(2U~)

5 (71.4%)
1(71-"")

28

~"

50

92

"~

0.138

68

75

Japan

0(0%)

18

35

~,
Italy

0(0%)

39

65

Ireland
.~

0(0%)
0(0lI0)

,"
•"
"
•"

86

Germany
"
-

1 (100ll0)
(100%)

36

23

France

Anglo

51

48

Canada

35

46

I

0.026

I

0.530

0.650
O~

54

3.104
1.1'"

31

,~,

31

,~.
1.859

34

0.528

35

0.083

40

0.000

"
"
" .,.
" .00
•" =
1.667

Partnership
_ip
Dissolution

Buyout
~

'-'

--........ ....,

I

...., ....,

Anglo
Mob

1(
(50%)
I
_}

I (50%)
)
(-)

0(0%)
0(0lI0)

o0(0%)
10lI0)

Latin Europe

(50.0%)
I1 (10K)

0(0%)

0(0%)

1IDOK)
(50.0%)

~-

Far East

3 (13.6%)
J(llMo)

3 (13.6%)
J(Il.K)

1I (',K)
(4.6%)

15 (61,2")
(68.2%)
)j

Nordic

o0(0%)
(O"l;)

I (IOOllo)
(100%)

0(0%)
O(O"l;)

0(0%)
O(OlIo}

Nordic

1 (12.5%)
'l':U")

2 (25.0%)
2~_1

1 (1:U")
(12.5%)

4 (50.0%)
'(~l

~-

Germanic

3 (17.7%)
](11.1")

1 (5....)
(5.8%)

3 (17.2%)
J(17.30)

10 (58.8%)
10(~)

Anglo

0(0%)

(7.1 %)
I1 n.l"l

0(0%)
0("')

13 (92.9%)
1ll'2.")

Anglo

10(11.1%)
'OOU")

28 (ll.l")
(31.1%)
21

13 (l~"")
(14.5%)
IJ

23 (11",
(13%)
2J

39 (23%)
~(2J"1

21 (11")
(12%)
11
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_
..po
Partnerships
Maintained
M';""'"""

Partner
Buyout

"

"•
•"
"
"
"

3rd Party
,,~

Ronen's
Cultural
001.....
Category

PD
~

Hofstede's
IW......••
Cult.
~.
Distance
~

39
)II

(43.3%)
(UJ")

90 (52%)
!lO(12")

Total

,~,

,
,
,
,
,
,
,
n
,
•
1

2

2

••

# of
Establish
-~
-ed Firms

~-

,
,
,
,
1

1

2

7

,

2

1

5

2

2

,

14

,
",
,•
,

90

34

2

22
1

8

17

"
•"
'"
173

2

17
1

4

3
3

"
"

73

1.

U-....,.,,~
Uncertainty
Avoidance

••2.3.

Hofstede's
Cultural DOnano:•
Distance
Hof_',Oolh...l

Table 1:
2: Descriptive
Statistics ....
and CGo
Correlation
Matrix8
Tobio
Doo<rIptho. SIoII>tIa
I iI.IiOil MauU'

Mean
53.143
'l.I'l

-..

S.D
18.157
11.1$1

0.632
;

,~

0.343
O}Ol

0.475
0.'"

01lJ)
0.653 ,* o,m·
0.795 *

40.804
~~

8.141
1.1<1

0.823 '* 0--''''·
0.572 * 0.261'
0.268 *
0.123

"

I

1

•
2

•
3

, •

•
4

5

6

_Ill"...,.
UA*PD
U,,'
PO

6.

Hofstede's
CD * PD
lIofitod<',CD'PO

30.817
1lI.lil

57.567
J7.l61

.~.

;7.

Ronen's
CD * PD
~',CD'PO

15.023
IJ.dI]

22.129
IBN

~.
0.807 * o.m
0.876 *'
* ~
0.879 * 0.940
0.568 * UIIl'
0.835 '* om'
O.tll

8.

Exogenous U"""""iy
Uncertainty

0.3191
D.J191

9.

Subfield Value

,~

4.

5.

Power Distance

•
•, 5F· _•V....

_v_

_
U-t>
10. Subfield
R&D EoI'<"'"
Expense

'"".

•
8

2290.158
2:!\1O
I~ 1283.659
12I1.6J9

10

11

'" "

0.794 '* IU1J·
0.573 * 0.9\1'
0.918 *
0.964 '* 0,19<

.

0.869 * 0.971'
0.893 '*
0.977 * 0.721'
0.728 * 0.11
0.711I '* 0.191

.
.

.

5.736

""
'M

-0.035 '* -0.006
m
.!.OJ'

41.423
'I.m

11.846
IL~

0.201 *' anS2'
0.135
0.188 * D.:llli
0.052 * nil)'
0.133 * 0.'''-;
0.186 *, .~.
0.205 * D.I(Il'
0.107 * 0.321'
0.328 *
O.
IJS *' D.'U'

-0.004
.~

1.095

0.050 '* o.o:so
0.050 *' 0.099 * .~
0.026 * 0.0'52
0.052 '* .~.
0.056 * D.IOlI
0.106 *' .~.
0.098 *
O.tllll

._.
•m·

~.
-0.027 * -0.029
* -<1m
-0.014
-<1m)'
•

-0.013
-<Inn

0.103

._.

-lIml'*
'00'
-lim, • -<l, lOll •

11. 1Target's
Partners
....•••# of ..........

3.118
l.111

~.
-0.128 * -0.112'
-0.112 * -O.ln'
-0.173 * -0.086 * -0.003
* -0.111'
-0.177 * -0.040 * -<l.I2I'
1.625 -0.030
'ill

12. Joint Venture

0.170
0.110

0.375

"

09

1.078 I 0.1116
0.786 '*

••
•
••

Ronen's
Cultural 0.""",,
Distance
R""",',Oolbmol

;7

""

-0.021

.

.~.
-0.076 *

0.053 '* O.Im'
0.058 * o.lIJ9
0.039 *' 0.07]
0.073 ,* -0.035 * -0.109 * -0.084
* O.lt\oO
0.164 •*
~.
0.067 *' omJ'
0.035 * D.011
0.072 '* O.0'5l
O.Ol\l

*, "
Pearson
correlations are ~pir
significant
at p.
p < 0llS.
0.05.
- - ..,.,.1"",",,,,
.....

_"'"PO

Correlations ...
are calculated
using pooIod
pooled """.-tionaI
cross-sectional ...
and ,time-series
data """"",Ill
covering 173 """ily
equity partnerships on<!
and 9.BOl
9,843 __one-month
periods.
,a C<Jmlot_
. 1 _ .....
..... ...no. d'"
" ,..-.
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Table 3:
Partial Uk.n_
Likelihood E<lIma...
Estimates ,..-II.ur<!
for Hazard 01
of ""......
Partner Buyout
and Pa,rtnership
Dissolution
Tablt
J: ""nlal
Buy",,' .nd
Portn<nlllfl . .....
Variable
Name
V.....bl<N.11_..,
,,-.
Uncertainty Avoidance
Hofstede s OIt.1nl
Cultural ou.-.
Distance
Hoi......',

,

(1)
-0.0278
.....ClllI
(MI97)'
(0.0197l

,

(2)
-0.0338
-(I.OHI
(0.0356)
(0.Ql56)

Power Distance

-~
IIA
• PI:>
UA*PD
Hofstede's CD * PD
H",_',m'PO

'"

"m

0.1899
(0.2100)
(0.1100)

I

Ronen's Cultural Distance
R....·.c.I1"'..
~

Partnership Acquisition
P'~"'"I(4)
(3)

_.
.- ."",
....,
-0.0660
(0.0420)

.~""

-0.0996*
(0.0392)

.~,

-0.0262
(0.0246)

•.-

,

(5)

__,.101
vo"""
Subfield Value
Subfield R&D Expense
_RADE>._
Target Firm's # of Partners

T.... _ · . ' ' ' ' _
Joint Venture
Joio<V_.
.

-2.0209
·1.(1209
(2.2834)
(7.213-1)
-0.0581
(0.1951)
(O.1~ll)
.~,

-0.0131
--11.0111
(0.0165)
(O--011il1
-0.4819**
-0.4119"

-2.3513
·l.lJlJ
(2.2945)
(2.1"')

-0.0775
--/lU",
(0.2020)

-0.0612
-o.Ofill
(0.1962)
(0.1'161:)
.(1.01<)
-0.0143

.="
-0.0217
(0.0174)
(Mn.)

.- """'._,"

"'",,,

-0.3797*
~m'

(0.1627)

(0.1678)
(lI.I&'7t)

0.6862
(0.5065)
(0-'06.'1)

0.6543
(0.5057)

-324.72***
_Jlli
m··· ·ll412"·
-326.70***
Log-likelihood
Ratio
.I;kolil»od biD
Standard ................
error in parentheses
•a $1-.1
1><..,
t p<O.IO;
*
p<0.05;
**
p<O.OI; *** ,<0001
p<O.OOI
p<ClIO:' p<om," p<OJlI;'"
• Oooe-Wlod
One-tailed ,.....
t-test to<
for h,~
hypothesized rei"""
relations

. . . ,lA··
"'''''''
(0.0170)

-0.4524**
(0.1659)
(O.l6l9J

0.6992
0.6Il'Jl
(0.4355)
(O.om)

.,,,,,

-0.0510*
--ll.ll'lO'

-0.0215
--/I.02ll
(0.0210)

(0.0254)

0.6032
(0.5020)

(8)

(9)

•

(0)

-2.7992*
·l.7991·
(1.5773)
(1.'l7J)
-0.0902**
-O.O'JOl"

.~.
-0.8394*

.-,

(0.4066)
(O.~)
-0.0315
--ll.OIll

(0.0195
((I.om

(0.0306)

0.0219t.
nml9t.
(0.0136)
(O-O"Ii)

-1.8959
.1.m9

-2.3481
·l.).I81
(2.2896)

0-'
=.

(2.3054)

,~,

0.0903**.
1l.090J··'
(0.0388)
(O.OOU)
-1.8051
2.6796t
·I.el
l.1i79li1
(2.2970)
(1.5885)
(21971l)
(I-'IIJ)

. _.

3.2658*
l,26.I1·
(1.6409)
(1./ioI09)
0.2183
0.71lJ
(0.1638)
(O.I6J.I)

,=

2.5622
(1.5882)
(I.JW)

(0.1954)
(0.19101)

-0.1045
.(I,I04l
(0.1988)
(o.,'ItI)

-0.0175

~,
-0.0154

-0.0220
om.

(0.0168)
(MIIit)

(0.0174)
(0-011')

~,.
0.0148
(0.0164)
(OJllIiolJ

0.2007
0,2IlO1
(0.1631)
«I.16JI)
0.0140
MI.s(I
(0.0162)
(OJI11il)

(0.1632)
10.16»)

-0.4567**
-<1..
561"
(0.1637)
(O.16Jl)

-0.3884*
(0.1622)
(O.1/i7l)

-0.4584***
-lJ.OS$l"·
(0..1291)
(0.1291)

-0.4982***
(0.1303)
(O-l)(ll)

-0.4851 *** -0.4775***
--11.0.,1'"
-lJ..
(0.1289)
(0.1310)
(0-1)10)

0.6359
(0.5008)

"~
(0.4986)
(0._)

0.1343
0-IlO3
(0.4955)
«l,ffll)

0.0792
(0.4911)
(0"911)

0.0966
(0.4917)
(O.-Om)

327.52***
llUl'"

328.21***
37111'"

327.20***
37J2ll""

-0.0736

~'"
(0.0172)
(lIJUnl
-0.4213**
.o..slil"

0.6449

....,
0.6671
O.6liIl

(0.4954)

-326.98*** ·llHIi·"
-325.86*** ·ll.ll.···
-325.14*** _Jl:l91·"
-322.93***
·126.'/1'·'
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0.1934
0.193-1
(0.1637)
(o.lliJ1l

3.1736
1.17JIi
(1.6273)
(I,lil'll)

-0.0666)
--/I,0W>6)
(0.1976)
(0.'976)

.""" .-,
.~,

::iE'" •
-0.2919
--/1.29'9
(0.1823)
(aIm)

0.0012*.
0.0012'
•
(0.0006)

-1.8379
_1.1179
(2.2631)
(l.7li.J1)

"

(7)
-0.0179t
-001791
(0.0102)
(0.0102)

-0.7904
(0.6699)
(0_)

_·,m·PO
Ronen's CD * PD
Exogenous Uncertainty
E>._II~

Partnership Dissolution
-,~

(6)

~

...

0.0151
0-01'1
(0.0164)
(O-Olliol)

0.2045
0201'
(0.1634)
(011iW)
0.0124
Oflll-<
(0.0162)
(O-Ol/il)

n,"·

- - .-,
.'~
0.1550
O.UlCI
(0.4976)

328.52***
311.l2"·

Table 4: Partial
Hazard oU..........
of Partner Buyout
T.bI<4:
P.rtlo! Likelihood
Uk<IIbood Estimates
E.l1....... for
r.... IIOJM<1
BU1"'"
(2)
(11

(1)
(1)
-0.4271
.(I,4m
(0.6234t
(0,6;o.ol'

~

I

n

a

l

I

l

C

v_H
_
Variable
Name
__
Cultural Distance - Partner
Differences ill
in PI)
PD
aolootoIlJoio<-.
Cultural Distance -_ r......'
Partner
Differences in UA
DiI'ferooon
UA
CoIn.nI DioloIu _ _
Cultural Distance - Partner
Differences ill
in Jodi......"
Individuality

Diff..-..

(3)

-1.3022
_I.JOl2
-0.1099
-4,10'19
(0.8065)
«I,IOi\S)

DiIf_.

<-

-0.4084
(0.3592)
(03m)

.

.

-

.

u

o

IoI-.I;,,;,y
__
Cultural Distance - Partner

~

-,

-0.5841
(0.5007)
(O~)

Cultural Distance - Partner
Differences
in Masculinity
.. ill
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Standard
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Table 5: C....nl....
Countries IooSornplo:
in Sample Lo<ololl
Located bl
by Power
Uncertainty Avoidance*
T.bl<S:
Pow... Distance
DIolo.... and
ODIIl1..-....,
A. $' H:'"
Low Power Distance

High Uncertainty Avoidance

AustraUa
Canada

Medium Uncertainty
Avoidance

Unite~ Kingdom

Ireland
Norway

United States

Denmark
Sweden

Low Uncertainty Avoidance

* The darker the background the more likely firms from these countries are to buyout their partners..
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